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 This dissertation investigates the experience of Muslim identity in the United States. It 
explores the various encounters between Muslim life and American forms. It pays 
particular attention to the processes of cultural settlement of Muslims and their post-9/11 
citizenship practices. Arguing that there has been a growing disjuncture between the 
nation and the state since 9/11, I ask how Muslims respond to this disjuncture which 
threatens to leave them outside the definition of the nation while still remaining inside the 
state. How do they remake boundaries so as to include themselves in the nation? 
Focusing on the relationship between religious identity and cultural citizenship, my 
multi-site ethnographic research explores various boundary works: the process of 
boundary-crossing where Islam is translated into another language, culture and even 
geography and the process of boundary-shifting where Muslim demand for recognition 
takes the form of multiple citizenship practices such as civil rights advocacy, interfaith 
activism and Muslim ethnic comedy. My dissertation also explores the ways in which 






Introduction: Muslim Life and American Forms 
 
 
Imagine that you are reading today’s New York Times. As you begin to turn the 
pages, you notice that a great many of the stories have to do with Islam or Muslims. The 
reason Muslims get so much coverage these days is obvious. What is not immediately 
apparent, however, is that there are in fact two kinds of stories. The first has to do with 
Muslims overseas, who enter the American public’s imagination in the context of war 
and terror, or to use the official nomenclature, “the war on terror.” This type of news has 
recently come to dominate the pages of the Times. Totally unknown places like Sadr City, 
Basra, Falluja and Kabul are now part of everyday American consciousness. In these 
stories Muslims appear as enemies, as troublemakers, or at best as friendly natives. These 
international news stories deal with Muslims and Islam in their externality to American 
culture and geography.  
You also come across stories belonging to a new genre of news about Muslims. 
These articles, still rather infrequent in comparison with the first type, are of an entirely 
different quality: they are stories about Muslims in America. The Muslims in these pieces 
appear either as suspects of terrorism (which puts them back into the first category of 
news) or⎯ more often⎯ as victims of the violation of rights. This second group of 
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Muslims is generally represented as next-door neighbors or decent Americans, people 
who are struggling for their civil rights and are in need of empathy, understanding and 
respect.  
In 2006, the New York Times assigned its first-ever correspondent for American 
Muslim affairs. The correspondent, Neil MacFarquhar, a veteran foreign correspondent 
reporting on the Muslim world, moved from Cairo to San Francisco to begin covering the 
affairs of domestic Muslims (National Public Radio, 04/13/2006). Then in 2007 Andrea 
Elliott, another Times reporter, won a Pulitzer Prize for her three-part series of articles, 
“An Imam in America.” Published in March 2006, the articles in the series each covered 
more than two pages of the paper and were enthusiastically welcomed by the Muslim 
community. The New York Times itself reported that the series received wide acclaim 
both inside and outside the Muslim community (NYT, 04/17/2007).  
The curiosity about Muslims in the United States is not limited to the pages of the 
New York Times. It is shared by neighbors and co-workers, as well as by the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security. This interest is a mixture of fear and fascination. For 
a whole range of reasons, people wonder what it is like to be Muslim in America. The 
events of September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11) had a deep impact on American society, 
but a deeper one on Muslims living within it. Once practically invisible, they suddenly 
found themselves overexposed. Muslim membership in American society became more 
complicated. Are they terrorists? If they are decent citizens, how do they live their lives 
since 9/11? Today such questions are constantly asked, explicitly or implicitly, in 
everyday encounters, in policy circles, and in government agencies. In this dissertation, I 
ask similar questions as I explore the experience of being Muslim in America, both 
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before and after 9/11. And since 9/11 has imposed itself on public discourse as the 
threshold of a new era, let me also start with the impact of this turning point in our recent 
history.  
 
The Shrinkage of Nation: 9/11 As Neurosis 
The impact of 9/11 on the American psyche has been described as a “cultural 
trauma” (Smelser 2004: 265, Alexander 2004). In a pioneering study, Kai Erikson 
approached the collective experience of trauma as a form of shock with “a gradual 
realization that the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that 
an important part of the self has disappeared” (Erikson 1976: 153). I prefer to use 
collective neurosis instead of cultural or collective trauma, because it better expresses the 
alienation from a part of the social body. Neurosis is a state “in which the boundary 
between the ego and the external world become uncertain or in which they are actually 
drawn incorrectly. There are cases in which parts of a person’s own body…appear alien 
to him and as not belonging to his ego.” (Freud 1961: 13). The collective neurosis 
triggered by the traumatic events of 9/11 resulted in the release of collective psychosocial 
energies—patriotism and a resurgent nativism. It was expressed through a new emphasis 
on flags, the English language, and border security. The nation’s borders, both internal 
and external, were re-deployed: they were “tightened” and “hardened.” An overall sense 
of Durkheimian collective effervescence gave rise to nationalism in general and 




This heightened sense of “one nation under threat,” reinforced in the ensuing 
years by government policies (Howell and Shryock 2003), created a disjuncture between 
the state and the nation⎯ or to put it differently, a withdrawal from demos to ethnos 
(Balibar 2004: 9, Habermas 1998: 129). A nation that was, at least theoretically, divided 
into citizens with equal rights and responsibilities was gradually transformed into a nation 
that was united (“united we stand”). Certain distinctions between the public and private 
spheres evaporated. Even the resistance to erosions of civil rights had to be formulated in 
the language of patriotism, as attested by the common bumper sticker: “Dissent is 
patriotic!” 
Once the assumed congruence between nation and state was lost, a shrinking 
nation left behind an abandoned space that was inside the state and yet outside the nation. 
Rules and regulations that had been directed outward—and from which the nation’s 
interior had been mostly exempt—now entered the domestic space. As a result, 
instruments of security once part of the exterior of the state were turned inwards. Post-
9/11 America witnessed the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Patriot Acts, and the merging of agencies of domestic and foreign intelligence. Spying 
became internal surveillance, defense became security, kidnapping became detention, and 
arbitrary acts became “executive decisions” beyond the reach of law, justified by such 
terms as “security risk” or “national security.” The state was cleansed of those outside the 
nation by means of denationalization, deportation, and rendition. The interests of the 
nation took priority over the law of the state. What happened was, in the words of 
Hannah Arendt, “the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an 
instrument of the nation [...]; the nation had conquered the state.” (Arendt 1973: 275). 
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Some people, even if they had full legal citizenship, suddenly came to be seen as 
cultural aliens. In short, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 created a new situation where 
Muslims who were inside the state now found themselves outside the nation. At the 
height of the panic, as the disjuncture between the state and the nation started to grow, 
many Muslims who were citizens or residents considered changing their names, and 
some of them did, as a way of smuggling themselves back into the nation. They wanted 
to avoid becoming victims of the nation’s wrath (e.g., discrimination in employment). 
Muslims⎯ who were still protected by the state and its legal structures⎯ no longer felt 
themselves protected by the nation and its public sentiment. This loss of membership in 
the nation is crucial for understanding what it means to be a Muslim citizen of the United 
States after 9/11. 
The impact of 9/11 on the surface of American society is in effect an ethno-quake. 
This tectonic shock to the social landscape produced a crack which left Muslims as a 
group exposed. The status of Muslims suddenly changed from invisible strangers to 
highly visible strangers.  
So where should one begin an investigation aimed at understanding the 
experience of being Muslim in America? I believe a good place to start is the airport. 
Muslim identity entered the American public imagination⎯ forcibly⎯ through airplanes 
and airports. Since then airports have become an interface between Muslim lives and 
American law and public. Not only do all citizens feel the consequences of 9/11 most 
immediately at the airport, but more importantly, the airport has become the ultimate site 





Figure 1.1: Muslims at the airport. Cartoon by Khalil Bendib, The Muslim Observer, 
August 31-September 6, 2006. 
 
At the Airport 
Airports have become an interesting space for Muslim identity. As a space of 
transition, the airport is a liminal place. With its strict rules and rites of passage, it has all 
the characteristics of a threshold place (Gottdiener 2007: 11). The airport is an entry and 
exit point to and from the nation-state. It represents the edge of the nation. It is a 
ritualized border, where various forms of surveillance and control are exerted. Especially 
since 9/11, widespread anxiety about aviation security, ever-more-intrusive screening 
procedures, and the creation of no-fly lists all give rise to “societies of control,” a 
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condition Deleuze imagined to be the next stage of surveillance after Foucault’s 
disciplinary society (Deleuze 1992: 3-7). The airport thus provides a condensed version 
of the surveillance and control carried out by the “safety state” (Lyon 2003). It is at this 
site of passage that Muslim visibility and anxiety reach new heights. 
An airport, then, is the site par excellence for observing the impact of 9/11 on 
Muslim lives in America. At the airport the relationship between Muslim identity and 
American sovereignty comes into the open. Many reported Muslim civil rights violations 
and a significant portion of everyday Muslim conversation revolve around anecdotes 
about airport experiences. Muslims are surprised when they are not selected for random 
search on a given trip. People jokingly say that driving while black has been replaced by 
flying while Muslim. 
Muslims experience the disjuncture between the nation and the state that I 
described above most directly at the airport. If elsewhere the disjuncture was an implicit 
condition, it becomes explicit when a person with a distinctly Muslim appearance walks 
into the airport. Someone who so far (in the city, at the ticket counter, etc.) has been 
treated casually and equally, suddenly becomes suspect. Before they enter the airport they 
may be outside the definition of the nation, but they are still protected by the law; that is, 
still inside the state. But when they walk into the airport— where internal and external 
meet and where external borders are now internalized— they sense their protected status 
beginning to evaporate. Even those Muslims who do not consider themselves particularly 
profiled or discriminated against in everyday life suddenly begin to feel uneasy at the 
airport. Citizens are asked to report suspicious behavior or persons. The state of alert now 
expected of all travelers is experienced most intensely by Muslim passengers, exhausted 
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by too much self-awareness. At the airport human beings are stripped of their language 
along with their shoes. From the electromagnetic point of view, they become completely 
naked. The distinction between public and private is partly suspended as security 
personnel fumble with previously sacrosanct bodies. Strip searches and other security 
rites of passage show people the “hard edge of the nation” (Bosniak 2006: 4). In short, at 
the airport, Muslims come face to face with the nation beyond the protections of the state. 
Close questioning by security agents who are trained to detect inappropriate emotional 
reactions (Salter 2007: 49) and scrutiny of travelers’ faces for signs of ill intent are both 
particularly interesting aspects of the airport experience. At the airport, both speech 
(logos) and expression (the face)⎯ which philosopher Emmanuel Levinas famously 
interpreted as the source of unpredictability and transcendence⎯ meet the pressures of 
objectification and control. 
A striking outcome of the securitization of society is the ban on jokes at the 
airport. Making jokes in the security check area is strictly prohibited. An interesting 
outgrowth of this is the attempt on the part of Muslim ethnic comedians to turn the stage 
into a symbolic airport (see Chapter 7). Not only do they draw much of their material 
from their airport experiences, but some literally enter the stage with a simulated ritual of 
passing through metal detectors and being frisked by mock TSA staff. The turning of 
airports into no-joke zones and the turning of the Muslim comic zone into a symbolic 
airport are two symptoms of the same collective neurosis. At one and the same time, 9/11 




Part of this study deals with the ways in which Muslims undo exclusion by 
turning their newfound visibility to their advantage. I consider some of the ways they try 
to bridge the gap opened between themselves and the rest of American society as a result 
of collective neurosis. Since 9/11 Muslims have realized that it is not their Islamic 
identity but their American citizenship that is at risk.  
This dissertation divides into two parts: the first half deals with Muslim anxieties 
about their Islamic identity in an American environment, the second with anxieties about 
the potential loss of their American citizenship. My discussion draws attention 
particularly to the cultural aspects of membership in American society at a time of crisis. 
 
In Search of Cultural Citizenship 
The exclusion against which Muslims struggle is marked by its particular time 
and place, but reveals the complexity and contentious nature of citizenship in general. 
What is citizenship? And what do I mean by “cultural citizenship” as a specific 
dimension of citizenship that American Muslims seek to acquire? A collection of rights 
and obligations that shape membership in a polity, citizenship offers universality and 
equality to its insiders and closure and exclusion to its outsiders. Its origins can be traced 
back to Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, with their respective republican 
(practice-based) and liberal (status-based) traditions. Approaching citizenship as a mode 
of incorporating excluded groups is a horizon opened by T. H. Marshall in his 
groundbreaking treatise, Citizenship and Social Class (1964, first published in 1950). As 
a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, citizenship is a product of struggles among 
various political, social, economic and cultural groups. American citizenship in particular 
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has always been a politically charged and contested status (Smith 1997: 14). The concept 
of citizenship in general covers an extremely wide spectrum of conditions and practices. 
After examining Marshall’s contribution to our understanding of citizenship, I will focus 
on its cultural dimension under the rubric of “cultural citizenship.” 
Marshall identifies three dimensions of citizenship—civil, political and social. 
Civil citizenship refers to the legal rights developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in response to absolutism. It is institutionalized in the right of habeas corpus. 
Political citizenship describes the right to participate in the exercise of power. Developed 
with the emergence of parliamentary democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, political citizenship refers to the right to vote, the right to freedom of 
association, etc. The third dimension of citizenship, social citizenship, emerged in the 
twentieth century and went beyond the conventional notion that membership in a 
community is predominantly a political matter (Shafir 1998: 13). What was still lacking 
was a means of transforming social hierarchies towards egalitarianism. Social citizenship, 
thus, takes aim at the problem of exclusion generated by the tension between 
citizenship’s promise of universal equality and the social inequality produced by market 
forces (Somers 2008: 9). Marshall saw social citizenship as a correction not so much to 
material inequalities but to status inequality. 
 
By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the 




“Citizenship requires a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty 
to a civilisation which is a common possession” (Marshall 1964: 24). At first reading it 
may seem to suggest that citizenship entails one common culture (civilization) to which 
loyalty is asked (Hindess 1993: 26). But Marshall’s conception of common culture is not 
a fixed, exclusive one. Rather, common culture remains substantially open and 
unspecified, characterized largely by its connection with the sense of equality (Marshall 
1964: 18). What is common will be decided in part by the groups to be included. 
Therefore, social citizenship represents a successful transcendence not only of juridical 
notions of citizenship, but also of the distinction between its liberal and republican 
conceptions. 
Marshall places the idea of human dignity at the core of citizenship because he 
recognizes that “equality of status is more important than equality of income” (Marshall 
1964: 33). Social citizenship, as articulated by Marshall and echoed by Judith Shklar 
(1991: 2, 19), is primarily a matter of “social standing” and recognition. It thus refers to 
“the human right to the dignity of social inclusion and recognition as full members of a 
political and social community” (Somers 2008: 8, 37). Although the three dimensions of 
citizenship evolved historically in a certain order, no teleology should be assumed in their 
appearance and potential demise. 
At the time Marshall conceptualized social citizenship, societies were less 
heterogenous. Today large-scale processes of globalization and immigration have altered 
the character of liberal democratic societies. Proliferation of new identities and 
diversification of needs have justified Marshall’s emphasis on inclusion, recognition and 
dignity as the core issues of citizenship. They have also given rise to a literature that 
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focuses on citizenship from the point of view of identity politics (Kymlicka 1998, Isin 
and Wood 1999). 
The identity dimension of citizenship and has been approached differently in 
different contexts, from the European unification process (Delgado-Moreira 1997) to 
Asian and Latino immigrant communities in the United States (Ong 1996, Rosaldo 1997). 
Cultural citizenship is also invoked in relation to the rights of sexual minorities (Pakulski 
1997). 
Given the emphasis it places on human dignity and recognition, the concept of 
cultural citizenship can be seen as a deepening of Marshall’s social citizenship (Taylor 
1994). It may also constitute a fourth generation or new dimension of citizenship which 
“involves the right to be different, to re-value stigmatized identities, to embrace openly 
and legitimately hitherto marginalized lifestyles and to propagate them without 
hindrance” (Pakulski 1997: 83). Here the emphasis is on the symbolic and ideational 
sphere. Pakulski describes a set of principles that characterize cultural citizenship: the 
right to symbolic presence, dignifying representation and maintenance of a different 
lifestyle. These are deployed against marginalization, stigmatization and assimilation.  
An important implication of cultural citizenship is that the demand for dignity, 
recognition and equality is pursued with respect to a more elusive excluder, the 
public/nation rather than the state/law. Like social citizenship, cultural citizenship refers 
to citizenship practices that aim to bridge the gap between legal citizenship and full 
membership in a polity, with a particular emphasis on the psychic and symbolic 
dimensions of the membership process. 
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In my discussion I approach the cultural citizenship of American Muslims within 
Pakulski’s framework, which locates the avenues of citizenship in multiple sites 
including not only the state, but also public sentiment or the nation in general. Following 
Somers’ conceptualization, I also treat citizenship as an “instituted process” (Somers 
2008: 28).  To say that citizenship is a process is to indicate its temporality and openness. 
To say that it is instituted is to indicate its historicity. That is, citizenship is historical in 
the sense that it does not spring from any presumed “nature” or essence. It exists as a set 
of practices only to the extent that those practices congeal into enduring yet fragile 
institutions of rights. 
 
American Muslims: Between Exclusion and Overexposure 
It is now time to answer a question that I put on hold in the previous pages: who 
are the American Muslims? What does American Islam look like? Perhaps I should start 
with a local answer to this global question. After all, this study draws on research most of 
which was conducted in Detroit, a microcosm of Islam in America. It is also the 
birthplace of various Muslim movements and institutions. Detroit is home to the first 
mosque in America. It is the birthplace of the Nation of Islam. As in the rest of America, 
the majority of Muslims are immigrants to Detroit, but the story of Islam is not 
exclusively a story of immigration. Large African American convert communities are an 
important part of the Muslim landscape in America. One can easily both find first- and 
third-generation immigrants, converts and mosques. 
Islam in Detroit, as in all America, is divided along the lines of race, ethnicity, 
time of immigration, language competence, and sect. Detroit’s first mosque was 
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established in Highland Park in 1921 by Lebanese Sunni immigrants. Mufti Muhammad 
Sadiq led the first prayer at the Highland Park mosque and gave a historic speech which 
was reported by Detroit News under the heading “City’s Mohammedans Open New 
Mosque, First in U.S.” (Detroit News, June 9, 1921). Missionaries from the heterodox 
Ahmadiyya Movement of India arrived in Detroit around the same time. And in 1930 the 
Nation of Islam, started by Wallace D. Fard and led until 1975 by Elijah Muhammad, 
opened its first “temple” in Detroit. 
Dearborn and the metro Detroit area have seen several influxes of refugees. In the 
first quarter of the century they were mostly economic refugees leaving the Ottoman 
province of Syria. Later Palestinian and Lebanese refugees came to the region fleeing 
regional and civil wars. More recently, waves of Bosnian and Iraqi refugees, and Yemeni, 
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants have all settled in the area. And the list 
could be extended. Suffice it to say that one can find in Detroit both Albanians, one of the 
oldest communities, and Senegalese Africans, among the newest. Some of these 
communities are Shia, others are Sunni. Some are inner-city mosques, some are 
suburban. An extensive documentation of this mosques has been produced by Building 
Islam in Detroit Project.1 
Muslim communities are so diverse that only a few strands unite them: Islam as a 
religion and the American experience. The question of the incorporation of these 
different groups into the larger society as Americans is at the same time a question of 
their articulation of a common identity as “Muslim” among themselves. Common identity 
                                                 
1 More information can be found at http://www.dc.umich.edu/dmc/grocs/05/buildingislam.html . 
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requires a variety of convergences. One of them is convergence in a common language, 
both linguistic and cultural.2  
I was always fascinated by how these communities named their institutions. Let 
me give just one example to illustrate how factors such as time of immigration, class, and 
acquisition of English language play out in the symbolic process of self-identification. 
Here are the names of three Detroit mosques: 
1. Masjid al Tawheed 
2. Tawheed Center 
3. Unity Center 
Masjid al Tawheed is located on Warren Avenue in Detroit and has a 
congregation made up predominantly of recent Yemeni immigrants. The imam does not 
speak any English and relies on a translator. He is quite prejudiced against other Muslim 
groups (Shias in particular) and thinks the best way to live in America as Muslims is to 
minimize contact with non-Muslim Americans. His community is mostly poor: a number 
of them drive ice-cream trucks for a living, and you always see a small fleet of them 
parked behind the mosque at prayer time. The second mosque, Tawheed Center, is 
located in Farmington Hills, a somewhat more affluent suburb. Its congregation is mostly 
lower middle class. The mosque has an introverted but not entirely unwelcoming 
character. Compared to Masjid al Tawheed, they are an older generation of immigrants. 
Tawheed Center has an ethnically mixed (mostly Arab and South Asian) congregation 
and is not much involved in interfaith activities. The third mosque, the Unity Center in 
Bloomfield Hills, is located in one of the richest suburbs of Detroit. The congregation is 
                                                 
2 In this study, I use the word “Muslim” to refer to individuals whose primary identification is with Islam. 
The experience of non-religious Muslims is not covered in this work, although their experience might not 
be very different from that of religious Muslims as far as the impact of 9/11 is concerned. 
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multiethnic and upper middle class. It includes relatively more established immigrants as 
well as converts. The orientation of the mosque is very ecumenical, both with respect to 
Islamic sects and to other faith groups. The leaders of the Unity Center are among the 
most active Muslims on the Detroit interfaith scene. 
Now the interesting thing is that all these mosques actually have the same name. 
Tawheed means “unity” and refers simultaneously to the oneness of God and the unity of 
the Muslim community. The evolution of a single name⎯ from pure transliterated Arabic 
(Masjid al Tawheed), to a mix of Arabic and English (Tawheed Center), to an entirely 
anglicized form (Unity Center)⎯ perfectly encapsulates the three mosques’ degrees of 
internal diversity, time of immigration, involvement in interfaith activities, and overall 
level of engagement with their American environment.  
The density of the Muslim community and diversity of mosque cultures in Detroit 
makes this area a perfect destination for discovering patterns of community development. 
Andrew Shryock observes one such pattern in  
the developmental arc of mosque creation which begins with the acquisition of a 
prayer space, then a move to a house or apartment, then the purchase and 
refurbishment of an existing structure (a church, a warehouse, an old workshop, a 
restaurant, a bank), the construction of a mosque “from the ground up,” and 
finally the establishment of the mosque-school-cultural center, which is now the 
aspiration of nearly every active mosque community [in Detroit] (Shryock 2007: 
7). 
 
The three largest Muslim ethnic groups in the United States (and in Detroit) are 
Arabs, South Asians and African Americans.3 About two thirds of Muslims are foreign 
born. Estimates of the number of Muslims in the United States vary widely. The most 
                                                 
3 The percentages for the national scale are South Asians (32%), Arabs (26%), African Americans (20%) 
and other (22%) (Bukhari 2003: 9). 
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commonly cited number is 6 million. But it is not a reliable figure.4 What is agreed upon, 
however, is that American Muslims are on average better educated and financially better 
off than their fellow citizens. According to the Pew Research Center’s 2007 report, 
American Muslims are mostly middle class, have moderate views and share mainstream 
values. The same report also found that a majority of Muslims “believe that it has become 
more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since 9/11. Most also believe that the 
government ‘singles out’ Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring.” 
One can observe the growing interest in Islam and Muslims from the shelves of 
bookstores. The literature on Islam has been growing steadily since 9/11. Some of it can 
be called alarmist or Islamophobic literature, some are editions of standard religious 
texts, and others are “Islam for Dummies”-type introductions. Muslims themselves are 
also producing work in response to the demand for knowledge about Islam. 
The classical works on Islam in America are for the most part the work of 
Islamicists, that is, scholars of Islamic studies (Haddad 2002, Smith 1999, Haddad and 
Esposito 2000, Haddad and Smith 2002). Most of this early generation of works provides 
snapshots of the experience of being Muslim in America. Works on Muslim slaves 
(Austin 1997, Diouf 1998), convert Muslims (Abdallah 2006), and the African American 
experience (Jackson 2005) are drawing increasing attention. Popular works representing 
journalistic interest in American Muslims (Abdo 2006, Barrett 2007) share the shelves 
with a literature of Muslim self-justification and apology. For example, in 2005 when I 
                                                 
4 Ever since a New York Times article cited 6 million as the number of Muslims in the U.S. (NYT, 
02/21/1989), the Muslim population figures have been subject to contestation. Ihsan Bagby’s study, The 
American Mosque: A National Portrait (2001), based on a sample of 416 mosques, estimated the Muslim 
population in the United States to be somewhere between 6 and 7 million. Another study put the estimate at 
5.7 million (Ba-Yunus and Kone: 2003: 314). The most commonly cited number of 6 million has recently 
been severely undercut by the Pew Research Center’s study, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly 
Mainstream. The Pew report (2007) estimated 2.35 million Muslims in the U.S. 
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walked into a Borders bookstore to check out the new releases, there were two Islam-
related books in the storefront display of popular mainstream titles. The first was Khaled 
Abou El Fadl’s The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (2005). The second 
book was by Cpl. James Yee, the former Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay who was 
accused of espionage by the US government. After a highly publicized case all the 
charges against him were dropped. His book’s title reflects the tension that gave him both 
recognition and victimhood: For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire 
(2005). My first thought was that this is how Islam enters the mainstream, through 
apologetics and victimhood. Finally, rounding out the picture is a proliferating literature 
by Muslim public intellectuals who propose future directions for the community (Khan 
2002, Safi 2003, Shakir 2005).  
On the academic front, the field of American Muslim studies is a new one and 
fragmentary at best. Most of the works focus exclusively on immigrant Muslim 
experiences. The few that deal with the African-American experience tend to treat it 
separately. Comprehensive, in-depth studies that are grounded in fieldwork are very rare 
(Moore 1995, Cesari 2004). The increase in ethnographic takes on Muslim experience in 
America is taking place largely outside the discipline of sociology (Schmidt 2004, 
Shryock 2004).  
Today we see a proliferation of new Muslim practices (e.g., Muslim comedy) and 
discourses (e.g., Abrahamic discourse) which can be called post-diasporic. The existing 
literature on American Islam, however, seems stuck in the diasporic moment, still 
producing snapshots of individual ethnic communities. In this study, I focus on the post-
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diasporic moment and the processes of convergence among American Muslims of 
different backgrounds. 
 In this dissertation, I approach American Muslims as a religious/cultural minority, 
paying particular attention to the process of cultural settlement before 9/11 and Muslim 
citizenship practices after it. I also trace the transformations that take place among the 
second and third generations of people and institutions that are no longer either 
immigrant or convert. In this study, I explore aspects of identity formation as a result of a 
series of boundary work. Identities are produced through various shifts in and 
contestations over the “symbolic boundaries” that separate “us” from “not us” (Lamont 
1992: 9, Zubrzycki 2006: 210). Muslim identity in the United States is an outcome of 
processes of boundary crossing and is engaged in boundary shifting (Zolberg and Woon 
1999: 8-9). The concept of boundary crossing entails an investigation of the symbolic 
violence and disorientation experienced by newcomers. The concept of boundary 
shifting, on the other hand, makes us attentive to the transformative influence that 
newcomers aspire to have on their host environment. Especially after the exclusion 
generated by 9/11, how do American Muslims remake boundaries so as to include 
themselves in the nation? As citizens, how do Muslims try to overcome social exclusion 
and make the practical boundaries of American identity more congruent with its legal and 
theoretical universalism?  
 
Theoretical Orientations: Cultural Sociology and Phenomenology 
This dissertation is about Muslims and Islam in America. While it has elements of 
both sociology of religion and immigration studies, it is not covered by either alone. It is 
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more broadly a study in cultural sociology in the tradition of phenomenology. When 
carried out phenomenologically, as Berger and Luckmann have suggested (1966), 
cultural analysis becomes an extended sociology of knowledge that links ideas, values or 
cultural constructs in general to experience and lifeworld (Joas 2000, Habermas 1987). 
My cultural sociology is Simmelian. I am interested in the tension between life 
and forms, between experience and culture (Weingartner 1960). I find Simmel’s 
“philosophical sociology” (Simmel 1950: 58) and writings on cultural crisis to be full of 
insights that one cannot find in the mainstream classical sociologists. I complement 
Simmel’s sociological vitalism with the phenomenological tradition.  
As an ethnographer, I take seriously the phenomenological maxim, “I is the dative 
of manifestation.” What is manifested and what the ethnographer bears witness to by 
means of his “-graphy” is a series of experiences mediated⎯ and sometimes obscured⎯ 
by ideal types (Schutz 1967). That is, the reality observed is a combination of ideal types 
and experiences. Located in a particular place and time, the researcher is acutely aware of 
his perspectival finitude. The task ahead of him therefore is interpretation (Weber 1978, 
Gadamer 2005). As Robert Wuthnow points out, cultural analysis is essentially an act of 
interpretation. The “object itself is a cultural construction, subject to the meanings we 
give it” and thus interpretable in different ways (Wuthnow 1987: 17). Therefore, when 
correctly understood, phenomenology becomes hermeneutic, that is to say, interpretive 
(Dreyfus 1991: 32). Heidegger himself redefined phenomenology along those lines when 
he said “the meaning of phenomenology lies in interpretation” (1962: 61). Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology attempts to understand life from within the flow of life 
rather than from the outside. 
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I am also inclined to call my sociology an agonistic sociology. Agonistic 
sociology has several sensibilities: these are a) historicization of rationality and attention 
to the genesis and degeneration of rule (order), b) attention to the agonistic elements 
(charisma, anomie, exception), and c) sensitivity to temporality.  
My interpretive approach to sociology pays attention to the margins rather than 
the mainstream, to lived experience rather than floating abstractions and to the residues of 
chaos as yet untouched by formatting. I follow the recommendation of Norbert Elias⎯ 
another Simmelian⎯ that, for example, anomie is not the opposite of social structure but 
a part of it (Elias 1994: 177). In this study, I take a historicist, social constructionist 
approach to identity and community and explore how new realities are constructed and 
old ones socially destructed. In many ways my sociology overlaps with both philosophy 
and anthropology. It easily blends in with the “sciences” of human experience. My 
cultural sociology draws on Simmel in sociology and Heidegger in philosophy. It can 
also be seen as a preliminary attempt at a Heideggerian sociology. 
Perhaps I should clarify my own methodological position with respect to the 
various strands of phenomenology. The two strawmen that I would identify so as later to 
claim the middle ground are Bourdieu and symbolic interactionism. While I find the 
symbolic interactionist tradition’s lack of interest in power relations a great shortcoming 
(rendering it less than sociological), I am very frustrated with Bourdieu’s ultimate 
translation and reduction of everything to power relations, regardless how “fine” the 
varieties of power he might identify. I believe that cultural sociology, when conducted 
phenomenologically, pays particular attention to questions of historicity, the fragility of 
the subjective and intersubjective worlds and their temporal/spatial processes. In that 
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way, phenomenology reflects true human experience, which is always grounded in time 
and place. This tradition has its origins in the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger and 
its sociological articulation in the work of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann. A less 
restrictive list would include philosophers like Nietzsche and Foucault and sociologists 
like Simmel and Weber. 
A neglected promise of phenomenology is that it can restore the primacy of 
experience vis-à-vis the ideal types. The Weberian ideal types are abstracted, formalized 
reports of experiences “elsewhere” and “in the past.” At best they are averages, a form of 
reluctant generalization. There is no way to avoid them, since the very ethnographic 
account one produces based on experience turns into an inventory of ideal types for 
another interpreter/reader. However, what needs to be done is to overcome the alienation 
from experience that we see in such methods as surveys, where the researcher speaks and 
observes “from nowhere.” As Stephan Fuchs observes, “location decides what an 
observer can and cannot see. You can observe only that which can be observed from 
there. No observer can disclose ‘the’ world as such” (Fuchs 2001: 4). Not only the 
subjects and objects of our research but also we ourselves are in-the-world. 
Phenomenology rejects the view from nowhere. Being-in-the-world or intentionality 
expresses the fact that we are in “an irreducible ontological relationship with the world” 
(Moran 2000: 3). 
The urge for generalization and abstraction almost completely severs the 
connection between ideal types and their origins in the lifeworld (experience, pragmata). 
The contrast between ideal types and experience is similar to the relationship between 
rationality and charisma. We often forget that rationality is nothing but a routinized 
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charisma. What makes a rationality rationality is not that it is not arbitrary, which it is, 
but that it is agreed upon and thus routinized. Instead of opposing charisma and 
rationality to each other, we need to place them in relation to each other on a continuum 
of nascence and congealment. Bourdieu’s anti-theoretical theory of practice is an attempt 
to restore charismatic edge to particular experience (action) against the once-and-for-all 
abstract universalism of structuralism (Bourdieu 1990). Therefore, from the 
phenomenological and ethnographic points of view, the primacy belongs to experience, 
the very source of the objects of observation and abstraction. 
It is remarkable that despite classical theory’s anxiety about standardization and 
bureaucratization, modern-day sociology has succumbed to the desire for abstract 
generalizations and methodological bureaucracy. This crust of rational abstractness is 
burst through by ethnographic experience in life. The confrontation between these two 
traditions has a long history in the opposition between life and reason, and between 
Pascal and Descartes. Ethnography is exciting because it brings in fresh experience.  
 
Methods, Data and Research Sites 
Kurt H. Wolff, a translator of Simmel and student of Karl Mannheim, suggests the  
term “surrender-and-catch” to describe a research style that we otherwise know as 
participant observation. The ethnographer must surrender himself to experience without 
prejudice or objectification, then withdraw to make sense of what he has seen. This, of 
course, is a methodological formulation of the Simmelian idea of the relationship 
between experience and culture, between life and forms. In pursuing this study, I  
unwittingly followed Wolff’s advice, long before I came across it in my readings on 
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phenomenology. This dissertation is my catch, observations that I hope will be interesting 
both to fellow academic observers and to my fellow Muslim participants.  
I am myself an immigrant to this country. I believe that my identity, my 
experiences as a minority (a Kurd) in Turkey and now as a Muslim and a foreigner here 
in the U.S. have given me greater access to the community and its complicated dynamics. 
In this dissertation I rely on ethnographic data that I gathered through casual 
conversations, taped informal interviews, and documentary-archival materials such as 
community magazines, weekly newspaper, flyers,  and audio-visual media. I also 
observed and listened to what is not spoken, what is taken for granted. Indeed, the first 
half of this dissertation is precisely about matters that are increasingly being taken for 
granted, things that will soon sink forever beneath the waves of common sense.  
My preliminary fieldwork began in the summer of 2003, when I spent two months 
as an intern at the national office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
in Washington, DC. Working as an intern, I had the opportunity to gain firsthand insight 
into the functioning of one of the main Muslim organizations in the U.S. After this initial 
exposure, I continued to keep an eye on the field. I conducted most of my active 
fieldwork in the metro Detroit area between 2005 and 2007. Part of my data and insight 
comes from the Building Islam in Detroit Project, where I am a member of a research 
team exploring various aspects of the collective spaces Muslims have built in Detroit. As 
noted earlier, Detroit is home to more than 50 mosques and provides an ideal setting for 
observing the naturalization of Islam and the institutionalization of Muslim identity. The 
density and diversity of Muslims in the Detroit area allowed me to think comparatively 
across time and space.  
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In addition to my research in Detroit and Washington, DC, I have attended 
community events at both the regional and national levels, from fundraising dinners and 
community lectures to gatherings sponsored by national organizations. In particular, I 
attended several annual conventions of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), an 
organization that has been historically very influential in the shaping of American Islam. 
I also attended locally-organized conventions, campus study circles and other activities.  
The multiple sites of my ethnographic fieldwork enabled me to link the national and local 
levels of community experience.  
 
Outline of Dissertation 
My dissertation is divided into two parts: “Cultural Settlement” and “Citizenship 
Practices.” Each part examines a different dimension of Muslim membership in 
American society. The first part deals with the orientations, translations and cultural fine 
tuning that take place at the interface of Muslim life and American forms. It examines 
how Muslims overcome the symbolic violence they initially felt living in a non-Muslim 
environment. The second part examines Muslim responses to the exclusion generated by 
9/11. While the first part addresses the inward processes involved in cultural settlement, 
the second part is about the outward practices of Muslims who seek to shift boundaries 







Finding Mecca in America: American Muslims and Cultural Citizenship 
Part I: Cultural Settlement Part II: Citizenship Practices 
Boundary crossing Boundary shifting 
Internalization of American habitat Externalization of Muslim identity 
Making America Islamic Making Islam American 
Inward processes Outward processes 
Acts of immigration Acts of citizenship 
Pre-9/11 encounters Post-9/11 practices 
 
Figure 1.2. Conceptual orientation of the two parts of the dissertation. 
 
For early Muslim immigrants, America was an unformatted territory and generated 
anxieties about preservation of their Islamic identity. They had to engage in a series of 
codifications: determining the direction towards Mecca, thinking about the ways of 
making English a Muslim language and deciding whether America could qualify as 
religiously legitimate homeland. America as a space, culture and domicile needed to be 
naturalized. 
Chapter 2 explores how Muslims arriving on the American continent faced the 
question of establishing the direction towards Mecca (qibla). As America was outside the 
Muslim sacred canopy, it became a frontier that needed to be incorporated in the Muslim 
spatial imagination. Determination of the direction towards Mecca is an important way in 
which Islamic nomos was introduced into an otherwise profane space. Such codification 
efforts required the canonization of one “correct direction” at the expense of multiple 
directions. It emerged gradually over the course of Muslim settlement in America. 
Unification of qibla among American Muslims is a symbolic unification of the disparate 
Muslim communities as well. The practical and theoretical debates around the question of 
qibla in North America provide a metaphorical starting point for my discussion of 
Muslim membership in American society. 
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Chapter 3 examines another transition or translation that Muslims in the United 
States had to make. Muslims historically met with English primarily in two contexts: as 
the language of Christian missionaries and of European colonizers. Skepticism towards 
the English language persisted among religious Muslims for some time. With economic 
globalization and the emergence of English-speaking Muslim minorities, Muslim 
attitudes underwent a change. In this chapter I trace the genealogy of the encounter 
between English and Islam and discuss Muslim efforts to make English a Muslim 
language.  
Chapter 4 deals with the difficulty some Muslims had in seeing America as a 
homeland. Historically, Muslim exposure to non-Muslim environments was discouraged. 
Muslim stay outside the land of Islam (Dar al Islam) was either temporary or out of 
necessity. With the rise of permanent Muslim minorities in the West, Muslims had to 
juridically justify their presence in a non-Muslim environment. This chapter 
contextualizes the origins of Muslim values and discourses about America⎯ which stand 
in stark contrast to the anti-Americanism rampant in most of the Muslim world. I trace 
here how America gradually evolved in the minds of its Muslim inhabitants from a land 
of chaos to a land of Islam. 
The formative experiences expressed by these three phenomena (direction, 
language and home) are increasingly taken for granted by second generation Muslims. As 
such they are the vanishing sites of negotiations that formed the backbone of American 
Muslim identity. During my fieldwork, I witnessed transitions whose traces are being lost 
over time. These three chapters provide a perspective on the constitution of Muslim 
common sense (doxa) in the United States. 
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The remaining chapters of the dissertation focus on the citizenship practices of 
American Muslims in relation to the larger American public. Unlike earlier chapters, 
these sections deal with Muslim practices after 9/11. American Muslims facing the risk of 
losing their civil liberties and human rights have been engaged in various practices of 
undoing exclusion. They assert three interrelated messages: “We are citizens” (civil 
rights), “we are kin” (Abrahamic discourse), and “we are human” (comedy). These are 
the themes of the final three chapters, dealing with avenues for cultivating and protecting 





Codification of qibla 
 
LANGUAGE (Culture) 
Making English a Muslim language 
 
HOME (Belonging) 




National level, pan-Muslim 
 
ABRAHAMIC (Kinship) 
Local level, congregational 
 
COMEDY (Humanity) 
Individual level, small group 
 
Figure 1.3. A thematic list of individual chapters. 
 
 In Chapter 5, I explore how Muslims as novice Americans suddenly found 
themselves on the frontlines of the struggle for civil rights. As noted earlier, the impact of 
9/11 on Muslims created both exclusion and visibility. It has also forced Muslims to seek 
recourse in the legal institutions of citizenship, which has led to increased sensitization to 
Muslim identity on the part of American law. The story of the largest Muslim civil rights 
group, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, provides an illustration of the dual 
outcomes of crises like 9/11. Through a discourse of victimhood, Muslims (and only 
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those Muslims who are protected by the law) have been able to fight discrimination. 
While 9/11 produced discrimination and stigma for Muslims, it has also forced American 
law and Muslim citizens to speak to one another. 
 Chapter 6 argues that Muslims have intuitively recognized the fact that the appeal 
to civil rights alone is not sufficient to secure Muslim cultural citizenship. They must also 
reach out to other faith groups through involvement in interfaith work. Exploring the 
landscape of interfaith work in the local metro Detroit area, I ask why Muslims prefer 
“Abrahamic discourse” over liberal pluralism in their search for inclusion. I argue that the 
collective neurosis and resurgent nativism on the part of the American nation makes 
Muslims gravitate toward a genealogical language of faith. Interfaith activism by 
Muslims has significant implications for their citizenship and constitutes an implicit 
demand for boundary shifting in a society that still defines itself in many ways as Judeo-
Christian. 
 Chapter 7 ventures onto “funny” ground: the emergence of Muslim comedy after 
the tragedy of 9/11. By examining the rise of comedy troupes such as Allah Made Me 
Funny and Axis of Evil, I link Muslim comedy to Islamphobia and the emergence of the 
“negative charisma” of Muslims in the post-9/11 era. I interpret Muslim ethnic comedy as 
a plea to humanity by standup comedians, a way of undoing otherness on a more personal 
level. A second-generation phenomenon, Muslim comedy is also a symptom of Muslims’ 
Americanization. I conclude my discussion by offering a new theoretical framework for 
understanding ethnic comedy in general.  
 Chapter 8 is a reflection on Muslim experience with a view towards the future. It 





PART I: CULTURAL SETTLEMENT 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Finding Mecca in America: 
Muslim Directionality and the Codification of American Space 
 
 
Muszaphar Shukor has a problem. As Malaysia's first astronaut, he's scheduled to 
lift off October 10 in a Russian Soyuz spacecraft for a nine-day visit during the 
holy month of Ramadan to the International Space Station. He's a devout Muslim 
and when he says his daily prayers he wants to face Mecca, specifically the 
Ka'aba, the holiest place in Islam. That's where the trouble comes in. From ISS, 
orbiting 220 miles above the surface of the Earth, the qibla (an Arabic word 
meaning the direction a Muslim should pray toward Mecca) changes from second 
to second. What's a devout Muslim to do? Malaysia's space agency, Angkasa, 
convened a conference last year to wrestle with these and other questions.  
--Patrick DiJusto, “A Muslim Astronaut’s Dilemma: How to Face Mecca 




If a tower were to be built in Mecca such that it could be seen from North 
America, in which direction would that tower appear? The question seems a simple one. 
Yet the answer has far-ranging consequences for Muslims in the United States. Far from 
hypothetical, it has a direct impact on the everyday lives of practicing Muslims. The most 
immediate consequence is that such a direction will determine where Muslims turn 
during their five daily prayers. It will also have an effect on the architecture of their 
mosques and the way they bury their dead. In other words, to carry out their everyday 
lives as Muslims, they must identify the direction towards Mecca. 
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 The immigration of Muslims to the United States triggers this question, one no 
longer asked in their countries of origin. At the same time, Americans who convert to 
Islam⎯ thereby crossing another kind of boundary⎯ are faced with the same issue, one 
that surely never occurred to them in their non-Muslim past. An obvious implication of 
this question is that Muslims engage in a process of re-orientation wherever they move. 
This spatial orientation is necessary to center their location on Mecca. Muslim 
directionality⎯ taken for granted and routinized in historically Muslim countries⎯ 
becomes a problem when Muslims move to an unfamiliar place.  
Historical accounts show that Muslim slaves who were brought to America turned 
in prayer towards the east. Immigrant Muslims, the bulk of whom arrived after the 
change in immigration policies in 1965, turned for many years to the southeast. African 
Americans who converted to Islam under the Nation of Islam and were known as Black 
Muslims turned, at least for a time, towards the west.  
When I ask this question of young Muslims in Metro Detroit, the answer I get 
most often is “none of the above.” They respond very quickly and easily: “Of course, the 
tower will appear in the northeast.” Today, for the overwhelming majority of Muslims, it 
is common sense and established fact that the direction of Mecca in America is northeast. 
Muslims’ encounter with American space required them to mentally digest their 
new environment, which meant inscribing Islamic nomos on American geography. The 
Muslim direction towards Mecca had to be extended in such a way that America, a 
previously external geography, could be included in the Muslim spatial imagination. 
Multiple directions emerged in the anomic space of North America because it was 
literally a New World for Muslims; it came to them as terra incognita. The shift from old 
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directions to new has left architectural scars, much like an accent in language, in some 
Detroit area mosques. In this chapter, I explore a unique aspect of the Muslim encounter 
with America and ask how Muslims appropriate and codify American space.  
 
America as Ocean and Storm 
In the month of Ramadan, Muslims fast and pay greater attention to their spiritual 
lives; they read Qur’an more frequently than at other times of the year. On October 7, 
2005, a Friday during Ramadan, I was at the Muslim Unity Center in Bloomfield Hills, 
Michigan, for jumah, congregational prayer. The mosque is always well attended on 
Fridays; today, because of Ramadan, it was more full than usual. The Unity Center is a 
relatively affluent community whose membership is multiethnic and professional. Many 
of them are physicians, engineers or business people. Imam Musa, the spiritual leader of 
the mosque, is an immigrant from Egypt. He served previously at another mosque in 
Dearborn, where he had a predominantly monoethnic, working class congregation. He 
speaks English with an accent. The sermons and speeches I have heard of his are always 
very ecumenical, moderate and spiritual. I have also heard from others that he used to 
have a more conservative outlook and that he changed significantly as he moved from 
one community to another. At the end of his sermon, which was about the Prophet’s 
practices during the month of Ramadan, he encouraged the congregation to make 
donations to the mosque. He reminded them of the Prophet’s generosity during Ramadan, 
then turned to the story of Noah to emphasize the need to support community 
infrastructure in an environment where Muslims live as a minority. Mosques, Imam Musa 
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told his audience, were like Noah’s ark, buffeted by the challenges of ocean and storm. 
“We should donate,” he said, “for the safety of our children; so that we don’t get lost.” 
Imam Musa’s remarks about the danger of assimilation into a Christian society 
were not unusual. Most Muslim community leaders and clerics seek to promote two often 
contradictory imperatives. They want new generations to interact with the majority 
culture and be fluent in it, but they also want them to maintain their Muslim identity. In 
the absence of necessary community institutions and crystallized normative guidelines, 
there is a perception that Muslims are very chaotic in their practices. Converts surf the 
internet for the most congenial style of their newfound religion and “shop around” for 
suitable mosques in their areas. The second generation often finds their immigrant 
parents and community leaders inept at dealing with the American context and with other 
faiths. Imams themselves usually oscillate in their sermons between catering to the mores 
of the older generation and soothing the exasperation of the young. 
Imams face constant challenges over their roles in the American mosque, which 
can be dramatically different from mosques overseas. Here they are expected to assume 
the role of counselor as well as prayer leader. Even mosques that started their lives as 
simple prayer spaces have gradually become community centers with basketball courts, 
schools, libraries and soup kitchens— and as such they create new roles and expectations 
for their imams. Practices vary significantly, however, depending on their particular 
constituencies’ class and ethnic backgrounds. 
 Community leaders like Imam Musa present mosques as ships that will allow 
Muslims to navigate the anomic environment of American society. Enduring storms in 
the ocean of America, they imply, is possible only if Muslims take refuge in the mosques. 
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Avoiding assimilation and constructing an American Muslim identity requires symbolic 
unity among Muslims. That unity finds its metaphorical expression in what Muslims 
believe unites them all around the world: qibla, the direction toward Mecca. At mosques 
like the Unity Center, Muslims collectively turn toward Mecca.  
The idea of coming together as a congregation and facing one common direction 
has a powerful place in the imagination of Muslims as a global community. It is not only 
a matter of symbolic unity but also a practical requirement of their religion, which is 
probably why Muslims were pioneers in the invention of such direction-finding 
instruments as astrolabes. If we are to pursue the larger implications of Imam Musa’s 
metaphor of Noah’s ark, Muslim life in American society is a matter of survival in a 
spiritually threatening environment. Muslims can survive as a community only to the 
extent that they see their mosques as ships and find their way (qibla) through the storm 
and chaos created by displacement. America does not so much pose a threat to Muslims 
as it induces a sense of agoraphobia: it represents a disorienting open space. This 
perception is most visible in the experience of early mosques, which as the first ships 
floating in the ocean of America had to change their direction and sail uncharted waters.5 
   
Mosques seeking their Qiblas: Ships and Astrolabes  
                                                 
5 The perception of America as an open space is not unique to Muslims. The discovery of America also 
resulted in a change in the orientation of Europeans.  
In the Middle Ages, Christian princes and peoples of Europe considered Rome or Jerusalem to be 
the center of the earth, and regarded themselves as part of the old world[…] In 1492, when a ‘new 
world’ actually emerged, the structure of all traditional concepts of the center and age of the earth 
had to change. European princes and nations now saw a vast, formerly unknown, non-European 
space arise beside them. Most essential and decisive for the following centuries, however, was the 





The Metro Detroit area is a unique place for the study of Muslim experience in 
America. It has one of the largest concentrations of Arabs and Muslims in the United 
States. It is a historical destination of Muslim immigration and the birthplace of African 
American Islam. It has been home to the earliest mosques in America. In no other place is 
Islam as naturalized and institutionalized as in the cities of Detroit and Dearborn, where 
there are more than 50 mosques. If anywhere, the Detroit area must be the best place to 
look for the itinerary of Muslim life in its passage to America. 
My visits to the dozens of mosques in the Detroit area taught me the most basic 
fact about the Muslim community⎯ its bewildering diversity. From Bangladeshis to 
Bosnians, Lebanese to Yemenis, from Iraqis to Albanians, Senegalese to African 
Americans, a whole range of ethnicities, languages and sects are represented. A middle 
way between treating them all as one and getting lost in the wilderness of their diversity 
is to classify them based on size and cultural proximity. The three major Muslim groups 
that constitute the bulk of Muslims in the Detroit area and represent the majority of the 
overall American Muslim population are South Asians, Arabs and African-Americans. 
They all have mosques and community centers in the Detroit area. Some are inner-city 
mosques; others are located in rich suburbs. The overwhelming majority of these 
institutions are very new. Most of them opened within the last two decades. Many of the 
mosques are converted buildings that used to be churches, houses, workshops, night 
clubs, banks and even bowling alleys. To mention just a few, the American Muslim 
Center used to be a church, the Muslim Center of Detroit was a bank and the Islamic 
Institute of Knowledge was once a bowling alley. 
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The first mosque in the United States was established in Highland Park, now a 
city within the boundaries of Detroit. The Building Islam in Detroit Project research team 
unearthed documentary evidence that this first mosque was opened in 1921. There are 
mosques with competing claims to being the oldest in the country (Khalidi 2000: 317). 
The first imam of the Highland Park mosque was Imam Hussein Karoub. When I talked 
to his grandson, Carl Karoub, the first thing he said was: “At the time of my grandfather 
Islam was not bad, it was unknown.” Imam Karoub was originally from Syria. He came 
to Michigan in 1914 to work for the Ford plant. 
Built on Victor Street in Highland Park, this first mosque was initially known as 
the “Muhammadan Hall,” as it was called on a fundraising flier from the 1920’s that Carl 
Karoub showed me. Unfortunately his grandfather’s mosque did not survive long. After 
his Highland Park experiment, Imam Hussein Karoub led another mosque. This new 
mosque was built in 1937 at the end of the Great Depression near Ford’s new Rouge 
Plant in Dearborn’s Southend. Imam Hussein Karoub himself, however, continued to 
serve the community as imam until he died in 1973.6 
                                                 
6 Imam Karoub is buried in Roseland park Cemetery. When I later visited the cemetery, I read on his 




Figure 2.1. Fundraising flyer for the first mosque in Detroit, ca.1921. (Courtesy of Carl 
Karoub) 
 
Imam Karoub’s second mosque still exists on Dix Road and is officially called the 
American Moslem Society, but people simply call it the Dix Mosque. Built by Lebanese 
immigrants, Dix mosque is now a predominantly Yemeni mosque in a poor industrial 
neighborhood. It is the oldest surviving mosque in the Metro Detroit area. It has 
undergone several renovations and expansions and its ethnic/racial composition has also 
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shifted significantly. Among the mosque’s historical oddities is the fact that early 
immigrant communities used to congregate there on Sundays rather than Fridays, the 
Muslim sabbath. Used as a social hall, the space was often appropriated for weddings and 
dancing, something that would never happen in a mosque in the Middle East. When 
believers prayed, they prayed towards the East or Southeast. Then 
one Friday in 1976 a group of Muslims gathered on the doorstep of the Dix 
Mosque in the Southend of Dearborn. Finding the door locked, they forced their 
way in and proceeded to do what Muslims all over the world do every Friday at 
midday: perform Jumaa communal prayers. For this group [mostly Yemeni and 
Palestinian] their dramatic entrance into the mosque symbolized its reclamation 
by “authentic” Muslims. (Abraham 2000: 279). 
 
The story of Dix Mosque is interesting in many ways. One interpretation of  this 
particular episode in its history is that the newcomer immigrant Muslims were troubled 
by what they saw to be the alienation of their fellow Muslims. They saw the earlier 
immigrants as simply “lost” in the ocean of America. They had lost their spatial and 
temporal bearings. In the eyes of newly-arrived and conservative immigrants, the 
assimilated Lebanese immigrants had come unmoored from Muslim time and calendar. 
“That the Dix Mosque was not open on Fridays was abnormal, even scandalous, in the 
eyes of the immigrant Muslim community.” As Nabeel Abraham describes, the 
newcomers⎯ who eventually came to outnumber the old immigrants⎯ declared that 
“henceforth, there will be no singing or dancing in this house of worship” (Abraham 
2000: 280). The Islam that reached the shores of America came in waves; its history is 
therefore one of constant adjustments and re-orientations. The case of the Dix Mosque is 
just one among many where new immigrants brought in more traditional religious 
expertise and introduced changes which led to more orthodox practices. 
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 Long before the arrival of Yemenis and Palestinians, new mosques were being 
opened in various parts of Detroit. If Imam Hussein Karoub was the first Sunni7 imam in 
the area, Imam Muhammad Jawad Chirri was his Shia counterpart. Imam Chirri led the 
Shia community and established one of the most effective and affluent religious 
organizations in the area. The Shia community once led by Imam Chirri now owns a 
major mosque complex that is increasingly becoming an icon of American Islam: the 
Islamic Center of America. It is located on Ford Road, very near the birthplace of Henry 
Ford.  
Today, of several dozen mosques in Detroit, only a few are almost half a century 
old and still in use. Around the time the Lebanese Shia community was building the first 
Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, Albanian Muslims had already opened their 
Albanian Islamic Center in Harper Woods. Established in 1963 and 1962 respectively, 
these two mosques are of the same generation and can be distinguished from other 
mosques in several ways. First of all, they were built as mosques and not converted from 
another use⎯ still the most common way of starting mosques. They had larger immigrant 
bases, which helped the communities reach critical mass. Secondly and more importantly, 
these two mosques each have two mihrabs (See Figure 1). The mihrab is a niche in the 
wall in the direction of Mecca, both giving the prayer area its orientation and designating 
the place where the imam stands to lead the prayer.  
In both of the mosques, the imams no longer use the original mihrabs that were 
built into the walls then thought to be facing Mecca. Instead they face a different 
                                                 
7 Sunni and Shia are the two sects in Islam. The difference goes back to the question of the succession of 
the Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis, who constitute the majority sect, believe that there was not a designated 
caliph and that the successors of the prophet are his companions. Shia, on the other hand, believe that the 




direction, which is not inscribed in the wall as a niche but is highlighted by the placement 
of a prayer rug and the organization of carpets. Accordingly, the whole congregation also 
forms lines behind the imams facing a direction different from the original orientation of 
the mosque. In terms of use of space, there is a cartographic incongruence between the 
congregation’s layout and the shape of the hall where they pray. 
I wondered about the background story of the two mihrabs. When I asked Imam 
Shuajb Gerguri of the Albanian Islamic Center about the reasons, he gave me a clear 
answer: “Back then they did not know, they used the flat map.” He told me the direction 
was changed in the early 1980s when it became clear that the direction was northeast and 
not southeast. At the time of construction of these mosques, the direction to Mecca and 
thus the placement of the mihrab was determined on the basis of a Mercator map as 
opposed to a spherical projection. And when the qibla was changed, it left a permanent 





Figure 2.2. The old and the new directions toward Mecca at the Albanian Islamic Center 
in Harper Woods, Michigan. The old direction is indicated by the tiled mihrab; the new 
one, by prayer rugs. 
 
Though most visible in these mosques, the consequences of qibla change were not 
limited to them. Muslim graves also had to be re-oriented. The arrangement reached with 
Roseland Park Cemetery, where Imam Hussein Karoub and many other Muslims are 
buried, was that because of the “improper positioning of the plots,” Muslim remains were 
to be reinterred “in another section of the cemetery in accordance with Islamic 
requirement” (Abraham 2000: 300). 
From the re-positioning of cemetery plots to the abandoned mihrabs in old 
generation mosques, the changing answers to the question of where the imaginary tower 
in Mecca would be seen in America has had important consequences. In order to prepare 
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the ground for a detailed discussion of what is known as “the qibla debate in America,” 
we need first to explore the symbolic meaning of the two ends of qibla: Mecca and 
America.  
I begin the next section by discussing the significance of Mecca, as both the focus 
of pilgrimage and the source of qibla. I will go about this in a counterintuitive way: 
explaining an empirical yet unfamiliar social object by means of a theoretical and 
philosophical discussion. I am well aware of the relative unfamiliarity of the two parties I 
am putting in dialogue here. Nevertheless, I find that the best way to give a degree of 
conceptual legibility to the phenomenon of Muslim directionality is by resorting to 
theoretical tools familiar to my audience in the social sciences. 
 
Muslim Directionality: Linking Mecca and America 
Muslims have a rule. Wherever they are they should turn toward Mecca for their 
religious rituals. Therefore, they live with a spatial orientation comparable to the concept 
of intentionality in phenomenology. To understand the dynamics of this directionality as 
part of Muslim religious life, we need to explain the importance and centrality of Mecca 
for Muslims. 
Mecca is the holiest city in Islam. The birthplace of Prophet Muhammad, Mecca 
is also home to the most sacred structure for Muslims: the Kaaba. It is believed that the  
Kaaba was first built by Abraham. Kaaba literally means ‘cube,’ in reference to the 
building’s shape. Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam, requires Muslims who have the 
material resources and health to visit Mecca at least once in their lifetime.8 
                                                 
8 The five pillars are (1) testimony of faith, (2) five daily prayers, (3) fasting during the month of Ramadan, 
(4) almsgiving, and (5) pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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Every year, Mecca hosts millions of Muslims from all over the world; the 
pilgrimage is the largest continuously held transnational convocation of people. As part 
of the ritual, pilgrims circumambulate the Kaaba. In this rite of passage, pilgrims strip 
themselves of all status symbols and dress identically. They shed their ethnic and gender 
differences and form communitas as they enter Mecca’s liminal space of exception and 
the spatial aura of the Kaaba (Turner 1973). They also follow a specific code of conduct. 
After completing hajj the pilgrims assume a new status and gain the title of hajji or al 
hajj.9 
Although hajj is a major religious requirement in Islam, it is only one aspect of 
the Muslim relationship to Mecca. Muslims also engage with Mecca on a daily basis. 
Another pillar of Islam requires them to pray five times a day, and in those five daily 
prayers, Muslims face Mecca, more specifically the Kaaba. The Kaaba is the source of 
qibla. It should be noted, however, that the first qibla in the formative years of Islam was 
not Kaaba but Jerusalem (Bashear 1991: 267). Early Islam shared the direction with 
Judaism, and the first Muslims also prayed in Christian churches in locations where they 
did not have a prayer space of their own. It was only later that Prophet Muhammad 
changed qibla permanently to the Kaaba. Although some scholars of early Islam argue 
that “one cannot speak of ‘one original qibla of Islam,’ but rather of several currents in 
the search for one” (Bashear 1991: 282), what is important in this symbolic unfolding of 
Islam is that the change of qibla allowed Islam to gradually distinguish itself from both 
Christianity and Judaism. As Zerubavel shows in his discussion of Easter and Passover, a 
                                                 
9 Mecca and the experience of hajj loom large in many convert narratives. One of the most famous Western 
converts is Muhammad Asad (formerly Leopold Weiss) who wrote about his conversion and experience in 
Mecca in The Road to Mecca (1954). For a more recent book on the conversion and hajj experiences of 
Westerners including Muhammad Asad and Malcolm X, written by an American convert, see Michael 
Wolfe’s One Thousand Roads to Mecca (1997). 
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unique symbolic system, be it temporal (calendar) or spatial (qibla), “accentuates the 
similitude among group members while, at the same time, establish[ing] intergroup 
boundaries”(Zerubavel 1982: 284).10 
The revelation on the basis of which Prophet Muhammad changed the qibla came 
to him while he was praying in a mosque in Medina. This mosque– now among the city’s 
pilgrimage sites– is called Masjid al Qiblatain, “the mosque with two qiblas.” The fact 
that qibla changed in the early history of Islam is inscribed in the structure of this 
mosque. All of the other mosques in Muslim-inhabited geographies have one single 
qibla. That is, they have one mihrab. They are all oriented towards the Kaaba in Mecca. 
The mosque with two directions is thus a unique mosque: it is the site where the decision 
for the qibla rule was made. It is the site of the decision that precedes the norm. Its 
similarity with the two mosques in Detroit therefore says a great deal about the nature of 
rules and rationality. At the bottom of a rule one finds an arbitrary decision. When 
decision is repeated so that it becomes congealed into a norm, we lose sight of the 
original decision. The parallelism between the spatial origin of Islam and its frontiers in 
North America is an interesting issue to which I will return towards the end of this 
chapter.  
The Kaaba is the center of global Muslim spatial structure. Also called “the house 
of God,” the Kaaba is the embodiment of divine sovereignty, towards which all sacred 
practices and rituals are oriented. In congregational prayers worshippers form lines 
which, if connected, would constitute concentric circles around the Kaaba and across the 
                                                 
10 There are many ways in which groups such as the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam stress their distinctiveness with respect to one another. A list of the boundary work in which those 
monotheistic religions engage would include such practices as dietary laws (kosher and halal) or dress 
codes, including head covering for women and men. 
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earth. When Muslims slaughter animals they turn toward Kaaba and they bury their dead 
in such a way that the graves are oriented toward Kaaba. The work of the Kaaba is 
similar to that of Heidegger’s Greek temple:  
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around 
itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and 
blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny 
for human being (Heidegger 1971: 41). 
  
In other words, the Kaaba makes the worlding of the world possible by standing 
there; it “first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of sky, the darkness of the 
night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air” (Heidegger 
1971: 41). As a temple, the Kaaba translates nature into culture, bare geography into 
directionality. It punctuates space, producing order out of chaos. It creates nearness and 
distance; it “holds” the world as an oriented space. 
The focal point of Muslim imagination, the Kaaba is also a symbol, one that 
Hegel would call the ultimate symbol of Islamic monotheism. In The Philosophy of 
History, he writes:  
The object of Mahometan worship is purely intellectual; no image, no 
representation of Allah is tolerated. Mahomet is a prophet but still man –not 
elevated above human weaknesses. The leading features of Mahometanism 
involve this –that in actual existence nothing can become fixed, but that 
everything is destined to expand itself in activity and life in the boundless 
amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the One remains the only bond by 
which the whole is capable of uniting. In this expansion, this active energy, all 
limits, all national and caste distinctions vanish; no particular race, political claim 
of birth or possession is regarded– only man as a believer.” (Hegel 1956: 357) 
 
The idea of Islam as a monotheistic religion that strictly polices the transcendence 
and unity of God and works as a racial equalizer finds its best symbolic expression in the 
act of hajj (pilgrimage). As noted earlier, the impact of hajj as an experience is 
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particularly visible in convert narratives. Most famously, in his autobiography Malcolm 
X writes, “I have met, talked to, and even eaten with people who in America would have 
been considered ‘white’– but the ‘white’ attitude was removed from their minds by the 
religion of Islam. I have never before seen sincere and true brotherhood practiced by all 
colors together, irrespective of their color”(Malcolm X 1964: 391). In an article on 
pilgrimage and ritual process, “The Center Out There: Pilgrim’s Goal,” Victor Turner 
quotes this paragraph to illustrate the concept of communitas (Turner 1973: 193) which 
he further develops in The Ritual Process (1969). 
From anywhere in the world one must turn towards the Kaaba and from any place 
there is only one correct direction to the Kaaba; yet from within the Kaaba all directions 
are correct. Someone who prays inside the Kaaba can turn toward any direction. This is 
an extremely important matter because it designates the Kaaba as an exception to the rule 
of directionality. The Kaaba as an exception is sacred. In spaces of exception the rule is 
suspended or, to put it differently, there is no rule. The Kaaba therefore is characterized 
by an originary indistinction (Agamben 2005: 6). The Kaaba as a center gives rise to the 
world around it and while structuring that world, itself escapes structurality (Derrida 
1980: 278).  
Before being structured, the center and the structure are identical. Once difference 
is introduced, they become constitutive “others”, with the center occupying the privileged 
place. The concept of “center” as it is used here draws not only on its usage by Jacques 
Derrida (1980) but also those of Edward Shils (1972) and Victor Turner (1973). That the 
Kaaba escapes structurality (i.e., directionality) indicates its status as exception 
(Agamben 2005, Schmitt 1988). That the Kaaba structures the world around itself points 
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to its charismatic character as a space (Weber 1968). Charisma11 is that which rule (or 
rationality) cannot explain, where explanation means subjection to a comparison and 
regularity. Since later readings of the Weberian concept of charisma have unfortunately 
focused on religious and political authority and leadership, the understanding of charisma 
has been limited and its obverse remains to be brought to light. Here, I would like to 
make two interventions based on my treatment of the Kaaba as a charismatic space. First, 
as Bourdieu (1991: 250) and Agamben ( 2005: 85) have aptly noted, charisma should not 
be treated as a quality of a person but of a position. Second, I would argue that there are 
two types of charisma: positive charisma and negative charisma. I will further explain 
these two points below. 
Weber’s charismatic leader, for example, has exceptional qualities; people follow 
him or her without question. But this is only one way that charisma makes its appearance. 
What does it mean that charisma is a quality of location or position and not person? It 
means something counterintuitive: it is not that great leaders emerge in times of crisis, 
but that in times of crisis (states of exception) the leaders that emerge appear great 
(charismatic). This understanding of charisma goes beyond “charisma of the office.” 
Once we dissociate charisma from the person and return it to its rightful owner, location, 
we can begin to look for other locations where charisma makes its appearance.  
In my conceptualization, charisma is the structural equivalent of exception and 
anomie12 in that it refers to locations where structure or nomos is absent (i.e, Turner’s 
                                                 
11 Charisma in its pre-Weberian religious use means a “gift of grace” and it refers to an incursion of the 
divine into everyday life. A spring of singularity and miracles, charisma therefore recognizes no established 
rule (Rieff 2007). 
12 Durkheim used the concept of anomie primarily to refer to a condition of inadequate procedural rules or a 
failure of rule development to keep pace with social change. This means that at the margins (frontiers) of 
social change we come across anomic space where rules are absent. On closer inspection, Durkheim’s two 
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“anti-structure”). Such locations cannot be subjected to the rule –as in the case of the 
Kaaba. Or they may not have yet been claimed, appropriated or subjected to the rule–as 
in the case of early Muslims’ perception of America. The rule can be a rationality, a legal 
code or a language of communication. In our case, the rule is directionality. Irregularities, 
violations of the rule are indeed charismatic, but in a different way. In the case of positive 
charisma, such irregularities are approached with fascination and special treatment (they 
are seen as above the law). Thus suspension of the rule of directionality inside the Kaaba 
marks it as divine. The empty space inside the Kaaba thus becomes the location of an 
omnipresent God. As the house of God, the Kaaba therefore has positive charisma. It is 
omnidirectional. 
 The same absence of rule is present in the case of negative charisma, too, but 
such irregularities are treated as pathologies and considered repulsive (below the law, 
substandard, incorrect). The contrast can be seen in the ways irregular language use is 
interpreted. While elites might seek distinction by deviating from the most widespread 
usage of language, immigrants seek to eliminate the differences which make them 
accented and incomplete (Bourdieu1991: 46). Here again we see the two ends of 
charisma: positive charisma which one seeks to maintain and negative charisma which 
one seeks to eliminate. Again the translation of this to our case would be that Muslims 
strive to get close to the Kaaba (through pilgrimage) and while showing anxiety towards 
full immersion in America. The former represents the source of nomos, the latter the lack 
of nomos (anomie). 
                                                                                                                                                 
concepts of anomie refer to inadequacy or absence of nomos whether they are procedural rules (in Division 
of Labor) or moral norms (in Suicide) (Olsen 1965: 37-44). 
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In short, if positive charisma is associated with creativity and leadership, negative 
charisma should be associated with chaos/anomie and lack of status. Negative charisma, I 
would argue, is also the location of what Victor Turner calls communitas. Both positive 
and negative charisma “emerge where social structure is not” (Turner 1969: 126).  In that 
liminal or anomic space where symbolic violence has not yet produced structure, there is 
neither hierarchy nor distinction. In a sense, negative charisma is naked, bare life 
(Agamben 1998). It is the unformatted surface, a geography without a qibla. It needs to 
be arrested, tamed and formatted. Negative charisma is anomic and must be subjected to 
discipline. It is forced to acquire docility, legibility, submissiveness to the rule. With the 
following statement about communitas, Turner summarizes the ways in which charisma 
makes  its appearance at various locations of the structure: “Communitas breaks in 
through the interstices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure, in marginality; 
and from beneath the structure, in inferiority.” (Turner 1969: 128) 
Between the positive and negative locations of charisma lies the territory of the 
rule. Yet the rule has a direction. It starts from positive charisma (the center, Kaaba) and 
flows toward the rest of the space with the ultimate objective of subjecting that space to 
its rule (by routinization and rationalization). As it flows, the rule clears and cleans, since 
that which is unclear is often seen as unclean. (Douglas 1966, Zerubavel 1991, 37). 
Mecca and America are two spaces linked together by a rule. The rule originates in 




Figure 2.3. Center and Margin. The exceptional space of Kaaba gives structure to the not-
yet-formatted space of America through the imposition of nomos (directionality). 
 
The sense of universalism generated by the Kaaba is an effect of the monotheistic 
exclusion of anything and anyone from the locus of divinity. The Kaaba is the house of a 
transcendent God and no other entity can claim that location. All the social and 
geographic space around and outside the Kaaba is subjected to a set of rules. This 
subjection produces believers and their orientation. In ways both physical and conceptual, 
the Kaaba resembles the panopticon that Jeremy Bentham developed and Michel 
Foucault analyzed. The architectural structure of the panopticon was simple: “at the 
periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower” (Foucault 1977:200). The Kaaba is 
a cubical tower at the center; at its periphery is a square building with rounded corners. 
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The building around the Kaaba is called Masjidul Haram (the Sacred Mosque). If the 
panopticon has a periphery of partitioned space with isolated cells, the Kaaba’s periphery 
includes both open and covered spaces for prayer. The spaces are punctuated by pillars, 
but they are not isolated. While the panopticon is a closed disciplinary machine, the 
Kaaba is an open device for spiritual discipline or for the disciplining of souls. Although 
Foucault considers panopticism the ultimate modality of disciplinary power in modern 
times and a technique of control which transcends the architecture of the panopticon, the 
Kaaba cannot be considered equally embedded in power or a product of modern times. 
Yet it exercises a similar function as a device that symbolically formats an open surface 
and produces space.  
  
Figure 2.4. Structural homology of Bentham’s Panopticon and the Kaaba, focal point of 
Islamic sacred space. 
 
As a modality of partitioning space and giving orientation, the similarities 
between the panopticon and the Kaaba are striking. Both the tower and the Kaaba see 
everything but cannot be seen. In its ideal use, the panopticon needs no guardian in its 
tower, since it is supposed to wield an impersonal and unverifiable power over its 
subjects. Inmates in the cells cannot see the guardian in the tower, while the guardian in 
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the tower sees them all. Whether they are physically in Mecca or not, Muslims all turn 
towards an empty building.13 An empty building with opaque walls, the Kaaba makes 
visible that which is invisible. It brings forth a world by allowing for the partitioning of 
space into directions. The Kaaba is a mental pole and the constitutive lack which allows 
the Muslim layer of direction (a metaphysical construct) to emerge as presence. 
Annemarie Schimmel notes that for Muslims the Kaaba is “the navel of the earth” (1994: 
57). The Kaaba is a “temple” that “in its standing there, first gives to things their look and 
to men their outlook on themselves.”(Heidegger 1971: 42)14 
 
America as Margin: Extension of Qibla and Erasure of Negative Charisma 
 Upon leaving the Arabian peninsula, wherever Muslims went they codified place 
and time according to their religious calendar and sense of direction. Determination of 
qibla therefore is an archaic issue for the people of the lands where Islam has a long 
history. The issue of direction to Mecca resurfaces in geographies where Muslim 
presence is more recent.  
The Muslim encounter with America as a geography and culture (i.e., through 
immigration) is marked by the re-emergence of the question of the direction to Mecca. 
The same is true for the American, especially the African American, encounter with 
Islam (i.e., through conversion). Both immigrant and convert Muslims engaged in a 
                                                 
13 Before Islam, the Kaaba was a sacred temple controlled by the pagan tribes of Arabia and the building 
was full of the idols they worshipped. Those idols were later removed by the Prophet Muhammad after he 
took control of Mecca. The emptiness of the Kaaba is thus in itself a symbol of Islamic monotheism. 
14 According to Heidegger, contemplation “is derived from templum, i.e., from [the name of] the place 
which can be seen from any point, and from which any point can be seen. The ancients called this place a 




search for qibla. This search was both literal and metaphorical: it required a cultural 
digestion of the American environment and/or of orthodox Islam.  
Muslim immigrants initially perceived America as a Christian country. They 
employed medieval juridical distinctions that divided the world into dar al Islam (the 
abode of Islam/peace) and dar al harb (the abode of war/chaos) (Haddad 2004: 32, 
Leonard 2003: 154). The initial application of Islamic nomos to American space, that is, 
the first appropriation of America by Muslims, conceived of America in its externality to 
Islam as a space of exception; Muslim presence in it was construed under the rubric of 
necessity (darura). Immigrants who came to the United States in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
wanted only to avoid the negative influence of American society (Schumann 2007: 5). 
This perception, however, changed over time (Haddad and Lummis 1987). 
I leave an extended discussion of this change to the chapter on the transformation 
of Muslim discourses on America (Chapter 4). However, suffice it to say that in the 
beginning Muslims perceived America as an undifferentiated entity and a space of 
impurity. In particular, the students who constituted the institutional core of the 
immigrant Muslim population had a diasporic orientation; they saw America as a 
temporary waystation.  
America was foreign to Muslims and Muslims were foreign to America. The 
initial conceptions of America in externality to Islam defined it as an anomic periphery. 
Legislating this anomic periphery meant, for example, extension of qibla, the Muslim 
directional order. The attempt to find the direction to Mecca in America is one way 
Muslims engaged with American space. Put differently, to appropriate America and turn 
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it into a navigable territory, Muslims had to connect Mecca and America through the 
Islamic rule of direction (qibla). 
In theoretical terms, the Kaaba in Mecca and America occupy the two ends of the 
rule of qibla, since they both stand outside it. In other words, they are places of 
exception. Both characterized by their absence of structure, America is an external 
exception and the Kaaba is an internal exception.  
As America has been temporarily and for practical reasons left outside the 
legislation, it forms an external exception in that it lies beyond the reach of the rule and 
remains in a juridical void. And because the rule has not yet conquered it, it is an anomic 
site where multiple directions arise. It remains bare geography, a nature yet to be 
converted into a culture. As a space over which the protective shield of the rule, the 
“sacred canopy” (Berger 1969) needs to be extended, America remains profane and risky. 
It emanates anomic terror. It causes confusion and disorientation. Practices in such a 
place fall under the rule of necessity and state of emergency where normal rules are 
unavailable. In this anomic space the differentiation of right direction from wrong 
direction has not yet been achieved: boundaries have not yet been definitively drawn. 
Therefore, religiously speaking, being in America generates anxiety, confusion and 
agoraphobia (Zerubavel 1991: 49) for immigrant Muslims because America appears as an 
unbounded and un-navigable environment. 
 
The Storm and the Port: The Qibla Debate 
Throughout the history of Islam, Muslim astronomers devoted part of their work 
to establishing the principles for the determination of qibla and the making of instruments 
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such as the astrolabe, which were indispensable instruments of navigation and 
exploration. Qibla was thus always bound up with cultural and geographical frontiers. 
The question of qibla hardly ever occurs to people in Muslim-inhabited geographies 
today, as such questions have been resolved centuries ago. It is the mobility and dispersal 
of populations brought about by colonialism, globalization, and immigration that have 
given rise to Muslim minorities outside the traditional lands of Islam. These movements 
create the need to determine qibla in formerly unimaginable locations like America, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
As we have said, most of the early immigrant mosques, including the first mosque 
in Detroit, faced east or southeast. In the seventies, as the number of mosques began to 
increase significantly in tandem with the rise in the number of Muslim immigrants, the 
question of qibla became an issue. In 1978, Muslim expert and NSF scientist, S. Kamal 
Abdali, published his Prayer Schedules for North America. Based on his expertise and 
research, Abdali argued that the qibla for North America was northeast. Supported by 
major Islamic organizations in the United States, the newly-reached conclusion that qibla 
in North America was northeast rather than southeast soon became the norm. Mosques 
made the required change to fix their directions. Muslims who used to face southeast 
would henceforth be facing northeast. The mosques that had mihrabs in the wall in the 
old direction left them untouched. They simply reorganized the layout of prayer rugs to 
redirect their congregations. But newly built mosques and mosques undergoing 
expansion or renovation adopted the new direction and carved their mihrabs accordingly. 




Of the two mosques with two directions, the Albanian Islamic Center at Harper 
Woods, Michigan, is planning to rebuild or move to a new location and the Islamic 
Center of America has already done so. It has moved from its old place on Joy Road to a 
new mosque complex on Ford Road. The new mosque was completed in 2005. In one of 
my visits to the new mosque, I spoke about the old qibla with Eide Alawan. Alawan is an 
interfaith activist and community spokesperson for the Islamic Center. He usually 
complains about what he calls “immigrant” ways of doing things. A proud American-
born Muslim, he always emphasizes values that Weber would call Protestant, like 
“punctuality.” In response to my question he said, “Tell you what, actually there is one 
guy who still thinks that qibla should be southeast. He’s an old guy. People don’t give up 
their habits that easily.” 
In the early 1990s two scholars from the Arab world visited the United States and 
reignited what can be called the “qibla debate” with a pamphlet entitled The 
Substantiation of the People of Truth that the Direction of Al-Qibla in the United States 
and Canada is to the Southeast. In this book, the authors, Nachef and Kadi (1990), 
argued that for both jurisprudential and technical reasons, the direction of Mecca in North 
America was southeast. The authors also declared the prayers of people who had used the 
northeast direction invalid and asked for a return to the southeastern qibla. Imam Haroon 
of Masjid un Nur in Highland Park also remembered this controversy when he said, 
“Back in the late 1980’s two brothers from overseas wanted to change but we did not pay 
attention to them.”  
Their disagreements mostly revolved around definitions in the religious texts and 
the technicalities of using maps. For example, what does it mean to be “facing Mecca?” 
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Such Qur’anic verses as “wherever you are, turn your faces towards Kaaba” (Qur’an, Al-
Baqara: 150) could be interpreted in different ways. Apart from such jurisprudential 
disagreements, the technical dispute was between Mercator projection maps and 
gnomonic (spherical) projection maps. The puzzle was whether one should use the 
“rhumb line” or the “great circle” to determine the shortest distance between Mecca and 
America. 
In response to their arguments and criticism, S. Kamal Abdali published an online 
article in 1997 titled “The Correct Qibla.” The discussion mushroomed on the websites of 
major Muslim organizations like the Islamic Society of North America. Some Muslim 
scholarly institutions outside the United States (e.g., Al Azhar University in Cairo) also 
became involved in the debate, issuing their own fatwas (legal rulings).  
Participants in the debate tended to charge their opponents both with being 
scientifically incorrect and with trying to divide the community. For example, Waheed 
Younis, the author of the article, “Qibla in North America,” wrote: 
This article is written to clarify the issue of correct direction of prayers (qibla) for 
Muslims in North America. Unfortunately, it has become a big issue and Muslims 
are being divided on it. It is also unfortunate that in this age of Mathematics, 
Geography and Computer when the Science of Navigation, Calculation and 
Cartography are reaching their pinnacle, and with the help of those tools, others 
did not have any problem finding the direction, navigating through and traveling 
to the Moon, we still do not have consensus on this small issue (Younis 2006). 
 
The most recent contribution⎯ which (like its predecessors) aspires to be the last 
word on the subject⎯ comes from Nuh Ha Mim Keller, an American convert and 
religious scholar. Keller’s book, Port in a Storm: A Fiqh Solution to the Qibla of North 
America, includes scientific illustrations and cites religious sources in Arabic. On the 
cover of the book is an image of an ancient astrolabe. In the book, Keller brings together 
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both religious arguments and  specialized technical knowledge. His book is probably the 
most comprehensive work on the subject available in English.  
Keller’s objection to those who push for a qibla change back to the southeast, 
apart from jurisprudential reasons, is based on two grounds: the authority of science and 
the need for American Muslims to develop their own religious knowledge instead of 
relying on speculations from the overseas.  
Islam is spreading to the far corners of the earth, and if the only way we can 
establish the qibla of the new mosque in Tierra del Fuego, for example, is by the 
visit of an impressive scholar from Algeria and hearing his opinion, the qibla will 
only last until an even more impressive scholar from Iraq arrives and gives the 
contrary opinion. People in our times are unable to accept such a process. The real 
world and not subjective personal preference must be our home port, and we can 
only put into it with religion and intelligence (Keller 2001: 175). 
 
If America was a stormy sea where Muslims risked losing their bearings, 
according to Keller, the fault lay neither with the religion nor America, but the 
irrationality of those who failed to make the move from a personal understanding to a 
scientific one. Muslims would find their home port through rationality and autonomy 
from overseas “experts.” Like Imam Shuajb and Eide Alawan, Keller treats the northeast 
direction as an objective fact. Northeast qibla inscribes itself both in the physical 
architecture of new mosques and the minds of communities who increasingly think of the 
northeast qibla as the standard, correct qibla. Once the northeast qibla is established as 
objective orthodoxy, it becomes commonsense and the southeast qibla is reduced to the 
level of subjective ideology. It gradually vanishes.  
In the immigrant Muslim experience, finding the direction to Mecca is a matter of 
mentally penetrating into America and linking it to Mecca. A similar process took place 
in the African American Muslim experience, as well. In their case, the challenge was to 
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link their American experience to the center of Islam in Mecca. Various discursive and 
symbolic moves within the African American convert community—including a qibla 
change⎯ brought them closer to their immigrant co-religionists.  
  
Black Mecca and the Bilalians 
The earliest Muslims in America were slaves. Of the enslaved Africans from 
West Africa, approximately twelve percent were Muslims from the region of Senegambia 
(Diouf 1998: 49). Among the many slave narratives that have come down to us today 
there are stories of Muslim slaves who struggled to maintain their religion against all 
odds. One example is Salih Bilali (Old Tom) of the Gullah Islands off the coast of 
Georgia, who was a respected leader and elder of slaves on a plantation. The grandson of 
Thomas Spalding, Bilali’s master, reports that his grandfather’s slaves were “devout 
Mussulmans, who prayed to Allah… morning, noon and evening.” He also adds that 
Bilali “faced east to call upon Allah” (Diouf 1998: 62).  
The stories of Muslim slaves that are available to us suggest that, in the absence 
of community and technical knowledge, Bilali and other Muslims turned towards the east 
when they prayed. One can identify several reasons for that. Most of the Muslim slaves 
brought to America were from West Africa, so Mecca in their consciousness was in the 
East. The slaves also came increasingly under the influence of Christian culture, so that 
east, the Holy Land, Jerusalem, and the sunrise tended to melt into one sacred direction. 
Muslim slaves’ search for the direction towards Mecca overlapped with this imagination 
and it reinforced the perception of east as qibla. 
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Not only the direction but also the religious terminology was gradually subsumed 
under a new culture and language. When the descendants of Bilali were interviewed for a 
project that attempted to retrieve the oral history of Georgia’s Sea Islands, they vaguely 
remembered some of the words their grandmothers uttered during prayers, but they 
appeared to them as indistinguishable exotic sounds such as “hakabara” (which 
researchers familiar with Islam later identified as “Allahu Akbar”). 
Islam not only gradually disappeared, in some instances it merged with 
Christianity. In 1860, a Muslim slave woman known as “Old Lizzy Gray” died in 
Edgefield County. Her obituary appeared on the front page of the Edgefield Advertiser on 
September 12, 1860. Her owner, Dr. E.J. Mims, wrote that she always said that “Christ 
built the first church in Mecca” (Muhammad 1998: 44). 
The stories of Muslim slaves remained unknown for a very long time as few paid 
attention to the Muslim component of their identities. Kunta Kinte in Alex Haley’s Roots 
was a Muslim, although Haley’s account downplays its Muslim elements (Haley 1976). 
Recent studies such as Allan Austin’s African Muslims in Antebellum America, have been 
recovering the stories of Muslim individuals and their spiritual struggles. As Umar ibn 
Said, a slave from Fayetteville, North Carolina, wrote (in Arabic) in his 1831 
autobiography: “When I came to the Christian country, my religion was the religion of 
Mohammed, the Apostle of God… And now I pray ‘Our Father, etc.,’ in the words of 
Jesus the Messiah” (Austin 1997: 16). A recent PBS documentary, Prince Among Slaves 
(2007), similary tells the story of a Muslim Prince enslaved in America.  
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Unlike some Muslim communities in the Caribbean and South America, the Islam 
that came with African slaves to North America was not fated to survive.15 But it left its 
traces in the memory and consciousness of African Americans. One example of this is to 
be found in the Gullah dialect of Georgia’s Sea Islands, where transculturation of African 
languages and English produced a creole that combined elements from both (Turner 
1949) including the survival of some Islamic terminology. Julie Dash’s movie Daughters 
of the Dust (1992) recovers the oral history of Gullah-speaking slave communities, some 
prominent members of which were Muslim. Nonetheless, the contemporary African 
American experience of Islam must be considered more recent: it dates back to the first 
quarter of the twentieth century.16 
The story of immigrants and their ways of finding their qibla is in some ways 
paralleled by those who were already Americans, yet looking for a qibla. African 
Americans who chose to become Muslim saw themselves as reclaiming the Muslim 
identity of their ancestors. This is best expressed in the extended title of the Nation of 
Islam: “The Lost-Found Nation of Islam in the Wilderness of North America.” The Black 
Muslim movement was simultaneously a restoration of racial dignity and a reclamation of 
Islam. 
These early Black Muslim communities were hybrid in many ways. They 
included elements from both Islam and Christianity. Even when the content was Islamic, 
oftentimes the form was Christian. Like their immigrant co-religionists, these Black 
Muslim communities also experienced gradual re-orientation and cultural fine tuning. 
                                                 
15 Samory Rashid argues against this common conclusion in (Rashid 2004: 55). 
16 Two organizations often referred to as representatives of proto-Islam in America are the Moorish Science 
Temple of Noble Drew Ali (1913) and the Nation of Islam (1930) led by Elijah Muhammad. Both 
organizations relied on a genealogical discourse and linked themselves to Muslim slaves and the history of 
Islam in Africa.  
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Two prominent Detroit mosques reflect the history of this transition: Masjid Wali 
Muhammad and the Muslim Center of Detroit. 
The Muslim Center of Detroit was opened in 1985 and has much more in 
common with immigrant mosques than the older Masjid Wali Muhammad. What is now 
Masjid Wali Muhammad used to be called Muhammad Temple Number One under the 
Nation of Islam and its leader, Elijah Muhammad. The members of the Nation of Islam at 
the temple used to pray towards Chicago, where the headquarters of the Nation of Islam 
were located. Many practices of the Nation of Islam were incompatible with the orthodox 
practices of Muslims in the rest of the world. How did Muhammad Temple Number One 
become Masjid Wali Muhammad and the Nation of Islam become the Muslim American 
Society? 
In a group interview with Imam Saleem Rahman of Masjid Wali Muhammad and 
his assistant Imam Gary Al Kassab, Imam Saleem described this transition. 
Our temples were not mosques proper... We saw others as weird and they saw us 
as weird. We felt like Allah came to us with Master Farad. Allah came in the 
person of Farad and chose Honorable Elijah Muhammad as His messenger. 
The transition [after Warith Deen Muhammad assumed the leadership] was 
difficult for many of us. I thought this is “our” religion. Mine was very small, 
what I was thinking. This man was talking about the universal. Many of us 
thought we were Muslims proper [but] we were not. The imam said “most of y’all 
are Christians masquerading as Muslims.” We were being taught the Bible… The 
Qur’an was always held up as ‘the book to come.’ Many of us had it. We had it on 
our shelves. And Elijah Muhammad said “in time we will get to the Qur’an. Right 
now I am teaching from the Bible. (Interview, February 18, 2005) 
 
At this point, the assistant imam intervened and said that “when Muhammad was 
mentioned in the Qur’an, we thought that it refers to the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. 
When my brother became Muslim through immigrants we had discussions about that…” 
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Imam Saleem continued with what happened after Warith Deen Muhammad 
assumed the leadership of the Nation of Islam in 1975 after the death of his father: 
This place used to be ‘Muhammad Temple Number One.’ In 1975 Imam Warith 
Deen Muhammad changed it into Masjid Wali Muhammad. All we did, we took 
out chairs and brought in carpets and changed the direction from West to Qibla. 
 
 I asked Imam Abdullah El Amin of the Muslim Center of Detroit, another mosque 
which follows the teachings of W.D. Muhammad, about the transition to orthodox Islam. 
El Amin also emphasized the suddenness of the transformation: 
You know, it’s almost like when the Prophet changed the direction of prayer from 
Jerusalem to Mecca, you know. So, on Linwood over there [that is, at Masjid 
Wali Muhammad⎯ MB], they used to pray to the west, and they were praying to 
the west all those years, but Imam Mohammed said no, the direction is to Mecca. 
So instantly the whole community turned to face Mecca. It was almost the same 
as the Prophet receiving the revelation to change and instantly all the Muslims 
without question turned their qibla toward Mecca. So it was a very powerful 
event. I think…  
 
When W.D. Muhammad assumed the leadership of the Nation of Islam he 
introduced several dramatic changes. Islam would no longer be “the black man’s 
religion” but a universal religion. It would be open to whites too. This move away from 
Nation of Islam doctrine towards mainstream Islam was symbolically crowned with the 
introduction of the word “Bilalian” as an alternative to Negro, black or Afro-American 
(Mamiya 1982: 138-152). The Nation’s newspaper, Muhammad Speaks, underwent a 
similar change under W. D. Muhammad’s leadership and became the Bilalian News. 
African Americans, in their search for Mecca in America, thus found their qibla 
in a historical figure who was simultaneously African and Meccan: Bilal al Habashi 
(Bilal the Ethiopian). Bilal ibn Rabah was the first Black Muslim in history. A 
contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad, he became Muslim while he was a slave. After 
his conversion and later emancipation he assumed an honorable status as a companion of 
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the Prophet17 and the first muezzin (caller to prayer). The figure of Bilal forged a perfect 
link between African Americans and Islam.18 His story resonated with the Black 
experience in America.19 The theme of Ethiopianism is also in harmony with Christian 
Biblical culture. Ethiopia is an ancient African kingdom with a long tradition of 
Christianity. Through the figure of Bilal, African American Muslims were 
simultaneously creating a channel of engagement with Islamic orthodoxy and remaining 
within the religious and racial discourse of the larger African American community.20 
The very name of the organization, the Nation of Islam, was also changed-- not 
once but several times. In each re-naming one sees the elements of convergence with the 
universalism of mainstream Islam and more importantly a closer embrace of mainstream 
America. This becomes clear through the evolving names of  the Nation of Islam: Nation 
of Islam (1930); World Community of al Islam in the West (1976); American Muslim 
Mission (1980); The Ministry of W. D. Muhammad (1985); Muslim American Society 
(1997). Warith Deen Muhammad’s name and honorifics have also evolved in a similar 
direction. Soon after he became the leader of the organization his title was changed from 
Supreme Minister (1975) to Chief Imam (1976).  
Qibla changes in both African American and immigrant Muslim histories, and 
various acts of naming and re-naming all bring the two lineages of American Islam closer 
together. In addition to the unification of qibla, there has been a growing compatibility 
                                                 
17 In Sunni tradition, the Prophet’s companions have semi-sacred status as bearers of religious knowledge. 
18 A recent commentary on the intersection of Black and Muslim identities is Zaid Shakir’s Scattered 
Pictures: Reflections of an American Muslim (2005: 63-76). 
19 When Dawud Walid, the executive director of CAIR-Michigan, gave a lecture to the members of Muslim 
Student Association on the University of Michigan campus in Ann Arbor, he structured his narrative about 
the Muslim ummah around the figure of Bilal as a way of bridging the divide between African American 
and immigrant Muslim communities (February 2, 2006). 
20 Another parallel movement is the Rastafarian movement. For the competition between the Bilalian and 
the Rastafarian movements, see Mazrui (2004: 121). 
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between the two groups’ theological discourses. Initially ethnic or racial, they have both 
increasingly become religious. More importantly, their convergence also encourages 
further embrace of Americanness as an identification compatible with Islam.  
  Both immigrant scholars like Taha Jabir Al Alwani and indigenous leaders like 
W.D. Muhammad encourage the possibility of interpreting Islam in the context of its 
minority status in America (Al Alwani 2003). The search for an Islamic legal thinking 
that takes the minority status of Muslims seriously into account is an attempt at carving 
out autonomy for Muslims in the United States. The road to such a possibility is full of 
obstacles, though, and the discussions cannot always be reduced to immigrant versus 
native differences.  
In the case of the qibla debate, for example, it is important to note that what 
appears to be a simple technical problem is rather a complex one. The debate between 
opposing views is a conflict between an “organic” (subjective) conception of space and a 
technical (objective) conception. Both sides can draw on sacred texts and prophetic 
traditions that confirm their approach. While it might be possible for the qibla debate to 
reach a technical resolution, we should remember that the debate is never purely rational 
or technical, for it is taking place under structural constraints such as the requirements of 
organized modern life in America and the imperative of unifying Muslims as a minority 
so that collective interests can be pursued. One such collective interest is the recognition 
of Muslim holidays in public calendars and institutional arrangements.21 
                                                 
21 Many Muslims have difficulties getting days off for holidays because they themselves do not know 
exactly when the holiday starts. They are torn between two calendars, two ways of partitioning time: solar 
and lunar. The lunar calendar, which has been marginalized in practical life by the hegemony of the solar 
calendar in the Christian era, resurfaces on special religious days. Although both solar and lunar calendars 
are ways of partitioning time, they slice time differently. As a consequence, there is always a certain 
disjuncture between the two. The debate over moonsighting among American Muslims constitutes another 
interesting avenue of exploration.  
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One can see the gradual emergence of structure, order and orthodoxy in the 
evolution of names that both immigrant and convert Muslims gave to their religious 
institutions. They called their meeting places temples or halls: the earliest mosques in 
Detroit under the Nation of Islam were called temples and the early immigrant mosques, 
such as the one in Highland Park and the precursor of the Islamic Center of America, 
were called Muhammadan Hall and Hashemite Hall, respectively. Both communities 
initially congregated and prayed on Sundays instead of Fridays They faced various 
directions during prayers, ranging from west to southeast. Their qiblas also eventually 
converged, a process of transformation whose traces are increasingly vanishing. 
 
Conclusion 
Translation of Islam into the American context requires both spatial and temporal 
boundary work, where immigrants and converts alike engage in cultural fine tuning and 
seek convergence between their practices. In the formative, contested moment prior to the 
emergence of orthodoxy, there is no rule, only multiple practices. After one of those 
practices gains canonical status through codification and others are marginalized⎯ as in 
the case of the northeast qibla⎯ one observes the emergence of a rule and the subtle 
disappearance of symbolic violence into taken-for-granted (commonsense) reality. 
Muslims initially lived with a cacophony of directions: southeast, west, northeast and 
east. When the standard is produced through constitution of one claim as the 
commonsense or scientific fact, the symbolic violence that once left scars in the interiors 
of mosques and created an accent in the Muslim sense of direction assumes normality and 
naturalness. Now it has become constitutive and productive. It is taken for granted that 
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qibla is northeast. The transition from anomie to nomos is accomplished and the 
elimination of negative charisma achieved. What was once felt as symbolic violence, like 
speaking a new language, has now become “nature”, like a native language. This is the 
contrast between Imam Shuajb or Eid Alawan, who take the northeast qibla for granted, 
and the old man who still thinks that the southeast qibla is right. It is the contrast between 
the two old mosques with two mihrabs and the many new ones with only one. And it is 
the contrast between first generation immigrants and the American-born generations. 
The direction of symbolic change for both immigrant Muslims of various kinds 
and W. D. Muhammad’s Muslim American Society has been a convergence towards 
orthodoxy in Islam. Yet this orthodoxy is not necessarily an orthodox Islam in general 
but one mediated by the American experience. In this convergence no party represents a 
preordained orthodoxy. Rather, orthodoxy is constituted through interaction and 
negotiation. This interaction and convergence makes possible the cultural settlement of 
Islam and leads to the crystallization of an American Islam. The contours of the 
development of American Islam can be traced through various sectors of American life 
that are being codified by Muslims. Those sectors include qibla, moonsighting, gender-
based partitioning of space in the mosques, development of halal food standards, 
sporadic neighborhood debates (like the call-to-prayer controversies) and the subsequent 
settlement of the problems of mosque soundscapes. All represent moments and sites of a 
negotiation between Islam and its new American environment.  
Qibla unification represents the symbolic unification of a community that is 
racially, ethnically, culturally and even linguistically divided. In this sense, the American 
context for Muslims of various backgrounds looks very much like the situation of 
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pilgrims in Mecca. Like American Muslims, pilgrims in Mecca come from various 
cultures, ethnicities, and language backgrounds but they are symbolically unified through 
the centrality of the Kaaba. Finding Mecca in America, therefore, is a story of the cultural 
settlement of Islam as an American religion in the eyes of Muslims. Whether Islam has 
become or will become an American religion in the eyes of non-Muslim Americans is 
another question entirely. The naturalization of Islam in America is contingent on the 
completion of the naturalization of America in Islam. Such a naturalization is made 
possible through the introduction of Islamic nomos in the form of Muslim directionality 















The English Language and Islam: Genealogy of an Encounter 
 
Etymologically both words kalam (“speech”) and kalima (“word”) derive from 
kalm, which the Arabic dictionaries define as jarh, which means to cut or wound. 
Jarh in turn is explained more generally to mean ta’thir, to leave traces and 




Unlike Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, Urdu or Malay, English is not among the 
historically Muslim languages. It is basically a language that has no history of hosting 
Islam as either religion or culture. Only recently has English become a “Muslim 
language” in the sense that a significant number of people in the United States and across 
the globe speak it as their native language while practicing Islam as their religion/culture. 
The connection between language and culture is important because languages are 
embedded in the cultures of their speakers; linguistic and cultural categories inform and 
nurture one another. The challenge of translation from one language to another becomes 
more acute when the cultures in question are dramatically different. In such situations, 
linguistic translation becomes a cultural reinterpretation. A question naturally arises: 
what happens when a set of practices and its attendant vocabulary adopts a new, 
culturally alien language as its habitat? Does the language put limitations on the culture? 
How does the culture or religion carve its own space in the language? 
Today the English language is the lingua franca of Muslims in the diaspora. 
Diasporic Islam is not only communicated but, more importantly, increasingly 
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“produced” in English. For instance, Hamza Yusuf, a prominent American Muslim 
scholar, is popular among Scandinavian Muslim youth (Schmidt 2005). The Islamic 
Center of America in Dearborn hosts speakers from Australia. One of the most popular 
convert public intellectuals among American Muslim youth is Abdulhakim Murad (Tim 
Winter), who lives in England and teaches at Cambridge. The link among all these people 
spatially removed from one another is Islam and English. Unfortunately, both the English 
language, which is new to Islam, and the mutual influence between English and Islam are 
taken for granted. The traces of their encounter increasingly vanish as Muslims are 
becoming naturalized. The encounter between Muslims and the English language is a 
neglected issue in the scholarship on Islam in America.22 Yet it is crucial for delineating 
the contemporary nature of American or globalized Islam because of the tensions and 
privileges it engenders. 
In this chapter, I discuss the cultural implications of the encounter between the 
English language and Islam. Examining both its historical and contemporary moments, I 
explore the impact of English on the understanding of Islam and the transformative 
appropriation of English by American Muslims. In other words, I investigate the ways in 
which Muslims perceived the English language in the past and how they now make it a 
Muslim language in the English-speaking American society where they are a minority. 
The framework in which I work is not linguistic, but rather a cultural sociology based on 
ethnographic research into the English language in relation to its Muslim speakers. As 
such, it investigates an important dimension of citizenship, namely the process of 
linguistic membership in a society and how Muslims overcome the symbolic violence 
incurred in their gradual immersion in the English language.  
                                                 




Linguistic Nomos and Symbolic Violence 
Key to the discussion that follows is the idea of language acquisition as a form of 
symbolic violence. Symbolic violence refers to the operation of naming or re-naming.23 It 
is the imposition of a nomos, the formative and collective form of which is language. 
Before further expanding the idea of symbolic violence, let me first explain what nomos 
means. Nomos is a crucial concept for understanding the relationship between order and 
orientation. Carl Schmitt describes nomos as “the Greek word for the first measure of all 
subsequent measures, for the first land-appropriation understood as the first partition and 
classification of space, for the primeval division and distribution” (Schmitt 2003: 67). 
Bourdieu similarly defines nomos as “a word that is narrowly translated as ‘law’ and 
would be better rendered as ‘constitution,’ a term which better recalls the arbitrary act of 
institution, or as ‘principle of vision and division’” (Bourdieu 2000: 96). 
As an imposition of nomos, symbolic violence can be of two types. 24 First, it may 
be constitutive. Such symbolic violence is productive in the sense that it establishes 
boundaries and generates entities by naming them. This kind of symbolic violence is the 
work of the limits into which one is born. Pure, constitutive symbolic violence is the 
primary form of classification; it is what Bourdieu (1984: 466) calls the habitus. One 
example of constitutive symbolic violence would be a person’s relationship to his or her 
culture and native language. The learning of a first language is pure symbolic violence in 
                                                 
23 Symbolic violence is not necessarily violence by other means. For example, what is symbolic violence in 
the act of name-calling? That the person is called a name that she does not want to be called is certainly a 
symbolic “violence.” But the concept of symbolic violence refers not only to schoolyard taunts and racial 
name-calling but also parental name-giving. Therefore, it may not be and usually is not perceived as 
something negative or harmful. 
24 Bourdieu himself does not distinguish between the two types of symbolic violence presented here. The 
distinction between ‘constitutive’ and ‘restrictive’ types of symbolic violence is mine. 
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the sense that it is not the imposition of boundaries on an already formatted surface, but 
the first formatting of that surface. This symbolic inscription of culture or language is 
constitutive and productive. It produces subjects. 
The second type of symbolic violence is the imposition of boundaries on entities 
whose existence and shape precede the newly imposed limits. It has a restrictive, if not 
always repressive, character. Unlike the first type of symbolic violence, it is felt and can 
leave scars on its subjects. These scars include accent in speech (animmigrant’s broken 
English), incompatibility of body language (Bourdieu’s Bearnese peasants who cannot 
dance), discrepancy between thought and expression (Muslim clerics’ inability to explain 
certain elements of Islam in English) and a general sense of disorientation (popularly 
known as culture shock). Speakers of second languages and practitioners of new 
religions⎯ where a new culture is superimposed upon an existing one⎯ are subject to 
such symbolic violence. Most immigrants and converts subject themselves to this kind of 
violence voluntarily. 
The difference between the two types of symbolic violence stems from whether 
symbolic violence is exercised for the first time or not. The first one is constitutive, the 
second, restrictive. It is often a matter of time for the imposition of boundaries to lose its 
impositional character and be regarded as natural. It usually does not happen in one 
generation, but does so over two or three generations. This happens when the effects of 
symbolic violence come to be perceived as natural and objective. Cultural settlement in a 
new language therefore can be defined as the eventual resolution of the tension between 




Language as a Habitat 
A native language is home. Someone else’s language can be a prison. The native 
speaker feels at home in the world because the world is in him, in the form of habitus 
(Bourdieu 2000: 143) The difference between a native language and a second language is 
that we are born into the former and defined by it. There is a perfect correspondence 
between our habitus and our habitat, our perception of the world and the world itself. 
Everything seems natural, harmonious. We become what we are and the world appears to 
us as it is through our native language. But when we speak another (“foreign”) language 
we are in a foreign land. Things do not seem natural and harmonious. A gap between our 
internal world (habitus) and this external world (our new habitat) emerges. Our effort to 
bridge this gap causes a lapse in time and the ordeal of internal translation. We do not 
feel at home; we stay on mental guard. Our turning of the new environment into a home 
takes time and may face obstacles from the ontological filter and restrictions of the new 
language. Once the new habitat sediments in our bodies, it becomes the new habitus for 
us; only then do we feel at home again. 
If, as Saussure argues (1959: 68), the essence of language is “convention,” then 
language cannot exist outside the culture of its speakers. That is, convention is a temporal 
ground. This, however, does not mean that the existing culture cannot change; on the 
contrary, acculturation is always possible. But it means that until sedimentation or 
convention⎯ which is the ground for language⎯ is achieved through time and across 
community, any new acculturation will “feel” unnatural, non-standard and strange. The 
mental fields and ontological categories carved by each language may not correspond 
neatly with those of another. In situations of immigration or displacement, a discordance 
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may emerge between habitus and habitat. The impact of finding oneself in “another” 
language is that the symbolic violence that is invisibly exercised in the production of our 
“native” language (in a way that precedes our history and awareness) all of a sudden 
surfaces in our consciousness and becomes visible. 
Therefore, put differently, symbolic violence is the introduction of a (new) nomos. 
The transition from one language to another may cause linguistic anomie25, where the 
original nomos is no longer valid and the new nomos is not yet fully internalized or 
naturalized. The original nomos which is home (habitus) to us now is overlaid by a new 
one (a gradually sedimenting habitat) which may feel like a prison. Over time and 
through naturalization/adjustment the new language and its prison-like feeling [inducing 
symbolic violence] is overcome and replaced by a feeling of a new home --a new habitus, 
which is a product of the incorporation of nomos (Bourdieu 2000:143). This transition is 
almost never perfect as the old home survives in the new one in the form of accent and 
delay. The naturalization process is an erasure of the disjuncture and an articulation of a 
new harmony between habitus and habitat. When fully inhabited, a language becomes a 
true instrument (like a glove) instead of a necessary but uncomfortable one (like an ill-
fitting shoe). 
This chapter captures a vanishing aspect of the cultural settlement of Muslims in 
American society and culture. Like the problem of the codification of space (i.e., finding 
qibla), the encounter with English belongs to the set of challenges Muslims faced in the 
initial stages of their entry into American culture: it is part of the genesis of American 
Islam. Oftentimes, these problems and challenges are forgotten by the later generations 
                                                 
25 Durkheim used the concept to refer to the weakening or absence of normative standards in modern 
society (Durkheim 1951: 241). A narrowly understood concept in sociology, anomie etymologically means 
the absence of nomos. 
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for whom all things historical26 now appear quite natural and unremarkable. But 
scholarship on Islam in America needs to avoid taking them for granted. 
 
Two Encounters, Then and Now 
The process of globalization has led to the spread of English as a global language 
and the spread of Islam as a global religion. The latter is also responsible for the 
emergence of Muslim minorities in English-speaking, historically non-Muslim countries 
such as the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The framework with 
which Muslims have perceived and interpreted the English language has also shifted over 
time. Two moments can be distinguished in the encounter between English and Islam. 
These are the historical encounter, marked by colonialism and Christian missionaries, and 
the contemporary encounter, marked by globalization and Muslim minorities.  
 
Historical Encounter: Colonialism and Christianity 
English: Colonial and Christian 
The early encounters between Muslims and the English language took place in 
colonial contexts. Muslims who were colonized by Europeans identified their languages 
with Christianity, domination and cultural conversion. Not only Muslims but all 
colonized peoples harbored a strong suspicion towards the language of the colonizer. The 
colonizer’s language was part of a larger colonial discourse where cultures and languages 
were placed in a hierarchy. It is not surprising that the first chapter of Frantz Fanon’s 
classic book, Black Skin White Masks, is on language. Early on he notes not only how 
                                                 
26 I use the term “historical” here to draw attention to the historicity, contingency and constructedness of 




“mastery of the colonizer’s language affords remarkable power” but also how it 
represents a tragic loss of authenticity. He observes that 
Every colonized people –in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority 
complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality- 
finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation. (Fanon 1967: 
18) 
 
That anticolonial movements have an ambivalent relationship with the language 
of the colonizer has a great deal to do with the colonial context, where the identity and 
authenticity of the colonized is balanced against the seductive power of the colonizer’s 
language. In the case of Muslims, where the difference in language is paired with a 
difference in religion, suspicion towards the language of the colonizer becomes 
inevitable. In other words, the colonizer’s language never comes to the colonized 
independently and simply as a language. It is never a means of communication alone. 
Rather it comes initially in a tightly knit bundle with colonial domination and its cultural 
apparatus⎯ including Christianity and missionary education. 
When Islam and the English language came into contact in colonial environments, 
English was accordingly seen as the language of “the colonizer” and “the Christians.”27 
As Ali Mazrui, a prominent scholar of Africa, notes, 
The equation of the English language with [Christian] missionary education was a 
major factor in conditioning Islamic attitudes towards it. Muslims became 
suspicious of the English language on the basis of a presumed guilt by 
association. This was aggravated by the sense of cultural defensiveness which 
developed among Muslim communities. (Mazrui 1971: 180) 
 
                                                 
27 Even today Christian missionaries use the prestige and power of English to spread their religious beliefs 
in many parts of the world. This in turn reinforces the perceived relationship between English and 
Christianity. In a strange twist, Muslim missionaries also use the teaching of English to enhance their 
prestige and persuasiveness (e.g. the work of  Fethullah Gulen community schools in Central Asia). 
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Thus, learning English historically meant learning the language of Christian 
missionaries or that of the colonizers. “Being associated with conquest and colonialism, 
English was seen as inherently inhospitable to Islam and as syntactically and discursively 
different from any of the major Islamic languages” another scholar writes (Malak 2005: 
2). In other words, due to the historical baggage of colonialism and Christianity, English 
has been perceived by many Muslims as a “kafir” (infidel) language (Pennycook 1994: 
314). This perception⎯ which has dramatically changed over time⎯ did not make the 
distinction between learning a language and adopting its culture. 
If the Christian convictions of English speakers led Muslims to approach the 
language with suspicion, how did colonialism affect Muslims’ appropriation and use of 
the English language? If English entered the Muslim imagination and experience through 
colonization, how did this shape the ways in which Muslims entered the discursive world 
of English? This question leads us to a striking dimension of the encounter between Islam 
and the English language. 
 
Diasporic Islam: An Identity-centric Islam 
The first Islamic texts written in English or translated into English and made 
available to English-speaking audiences were produced by Muslims living in colonized 
lands, notably India and Egypt. The most famous example is Abul Ala Mawdudi28 who, 
together with Sayyid Qutb, is considered among the founding figures of modern political 
Islamism. Colonial background informed the ways people constructed themselves and 
more importantly it impacted their articulation of religion. Even the mere use of English 
                                                 
28 Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) is the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in British India. Mawdudi’s works are 




language in the communication of religion and social issues inadvertently put authors and 
the users of that language in dialogue with the colonizing culture, thereby inviting a 
hidden transcript of anticolonialism. Hence, the English language was not only a means 
of communication for people who were colonized, but this fact shaped the content and 
deployment of texts written in English. If so, what can be said about the nature of Islam 
as it was constructed in texts written in English? 
Early Islam in English was marked by postcolonial nationalism and a sense of 
displacement. The audiences of such texts were either displaced Muslims speaking 
English or Muslims subjected to colonial rule. The Islam produced in the English 
language can thus be defined as a “diasporic Islam.” Consequently, one characteristic of 
Islam in the English language is that it approaches Islam not as religion⎯ or not only as 
religion⎯ but as an identity. This distinction becomes harder to detect in our age of 
identity politics, not to mention in the context of the scholarly tendency to reduce religion 
to identity. 
The encounter between the English language and Islam was mediated by the 
colonial experience and produced an identity-centric Islam, which at times would 
culminate in Muslim nativism. It is this diasporic foundation that arguably finds an echo 
in contemporary Muslim radicalism in the Western world. The impact finds expression in 
the anticolonial baggage of early writings. Intellectuals or scholarly figures who wrote in 
English or whose writings were translated early on into English were anticolonial 
thinkers. They often placed Islam in opposition to Western culture and civilization. And, 
not surprisingly, they produced a totalistic understanding of Islam which later became the 
ground for political Islamism. One might ask why this anticolonial sentiment and reaction 
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had a lasting impact. I contend that this moment was, to use Bourdieu’s terms, an 
“inaugural moment” (Bourdieu 2000: 95) in the institution of Islam in the English 
language. For practical reasons of path-dependency, those writings and their diasporic 
Islam had a lasting influence on how Muslims entering into the sphere of English through 
immigration (and those English speakers entering the sphere of Islam through 
conversion) made sense of themselves and their new environment. 
If one walks into the libraries of most of the mosques in North America⎯ as I 
have done often of late29⎯ in pursuit of textual sources of American Islam, one is likely 
to notice the presence of works by Mawdudi, Qutb, and many others. Yet only a decade 
or two ago, the libraries of Islamic centers were largely empty of English-language 
books. The few books available would most likely be those of Mawdudi and Qutb. The 
reason for this is not necessarily ideological. As a matter of fact, the wide presence of 
such books and the absence of others was due to the unavailability of Islamic works in 
English. Those that were available, therefore, became common30 and later classic. And 
they exercised a certain influence on American mosque culture and global Islam in 
general. Although there is today a proliferation of new Islamic works produced by 
indigenous American Muslims, the works of Mawdudi and Qutb continue to enjoy the 
status of classics of Islam in English. 
                                                 
29 In a recent visit to Detroit Muslim Center, a predominantly African-American mosque with a vibrant 
community and leadership, while checking  the books on display and for sale after the Friday prayer I was 
not surprised to see Mawdudi’s book, Toward Understanding Islam (Mawdudi, nd). 
30 As noted by Barbara Metcalf, “Islamic bookshops in Washington DC, Durban, London and Karachi will 
likely carry the same range of English books produced by English-speaking Muslims throughout the world” 





Figure 3.1. A typical mosque library shelf. This one, at the Tawheed Center in 
Farmington Hills, Michigan, includes Sayyid Qutb (Milestones), Abul A’la Mawdudi 
(Towards Understanding Islam) and Muhammad Asad (The Road to Makkah). 
 
A good illustration of the place of such works in the imagination of American 
Muslims can be traced in a recent statement by Dawud Walid. Walid is an African-
American Muslim and native of Detroit who is a vice imam at a mosque affiliated with 
Warith Deen Muhammad (Elijah Muhammad’s son); he is also the director of the local 
chapter of CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations),31 a Muslim advocacy group. 
When asked which authors he most likes to read, Walid said that he reads “Sayyid Qutb, 
Imam Khomeini, Maulana Mawdudi, Ismail Faruqi and Imam Warith Deen Muhammad” 
(A. James, Interview with Dawud Walid, The Muslim Observer, January 6-12, 2006). 
Although Imam Khomeini and Imam Warith Deen Muhammad are not technically 
diasporic, the remaining names are diasporic Muslims who produced Islamic works either 
                                                 
31 For an extended discussion of CAIR, see Chapter 5. An extended profile of Walid is located in Chapter 6.  
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in English or for English-speaking Muslims. What connects an African American Muslim 
born in Detroit to Muslim scholar/activists from India and Egypt of decades ago? The 
English language. I shall further develop the relationship between the English language 
and postcolonial Muslim intellectuals when I discuss the case of Ismail Faruqi and his 
approach to English. 
In short, the impact of colonialism and the English language on Muslims resulted 
in an anticolonial culture and identity-centric, diasporic understanding of Islam. Although 
the early Muslim intellectuals who wrote in or were translated into English successfully 
overcame their suspicion toward the English language, this was achieved at the price of 
turning Islam into an “identity” deployed in opposition to Western culture. This fact can 
also be restated from the other direction, as Mazrui does: “Although learning English will 
certainly lead to a certain degree of Westernization, it was the English educated, those 
who could speak the colonizers’ language, who came to articulate anticolonial 
sentiments” (Mazrui 1975 quoted in Mohd-Asraf 1996: 367). 
 
Contemporary Encounter: Globalization and Muslim Minorities 
As noted earlier, the story of the relationship between Islam and the English 
language is marked by two large-scale phenomena: colonialism and globalization. While 
the former characterizes the historical encounter of Muslims with the English language, 
the latter describes an ongoing process. Similarly, while the Muslim attitude toward the 
English language during the colonial encounter was one of rejection, in the contemporary 
world, it is increasingly becoming one of acceptance. Unlike the colonial situation, where 
English was the language of the colonizer and of Christianity, today Muslims are in the 
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process of making English a Muslim language and detaching it from its colonial past. It 
has also become the lingua franca for a significant number of Muslims. 
Globalization has brought English and Islam into closer contact. Once total 
strangers, globalization has turned them into friend and foe at the same time. While 
English allows for the articulation of a global Islam, becoming a vessel for its 
dissemination, the same English is often presented as an antidote to the international 
terrorism associated with Islam.32 Globalization of English and globalization of Islam 
have dramatically changed the interaction of both. English is no longer seen by many 
outsiders as tied to any culture or nation: it has now become the property of the entire 
world.33 The same can be said for Islam. Both English and Islam are now at large. 
Today one can speak of two ways in which Muslims think about the English 
language in relation to Islam. These are the issues of “English in Islam” and “Islam in 
English,” respectively. The first issue has to do with carving a space for English in Islam 
and among Muslims. This problem arises at the periphery of the language, in Muslim 
majority contexts where English is a foreign language. The second one has to do with 
carving a space for Islam within the English language and Western culture. This issue 
appears at the periphery34 of Islam, in Muslim minority contexts. These two approaches 
also mark the gradual immersion of Muslims in the English language. In the beginning, 
English was external to Islam and was treated as something that had to be 
                                                 
32 For example, English has been receiving particular attention from the US government. The Bush 
administration seems to have engaged in promoting the English language against Islamic extremism. The 
Washington Post reported the recent change in school curricula in Qatar as “more English, less Islam.” 
(Susan Glasser, “Qatar reshapes its schools, putting English over Islam” Washington Post, 2/2/2003). 
33 According to the British daily The Independent, within 10 years half of the world will be speaking 
English. (James Burleigh, “English to be spoken by half of the world’s population within 10 years, The 
Independent, December 9, 2004). 
34 Many Muslims would object to the distinction of center and periphery for Islam since it is theologically 
not tied to any location. Nevertheless, the geographies where Islam has a recent presence despite its 
historical presence elsewhere can be defined as the periphery of Islam. 
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accommodated/legitimized. Later, when Muslims became fully embedded in the English 
language through immigration and naturalization, it was Islam that seemed external to 
their setting (habitat) and in need of accommodation.  
 
English in Islam: Language as  a Tool 
This pragmatic approach to English is a direct outcome of economic globalization 
and focuses on the instrumentality of English as the language of globalization and 
technology. It emerges out of Muslim majority contexts and is best illustrated by the case 
of Malaysia. It comes as no surprise that Malaysia, a Muslim nation that has embraced 
economic globalization, is at the same time the first and perhaps the only nation to host a 
conference specifically dealing with the relationship between Islam and English. Held in 
1996 at the International Islamic University in Malaysia, this conference was presented as 
a response to the needs of Muslims in a globalizing world where the English language 
plays an increasingly crucial role. The interaction between Islam and English, the two 
globalizers, was deployed in terms of a parallelism: Jalal Uddin Khan, the co-editor of the 
published proceedings of the conference, noted that the conference was “perhaps the first 
of its kind in the world.” He then juxtaposed Islam and English as follows: 
Neither of them remained confined to the place of its origin, having reached far 
and wide across the languages and cultures of the world. Both are equally global 
and pluralistic, with the result that Islam today does not mean whatever is Arab 
only and English whatever is Western or Christian. There are Arab Christians as 
there are English-speaking Muslims or Muslims who are native English speakers. 
English has been the most widely used means of expression and communication 
as Islam has been the fastest growing or most resurgent religion in today’s world.” 




The timing, location and themes of the conference reflected the nature of the 
transition that Muslim nations like Malaysia were undergoing. From a framework of 
colonialism, Malaysia had moved to one of globalization, where English was being 
embraced as an imperative of development and progress. One could even surmise here a 
certain concurrence, if not complicity, between Islam and the globalization of English 
(Karmani 2003b). Many Malay Muslims believed that “when we learn English, we will 
be rewarded by Allah” because “when one seeks knowledge or learns another language, 
one earns God’s pleasure” (Mohd-Asraf 2005: 111). Thus learning English was not only 
Islamically legitimate but also desirable. In the words of African Muslim Dahiru M. 
Argungu, 
Muslims definitely need English today, in particular, in education. Apart from 
education, English is a strategic bridge linking Muslims with a vast English-
speaking non-Muslim world with great potentials for outreach da’awah35 
activities, business and international relations (Argungu 1996: 336). 
 
The following quote from another participant of the conference brings out how 
the suspicion toward English was overcome and highlights the role postcolonial Muslim 
thinkers played in appropriating the language: 
It is possible to be highly proficient in English and still maintain one’s identity as 
Muslims. In fact, there are many Muslims from among our contemporaries as well 
as those in our past, such as Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Fazlur Rahman, Sayyid 
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Ismail Faruqi, to name 
but among the most prominent ones, who are highly proficient in English and who 
have used their ability in the language for the purpose of Islam (Mohd-Asraf 
1996: 363). 
 
In the approach championed by the Malaysian conference, the English language 
was appropriated for Muslim purposes of global economic competitiveness, propagation 
                                                 
35 Da’wah is the Arabic word for service and propagation of Islam. An important idiom in the discourse of 
English speaking Muslims and essential element in the repertoire of diasporic Islam. 
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of Islam, and the fulfillment of a religious requirement about gaining knowledge.36 
English was thus detached from its Christian-colonial baggage and embraced as a tool for 
economic development and religious service. This treatment of English as an instrument 
of development in the age of globalization neutralized the negative history of the 
language. Yet English still remained external to the Muslim context, something to be 
incorporated and used. This was significantly different from the next approach which 
emerged at the “center” of the English-speaking world, where Muslims lived as 
minorities. 
  
Islam in English: Accommodating Islam 
The second way in which Muslims thought about the English language was 
related to the postcolonial immigration and the rise of English-speaking Muslim 
minorities in Anglophone societies. In this case, the use of English was no longer 
optional⎯ even when suspicions toward English lingered⎯ they derived from a concern 
about its capacity to accommodate Islam. The question here was how to make English a 
Muslim language. The following section discusses two articulations of “Islam in English” 
and notes two moments in the cultural settlement of Islam in the linguistic habitat of 
America. 
 
Faruqi’s Project of “Islamic English” 
A Biography of Diasporic Islam in America 
                                                 
36 Malaysian Muslim scholar Al-Attas, along with many other Muslim scholars before him, classifies the 
learning of other languages as fard kifayah (a communal obligation), “which means that there has to be a 
certain number of educated Muslims who should master certain languages so that they can acquire the 
knowledge that could be obtained through those languages” (Mohd-Asraf 2005: 115). 
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Founded in 1982, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) is currently the 
largest Muslim national organization in the United States. ISNA was born of the fact that 
many Muslim students who came to America to study ended up not going back. As their 
plans to return home gradually faded away, they decided to build institutions that would 
support their diasporic life. The first major Muslim organization and nucleus of 
immigrant Muslim institution-building in the United States was, after all, the Muslim 
Student Association (MSA). Despite the commonsense impression, MSA is not a branch 
of ISNA, rather ISNA came out of MSA. 
Ismail Raji al Faruqi’s (1921-1986) biography is, in a sense, also the history of 
immigrant Muslim experience in America. Not only did he articulate a vision for the 
Muslim community in his writings, he also played a key role in its institutionalization. 
Most of the institutions he was involved with as either founder or promoter are now 
major national organizations: the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Islamic Society 
of North America (ISNA) and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). Faruqi 
was also the first president and founder of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists 
(AMSS). 
Faruqi was a Palestinian refugee who came to the United States to pursue his 
academic studies. He received a doctorate in philosophy in 1952 from the University of 
Indiana. He wrote extensively on Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Although initially an 
Arab nationalist (Faruqi 1962), he gradually abandoned his Arabism in favor of Islamism. 
Faruqi’s ideological orientation and intellectual identity, both in its Arabist and Islamist 
phases, were in many ways postcolonial. After failed attempts to intellectually articulate a 
culturally essentialist idea of Arabism, he found in Islam what he had been looking for: a 
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non-western universalism and authenticity. The guiding theme of his intellectual career 
was an urge to create an authentic ground for himself (and other Muslims) outside of 
Western discourse. The diversity of the Muslim student community with which he 
interacted contributed to his gradual transition to Islamic universalism. He saw in the 
presence of Muslim students in America the possibility of a pure ummah (community of 
Muslims). 
As a visionary intellectual and community leader, Faruqi articulated a diasporic 
conception of Muslimness where ethnic and geographical origins were to be transcended 
in favor of an Islamic universalism. His distinctly diasporic orientation treated America 
as a precious meeting point for Muslims from all over the world. Although they were in 
America (as students), they were nevertheless oriented towards the Muslim lands. Most 
of the institutions initiated by Faruqi and his colleagues had transnational and diasporic 
names⎯ their community and institutions were “in” America, but they were not 
necessarily “American”. 
His colleagues, some of whom I had the opportunity to meet during my visit to 
the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, and at the annual conferences of AMSS, have specialized 
in such varied disciplines as Islamic studies, finance, and political science. Even though 
all are American educated, they are more inclined to see things in a transnational 
framework. (Not surprisingly, one of the senior members of the IIIT told me during a 
conversation that he had visited more than hundred countries, something which struck me 
as quite diasporic and not quite American). The legacy of Faruqi looms large over IIIT, 
AMSS, and ISNA. His contribution to Islamic thought is so significant as to constitute an 
exception: while American Muslims are more likely to “import” Islamic knowledge from 
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overseas, Faruqi is perhaps the only37 thinker whose work had a decisive impact on 
Muslims in other parts of the world. What was Faruqi’s contribution that could be 
exported from America to overseas Muslim contexts? 
Faruqi’s main project, which informed much of his institution-building work, was 
the idea of “Islamization of knowledge” (Faruqi 1982). This project was based on the 
assumption that modern science and knowledge needs to be rehabilitated so as to be 
compatible with the Islamic conception of the world. Despite (or perhaps because of) its 
instant popularity among Muslims at the time, the Islamization of knowledge project was 
a very ambitious one. As an epistemological critique of Western science and its 
metaphysical presuppositions, Islamization of knowledge was a reluctant engagement 
with Western modernity. 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) was established to serve this 
agenda. The Muslim students attracted to this project were to obtain Western knowledge, 
but “Islamicize” it upon taking it back to their home countries. In this way, they would 
become agents of an epistemological rectification (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2004: 72). When it 
became clear that many of these students were not actually going back to their countries 
of origin, their presence in America inspired individuals like Faruqi to dream of a Muslim 
ummah here. This microcosmos of the greater Muslim ummah was to be based in 
America, yet still oriented toward the Muslim world. 
 Faruqi recognized early on that the common language for all these Muslims 
coming from different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds was not Arabic but English. In 
other words, this emergent community was tied together by their Muslim identity and 
                                                 
37 A list of American-based Muslim thinkers who have influenced overseas Muslim intellectual life would 
certainly include important scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Fazlur Rahman. Yet, in my judgment 
the influence of Faruqi is far greater than others’. 
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shared American experience. Faruqi published a small book in 1986 in his “Islamization 
of Knowledge Series” that dealt with the question of English. This programmatic essay 
bore the title Toward Islamic English (Faruqi 1986). 
 
Toward Islamic English 
Faruqi’s Toward Islamic English does not even ask whether Muslims can or 
should use English language, this is already treated as given. The question, rather, is how 
to make the English language sensitive to the culture and worldview of Muslims. What is 
needed, Faruqi argues, is an “Islamic English.” Faruqi defines Islamic English as “the 
English language modified to enable it to carry Islamic proper nouns and meanings 
without distortion, and, thus to serve the linguistic needs of Muslim users of the English 
language” (Faruqi 1986: 7). But who are the Muslim users of English? Faruqi answers: 
Muslim users of the English language are, first, the Muslim citizens and 
permanent residents of the English-speaking countries, namely, the UK, the USA, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. To these, the non-citizen Muslim students 
should be added. The term also includes the Muslim citizens and permanent 
residents of those countries around the world where English is official language, 
such as Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Malaysia, the Philippines in Asia, and Nigeria, 
Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and others in Africa and around the 
globe (Faruqi 1986: 7). 
 
For Faruqi there is a serious problem in the relationship between Islam and the 
English language and it needs an urgent intervention.  
The present situation of the English language –when it expresses matters 
pertaining to Islam, its culture, history and civilization, to the Muslim World or 
the Muslims, whether used by Muslims or non-Muslims- is chaotic. It constitutes 
an intellectual and spiritual disaster of the highest magnitude. And it carries a 




Giving examples of how Muslim names are “mutilated” in transliteration, Faruqi 
calls for a creative appropriation of the language on the part of Muslims. According to 
him, Muslim speakers need to transform the English language at two levels: 
transliteration and translation.  
The question of transliteration appears in the absence of standardization. There 
are multiple uses and no central power to choose which usage is legitimate. Some Arabic 
terms that are increasingly used in English are often spelled differently. For example, 
should the Arabic term for Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca be spelled hajj or hadj? Is it 
Muhammad or Mohamed? Even the name of the religion itself still begs standardization; 
is it Islam or Islaam? 
The problems faced are not limited to transliteration. Through standardization and 
codification, Faruqi argues,  transliteration problems can be eliminated. It should be 
noted that Faruqi insists on a scholarly transliteration and direct use of Arabic words in 
English. In other words, not only should their transliteration be fixed, but they should 
also not be translated. Many Arabic words, he says, are not translatable into English and 
many others are rendered into English only with difficulty. Furthermore, Muslims cannot 
rely on the orientalists’ translations of Islamic terms. “The orientalists may have used 
such translations with impunity because for them it is a foregone conclusion that all 
Islamic meanings must fit themselves under Western categories” (Faruqi 1986: 11). 
There are certain concepts in Islam which cannot be translated. “To give an English 
translation of them is to reduce; and often to ruin, those meanings” (Faruqi 1986: 12). 
Faruqi⎯ and other Muslim intellectuals such as Naquib al Attas, who were 
influenced by his ideas⎯ argue that language reflects ontology, that is, the nature of truth 
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and reality as understood by a religion or culture (Mohd-Asraf 2005: 114). They also 
emphasize that the languages of all Muslim peoples have been infused by the basic 
Islamic vocabulary, which projects a distinctly Islamic worldview. Therefore, the Islamic 
ontology and conception of the world cannot be properly expressed through the English 
language unless it is adjusted.38 The adjustment that Faruqi suggests in his Islamic 
English, in the words of Argungu, “is a remedial measure which aims at bending the 
English language to accommodate” Islam (Argungu 1996: 332) [italics mine]. 
The lack of exact correspondence between the ontology of the English language 
and the ontology of Islam can be illustrated in several registers. Faruqi himself provides 
some of them. For example, the word “prayer” does not distinguish between dua 
(spontaneous supplication) and salat (the five daily fixed-time prayers). It collapses the 
two categories into one and erases the ontological distinction between the two. The same 
can be said about “alms-giving” which fails to distinguish between zakat (the annual 
obligatory public welfare tax) and sadaqah (altruistic, voluntary charity) (Faruqi 1986: 
11-12). 
There can also be conceptual misfits. For instance, some Muslims may find the 
expression “good luck” to be un-Islamic because it implies that things happen by luck. 
Similarly, some Muslims might find themselves uncomfortable with the use of the future 
tense39 in English because “when native speakers of English make reference to future, 
they do not feel a need to ‘soften the arrogant assumption’ that the future will occur, and 
appeal to the benevolence of God on such an occasion by adding ‘God 
                                                 
38 Muslim critics like Sohail Karmani, the editor of TESOL Islamia, an online journal, find this approach 
essentialist and inadequate because “the language informs thought and at the same time thought informs 
language” (Karmani, 2003b). 




willing’”(insha’allah) (Mohd-Asraf 1996: 355). This point is exemplified in the 
following paragraph from Faruqi’s Toward Islamic English, where he frames the purpose 
of Islamic English as a spiritual rehabilitation of the English language for Muslim users 
and performs what is suggested here by inserting “insha’allah” in the future-tense 
sentence: 
In modern times, the English language stands in need of the percepts and values 
of Islam which only the Qur’anic language can provide. Constant use of their 
Arabic form will help to shield the English-speaking Muslims from the onslaught 
of materialism, utilitarianism, skepticism, relativism, secularism and hedonism 
that the last two hundred years have established firmly in English consciousness. 
And it will –insha’Allah- inject a reforming and salutary influence into the 
consciousness of all English speaking Muslims, pulling them out of their tragic 
predicament in modern times (Faruqi 1986: 14-15). 
 
There are also religious words that are secularized and universalized in the 
language which Muslims may find alienating. Such Christian words used in a non–
religious sense include “bible, biblical, christen, christian, Christian name” (Brown 1996: 
310). Also, some Islamic terms are given Western interpretations that may not correspond 
to the Muslim conceptions of them (e.g., jihad, mecca)40. 
To all of the above problems one can add the culturally-produced errors of 
English. If the Muslim appropriation of English is relatively recent and marked by a past 
colonial encounter, the English language’s encounter with Islam is old and marked by a 
history of orientalism and cultural prejudice. A good example of such cultural prejudice 
invested in language would be the notion of “Mohammedanism,”41 which implies that 
                                                 
40 Most Muslims would object to the translation of jihad as holy war. Similarly, Muslims would also prefer 
the use of word mecca/Mecca only in religious context.  
41 Muslims initially used the labels and titles present in the mainstream culture. For example, the first 
Muslim mosque in Michigan (1921) was advertised as the “Mohammedan Hall”. In other instances, 
mosques would be called Moorish or Moslem ‘temples’. They gradually changed such titles and replaced 
them with “Islamic center” or masjid, the Arabic word for mosque. The evolution of names and titles 
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Muslims worship Muhammad, a false prophet claiming to be a god. Faruqi rightly points 
to the “Maumet” entry in Webster’s International Dictionary (Faruqi 1986: 10).  
Part of the prescriptive project of Faruqi’s Islamic English assigns Muslims the 
task of decolonizing English. Decolonization of the English vocabulary about Islam and 
codification of the Islamic vocabulary that is increasingly used in English are two 
avenues for the articulation of an Islamic English.42  
 
Islamic English or Muslim English? 
How Much Islamization is Too Much? 
In February 3, 2003, a young Australian Muslim, Irfan Yusuf, published a short 
essay criticizing Ismail Faruqi’s idea of Islamic English. Published on a popular 
American Muslim website, MuslimWakeUp.com, the essay was entitled “The Islaam of 
Double Vowels” (Yusuf 2003). MuslimWakeUp is a website that caters to young 
professional Muslims who are both second and third generation and also very critical of 
mainstream Muslim conservatism. The website provides a forum for discussion in 
addition to a cornucopia of content, ranging from critical essays to satire and poetry. 
Revealing a gap between Faruqi’s vision and the perception of new generations of 
Muslims in English speaking countries, the essay starts with a teasing question: 
Do we all remember that really cool Palestinian American academic, the late Dr. 
Ismail Faruqi? And what about his cool wife, Lamya? One wrote on Islamic 
thought, the other on Islamic art. A whole generation of young Muslims in North 
America was apparently brought up on that stuff. Well, that’s what we in 
                                                                                                                                                 
provides an interesting illustration of the shift from the labels applied by someone else to one’s own 
designation. 
42 Credit for the successful codification of some Islamic vocabulary should go to the Nation of Islam (led by 
Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X) and its successor, the  American Muslim Mission (led by Warith Deen 
Muhammad). They successfully corrected the spelling and hence pronunciation of some major terms in the 
media. Old British uses such as Moslem and Koran were replaced by Muslim and the Qur’an. The latter are 
increasingly becoming the norm even while the former remain in use.  
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Australia think. You see, we are really not quite sure. The Faruqis lived in an era 
before the Internet became popular and before we could chat with bruzzerrz and 
sistarrz across the globe. So in presuming the extent of Dr. Faruqi's influence, we 
relied on the inside jackets and back covers of his books.  
     Anyway, Dr Faruqi and his "Islamisation of Knowledge" project was quite 
grand although it did at times enter the realms of the absurd. Take for instance, his 
book, Towards Islamic English. What on earth is Islamic English? Is it just saying 
"masha-Allah" and "insh’Allah" every second word? Do we draw a little star after 
every capital "C" so that it looks like part of the Pakistani or Turkish flag? Then 
of course there is the Islam (or is it "Islaam") of double vowels… (Yusuf 2003). 
 
The essay is a partly-satirical rejection of Faruqi’s insistence on infusing Islamic 
concepts and forms into the English language. “The Islaam of Double Vowels” is 
symptomatic of the growing gap between Muslims born into English language 
environments and Faruqi’s (and his generation’s) call for an Islamic English. Unlike their 
immigrant parents or grandparents, the new Australian- or American-born generations of 
Muslims do not treat the English language as something alien to Islam or incapable of 
fully expressing it. 
The same tension can be traced in another instance where Islamic English is 
reconceptualized as Muslim English. In 2006, a popular Muslim online multimedia store 
and website, SoundVision.com43 published an article that asked the same question Ismail 
Faruqi asked two decades ago: “Can there be Muslim English?” (Mujahid 2006). 
Intended as a guide to common Arabic usage in the English language, the article starts 
with the assumption that “in the absence of simple basic common rules, Muslim English 
is becoming difficult to read for new Muslims, young Muslims and non Muslims” 
[emphasis mine]. 
                                                 
43 SoundVision’s mission statement notes that “the attitudes and behavior of men and women today are 
shaped and molded by the media whose ideals and images, by and large, are non-Islamic. SoundVision 
aims to produce content with Islamic ideals and images for all current and future media. SoundVision 
would like to lead the Ummah in the field of communication, Insha Allah.” 
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Unlike Faruqi’s programmatic and relatively purist “Islamic English,” Abdul 
Malik Mujahid’s article seeks to contribute to the standardization of “Muslim English.” 
And while Faruqi asks for more Arabic in English, Mujahid asks for less.  
If it is meant for a general audience, we suggest a minimum use of the basic 
Islamic terms in English. Loading a writing or a speech with Arabic terms may 
impress a reader or listener, but is certain to fail to communicate with a vast 
majority of Muslims (90%) who are not Arabs, are young Muslims, new Muslims, 
or non Muslims. If communication is the purpose, don't create problems for your 
audience. 
 
SoundVision’s guide to Muslim English makes a series of suggestions for both 
transliteration and translation of Islamic (Arabic) words and concepts. But it is 
minimalistic, asking that English not be burdened with unnecessary Arabic words. 
A general rule of thumb is that if it is not in the English dictionary, don't use it. If 
it is not an Islamic term, just an Arabic word, don't use it. It is good that we 
import Islamic terms from Arabic into English instead of through other languages. 
Therefore, Muslim is better than Musalman or Musselman… Salat is far better 
than namaz. If an Arabic term or its equivalent English word has become 
dominant in usage, lets keep using it for a while although it may not be very 
accurate representation of Arabic sounds or term. You cannot transform English 
into Arabgish or Engbic, can you? 
 
Inviting his audience to a “pronunciation jihad” in English, Mujahid provides the 
formula: “Simpler is better.” 
Quran is simpler than Qur'an, al-Qur'an, or al-Qur'aan while we are still struggling 
to stop the usage of Koran which does not seem to be ill motivated either. Usage 
of Islam is more dominant than Islaam or al-Islam or alIslaam, or al Islam. So let's 
be happy with it. Dawa is simpler and better than Da'wa, Da'wah, or Dakwah.  
Writing Allah or God has been a difficult issue for many. Some translations of the 
Quran use God others use Allah. Instead of taking a position on this issue we 
suggest use it interchangeably so that language becomes used to it instead of 




As a guide for the use of Islamic words for media purposes, the “Muslim English” 
approach differs strikingly from Faruqi’s Islamic English. Since the rules suggested by 
SoundVison “are based more on common sense than any deductive logic or structure 
imposed by English or Arabic language. This is an effort to develop standards in usage of 
Arabic words in journalistic English for the layperson” (Mujahid 2006). 
Although the SoundVision piece was not written in response to Faruqi’s project, 
the contrast between the two approaches allows us to make a useful distinction between 
Islamic English and Muslim English. Islamic English treats the linguistic nomos of the 
English language as a hindrance to the proper presentation of Islam. The idea that English 
cannot fully express the Islamic conception of the world is certainly open to debate. 
Nevertheless, it leads to a defensive position. If the format of English is oppressive and 
restrictive towards Islamic ontology, then a structural adjustment is needed. Islamic 
English is an attempt to “bend” English so as to “protect” Islamic ontology. Muslim 
English, however, approaches English as having a format conducive to the expression of 
Islam. Not driven by the fear of losing Islam in translation, Muslim English does not 
demand any surgical intervention into the language. Instead, it seeks to make Islamic 
ontological categories communicable without placing an additional burden on the 
structure of the language. In that sense, there are two alternative views or rather two 
stages of linguistic sedimentation. 
 
From Diasporic “Islamic English” to Post-Diasporic “Muslim English” 
A closer look at the intellectual approach of Ismail Faruqi and the practical 
approach of A. Malik Mujahid reveals several important differences between the two. 
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First of all, Faruqi’s articulation of Islamic English is philosophical, whereas 
SoundVision’s is commercial. Therefore, while Faruqi asks for a structural negotiation 
with the English language, the SoundVision author tends to accept the structure and seeks 
ways, to use Faruqi’s word, to “fit” in. Faruqi’s emphasis on and search for authenticity is 
indicative of the postcolonial character of his project. SoundVision’s orientation, on the 
other hand, is both post-diasporic and American. It replaces authenticity with efficiency 
as its primary concern. Finally, the greatest difference between the two articulations of a 
Muslim-friendly English language lies in the nature of their audiences; while Faruqi’s 
primary audience were Muslim students whose experience was characterized by 
displacement and immigration, the primary audience of SoundVision is second and third 
generation Muslims whose experience is characterized by cultural settlement and 
integration with the larger society. While Faruqi’s audience had an overseas (i.e. 
immigrant) habitus in an American habitat, SoundVision’s audience has an American 
habitus in an American habitat. 
 
An English Speaking Ummah 
Most American Muslim communities are still somewhere on the path between 
Faruqi and SoundVision, that is, between Islamic and Muslim English. The English 
language of Islam is in the process of crystallization and this process is paralleled by the 
formation of a community imagined through English. The fact that Arabic is the sacred 
language in Islam often prevents us from seeing the crucial role played by English in the 
formation of American Muslimness. 
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Today, Islam in America has two universal languages: Arabic and English. Arabic 
is the language of ritual and symbolizes ritualistic unity, whereas English is the language 
of communication and symbolizes communal unity. In an interesting twist, in America 
the Muslim idea of ummah (community) is possible only through one language⎯ and 
that language is not Arabic but English. Muslims coming from different ethnic and 
linguistic backgrounds connect with each other through English. English serves many 
functions for Muslims in American society. It is an instrument of legitimation, a means of 
connection with other Muslims (both locally and globally), a path to integration with the 
larger (American) society, and a vehicle for reaching out to non-Muslims (in dawah). 
 
 Language Dynamics of Mosques 
As mosque communities lose their original immigrant insularity and become more 
and more ethnically diverse, they face the challenge of finding clerics who can function 
in two languages: Arabic and English. The early imams could survive with Arabic and 
the ethnic language of their congregation. (In the case of Arab immigrants that would be 
Arabic. But it could be Urdu or Albanian for other communities.) The need for 
competence in English emerged only with the coming of the second generation, and has  
intensified with the third. It comes as no surprise that early imams, like Imam 
Mohammad Chirri of Islamic Center of America and Imam Vehbi Ismail of Albanian 
Islamic Center, found it necessary to write basic catechism pamphlets and books in 
English for their growing American congregations. As communities settled and grew in 
numbers, they lost their homogeneity through contact with other Muslims and through 
the influence of mainstream culture on the younger generation. The pressure toward more 
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use of English was further intensified with the conversion of people whose first and often 
only language was English. 
Most of the mosques try to strike a balance between their two-- and in many 
cases, three or more-- languages. Even though Arabic remains a constant as the language 
of ritual, out of convenience, most immigrants use their ethnic languages (Urdu, 
Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian, etc.) in daily communication. However, the lingua franca 
among Muslims of various backgrounds is English. Exclusive reliance on English 
alienates the first generation immigrants, while its absence alienates both new generations 
whose primary language is English and Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds. The 
extreme diversity of the Muslim community in the United States therefore encourages 
two phenomena, greater emphasis on the concept of ummah (Muslim community) as a 
unifying identity,  and the rise of English as the language of communication for that 
ummah. 
Today almost all mosques deliver most of their Friday sermons in English, though 
the proportion of English language use varies from imam to imam and congregation to 
congregation. English language competence is becoming more central to recruiting and 
hiring imams. As 9/11 and other factors created the need for outreach and interfaith 
activism, the language imperative for imams and community leaders has intensified. 
Lectures and extracurricular activities outside regular prayers have also contributed to the 
growing need for English language competence. 
 
English and the Postcolonial Network 
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The disproportionate representation of, for example, South African imams and 
intellectuals in the United States illustrates the crucial role that English plays in gaining 
access to global markets of Islamic clerical and intellectual knowledge production. As 
American congregations began to seek imams who would combine strong Islamic 
credentials with proficiency in English, they naturally turned to the once-colonized 
hinterlands of Islam. In Metro Detroit alone, three of the most prominent local scholars 
are examples of this trend: Imam Achmat Salie of Oakland County, the former imam of 
Islamic Association of Greater Detroit (IAGD), and Muneer Fareed, current secretary 
general of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) are both from South Africa and 
Imam Ali Suleyman Ali of the Canton mosque is originally from Ghana. Prominent 
Muslim academics in the United States like Farid Esack and Ebrahim Moosa are also 
both from South Africa. What makes possible the disproportionate representation in 
America of South African Muslims⎯ who are a tiny minority in their own country⎯ is 
the English language. 
The same dynamics also explain the origins of key figures involved in the 
polemics with Christianity. A case in point is the popularity of Ahmed Deedat’s books 
and audio-videos. Deedat, who died recently, was a Muslim scholar from South Africa 
who was well known for his knowledge of Christian scripture and his debates with 
Christian clerics. Most American Muslim bookstores still carry Deedat’s books.  
 
Avenues of Authenticity: English and Islamic Knowledge 
One can even discuss the presence of a politics of English in the American 
Muslim community, in the sense that mastery of English can empower one group over 
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another or one leader over others. Religious competence being equal, an imam who 
speaks English is often preferred. Communities may even sacrifice a degree of religious 
competence in exchange for language skills (i.e., employing an American-born imam 
rather than someone from overseas who has greater knowledge of Islam). Therefore, 
imams attempt to acquire competence in English and American culture. A young Muslim 
student recently told me that Shaikh Yaqoubi of the Zaytuna Institute is memorizing 
Shakespeare in order to better communicate Islam.  
The rise of the Zaytuna Institute demonstrates how those with simultaneous 
access to local American culture and overseas Islamic knowledge enjoy the highest 
popularity and prestige, especially among young Muslims. Hamza Yusuf and Zaid 
Shakir, both American converts and Islamic scholars associated with the Zaytuna 
Institute in California, are increasingly becoming popular among new generation 
American Muslims. In a New York Times story about the Institute, a 19-year-old student 
from New York states that “Sheik Hamza Yusuf and Imam Zaid Shakir have grown up 
here after having studied abroad, you can really connect with them. The scholars who 
come from abroad,” he adds, “they can’t connect with the people. They are ignorant of 
the life here.” (Laurie Goodstein, “U.S. Muslim Clerics Seek a Modern Middle Ground,” 
New York Times, June 18, 2006).  The search for a Muslim English has also given rise to 
what Hermansen calls “Islam-speak:” “peppering one’s conversation or presentation with 
pious formulae is a common feature of Muslim performance. It is a demarcator of 
Muslim discourse and a means of Islamizing English” (Hermansen 2004: 393). 
The African-American Muslim Voice  
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In the short run, the desire for native-born scholars has tended to privilege 
African-American imams (cf. the popularity of Imam Siraj Wahhaj on the MSA speaking 
circuit), suggesting an ever-closer convergence between black and immigrant language 
practices. At the same time, however, the different dynamics of the black Muslim 
community are leading them to choose a distinct  path through the pragmatics of Islamic 
and Muslim English.   
Unlike immigrant Muslims, African-American Muslims have a fairly comfortable 
relationship with Christianity.44 When I attended Friday services at the Detroit Muslim 
Center or Masjid Wali Muhammad, which was Temple Number One of the former Nation 
of Islam, I observed that the style and frame of reference of sermons were very different 
from those of the immigrant mosques. The speakers assumed their listeners to be 
intimately familiar with both the phrasing and stories of the King James Bible. They 
often supplemented Muslim ethical exhortations with Biblical aphorisms and illustrated 
their points with reference to stories not present in the Qur’an (David and Goliath, for 
instance). The speakers differed little in cadence and manner from the typical AME or 
Baptist preacher. And their audience received them in a fitting manner, with loud “A-a-
men”s and “You tell it, Brother!”s resounding from all parts of the mosque (including the 
women’s section). 
 
Translations of the Qur’an 
Although it is most actively felt in African-American mosques today, it is worth 
remembering that Biblical language is—if only indirectly—a part of the inheritance of all 
English-speaking Muslims.  
                                                 
44 For more on African American Muslims and their relationship to Christianity, see Chapter 6. 
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The English translations of the Qur’an most popular with Muslims in America 
today were all produced by either colonial Muslims in diaspora (e.g., Abdullah Yusuf 
Ali, a British Indian Muslim)45 or Western converts to Islam (e.g. Muhammad Asad, an 
Austrian Jew)46. These translators shaped their diction in imitation of (or, rarely, in 
reaction against) King James, the gold standard of elevated, “sacred” style in English. 
Because of the unavailability of tafsir (interpretation) of the Qur’an in English, the 
translations included somewhat detailed footnotes and translator’s notes, where verses 
were sometimes explained through the invocation of Biblical passages. For example, 
Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall’s introductory note regarding the first chapter in the 
Qur’an starts in the following manner: 
Al-Fatihah, “The Opening,” or Fatihatu’l-Kitab, “The Opening of the Scripture” 
or Ummu’l-Qur’an, “The Essence of the Qur’an,” as it is variously named, has 
been called the Lord’s Prayer of the Muslims (Pickthall 1938: 1). 
 
The analogy between Al-Fatihah and the Lord’s Prayer shows how translation is 
always a cultural reinterpretation. Similarly, in the notes to Yusuf Ali’s translation of the 
Qur’an, there are references to Shakespeare and Milton. The initial awareness and style 
of translation that emerged in colonial and early minority Muslim contexts is arguably 
still a part of the texture of the language of Islam in English. This awareness of and 
constant dialogue with Biblical culture is a result of being a minority in a Christian 
majority society. It also demonstrates that Muslims have chosen a Christian interlocutor. 
Pickthall’s introduction illustrates this point when he states, 
The aim of this work is to present to English readers what Muslims the world over 
hold to be the meaning of the words of the Qur’an and the nature of that Book, in 
not unworthy language and concisely, with a view to the requirements of English 
                                                 
45 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an (1934) 
46 Muhammad Asad, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran (1930). 
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Muslims. It may be reasonably claimed that no Holy Scripture can be fairly 
presented by one who disbelieves its inspiration and its message; and this is the 
first English translation of the Qur’an by an Englishman who is a Muslim. 
(Pickthall 1938: iii) 
 
If English translations of the Qur’an are inextricably linked both to Christianity 
and to the mind of the colonizer, immigrant and African-American Muslims deal with 
this troublesome history in very different ways. For immigrant Muslims, the Christian 
interlocutor is an other, even a rival. For African-Americans and converts, the Christian 
interlocutor is more often a family member, or even their own past selves.  
 
Another Mode of Authenticity 
Perhaps because their personal histories are often bound up with Christianity, 
English speakers who adopt Islam have rather different attitudes towards the use of 
Arabic than do Muslims who adopt English. In other words, African American Muslim 
English is often different from immigrant Muslim English. While African-Americans 
prefer Arabic words such as “al-Islam” (instead of Islam) and “deen” (instead of religion) 
as a way of authenticating themselves as Muslims, immigrants prefer English words such 
as “God” in order to authenticate their Americanness.  
This chapter has traced a circle from the authenticity anxieties of Muslims in 
general protecting themselves from corruption via language to the (dueling) new 







The Muslim perception of the English language has changed over time from a 
defensive suspicion to an appropriative embrace. As Muslims found themselves deeper in 
and closer to the English language sphere, they developed visions and strategies to detach 
the language from its Christian or colonial baggage and articulate English as a Muslim 
language. The perceived tension between the authentic Islamic conception of the world 
and the linguistic nomos of English is also a reflection of the location of Muslims like 
Faruqi who developed the idea of Islamic English. In other words, Muslim theories about 
the English language are a function of their locations vis-à-vis the language. The misfit 
between the ontology of Islam as it was understood by Faruqi and the structure of English 
illustrated the temporal nature of the language/culture nexus. Displacement of Muslims 
through immigration put their Islamic habitus at odds with their new linguistic habitat. 
The symbolic violence that the new habitat exercised on the old habitus found its 
expression in linguistic anomie⎯  or appeared, as it did to Faruqi, as chaos and injustice. 
It was this assumption that led Faruqi to employ words redolent of symbolic violence 
when he described the experience of Islam’s translation into English. He countered its 
“mutilation,” “reduction” and “ruin” with the suggestion of “bending” the English 
language to accommodate Islam.  
The cultural settlement of Islam in the linguistic habitat of American society is an 
ongoing process. It produces a tension between Muslim life and American forms. The 
process requires Muslim arbiters of style to transform the multiplicity of linguistic 
practices that now characterize Islamic English into a commonly-agreed set of rules. 
Once Muslim English becomes standardized, the anxieties and histories associated with 
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its development will sink beneath the waves of common sense. The triumph of a new 
linguistic nomos will establish the order and orientation currently lacking in the 



















How Immigrant Muslims Naturalize America in Islam 
 
There has always been some kind of nomos of the earth. In all ages of mankind, 
the earth has been appropriated, divided and cultivated. But before the age of the 
great discoveries, before the 16th century of our system of dating, men had no 
global concept of the planet on which they lived… Every powerful people 
considered themselves to be the center of the earth and their dominion to be the 
domicile of freedom, beyond which war, barbarism, and chaos ruled. 
--Carl Schmitt (2003: 351) 
 
Introduction 
 Muslims who become immigrants in the United States face a challenge unusual in 
the Muslim world: living as a minority in a non-Muslim society. This experience, which 
we in contemporary multicultural society take for granted, is a new situation for the 
majority of Muslim immigrants. It is not that Muslims never had minorities among 
themselves. On the contrary, there have always been non-Muslim minorities living in 
lands dominated by Muslims. But the reverse has not always been true, especially in the 
case of Muslims residing in Western societies. Muslim reluctance to settle permanently, 
as well as a lack of tolerance towards Islam in the Western world, have both contributed 
to this historical outcome. Muslim presence in and exposure to non-Muslim environments 
were historically “temporary” and justified within the legal framework of “necessity” 
(i.e., due to exception and emergency). The rise of Muslim minorities in contemporary 
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European and American societies is in many ways a new situation for both the Muslims 
and the West and therefore poses a challenge to Islamic law and Muslim imagination as 
well as to the West. The emergence of “permanent” Muslim minorities has significant 
religious implications. Is it religiously permissible to live in a non-Muslim society? What 
should be the nature of one’s relationship to such a social environment? These are 
questions Muslims interested in religiously justifying their new environment frequently 
ask themselves. The answers they find, to employ the much-debated Muslim juridical 
terms,  range from America as an abode of war/disbelief (Dar al harb) to America as an 
abode of Islam/peace (Dar al Islam). The evolution of the Muslim perception of 
“America as homeland” is an important cultural dimension of citizenship and constitutes 
an understudied aspect of Muslim cultural settlement in the United States. How do 
immigrant Muslims overcome their initial sense of “homeland insecurity” and feel at 
home as Muslims in America? 
This chapter is a phenomenological account of Muslim constructions of America 
as homeland. It starts by articulating the concept of home and what it means to feel at 
home. It continues with a brief inventory of the cultural idioms or topoi with which early 
Muslim immigrants and Muslims in their initial immigration made sense of their presence 
in America. This diasporic moment and vocabulary changed over time as exposure and 
interaction led to a more nuanced understanding. In addition to these cultural idioms, 
there are crucial juridical tools by which Muslims religiously interpret America and 
produce an articulation of America as “home.” Therefore, the fundamental question that 
this chapter answers is how Muslims naturalize the United States in Islam. I aim to 





Reality and Its Anomies 
One difference between an immigrant and a citizen is that for the citizen 
home/homeland are the same, while for the immigrant they are not. The correspondence 
between home/homeland is achieved through the extension of home into homeland. For 
continuity between home and homeland, which is a condition of feeling at home, requires 
the projection of what is private and subjective (i.e., home, Muslim, communal) into what 
is public and intersubjective (i.e., city, American, national). Before engaging in a 
discussion of the transformation of Muslim discourses on America, we need to establish 
some theoretical connections between feeling-at-home and homeland and between 
displacement and the sense of anomie. 
A defining characteristic of home is that it is a place where the relationship 
between the subject and space take the form of a feeling: feeling-at-home or being-in-the-
world. A place is home only when inhabited.47 It is inhabitation that turns “any” place 
into home. Hence, there is nothing essentialist about home. When inhabitation generates 
the feeling of “feeling-at-home” we can say that a place has become home. What is 
crucial for the sense of home is the experience of dwelling (Heidegger 1971:143). This 
                                                 
47 Home is a special kind of space: it is carved out of a general space and marked as exclusive; it is the 
surface upon which subjective world-construction takes place. Our selves are anchored in the things around 
us. It is because of the intensity of this anchoredness that we often say “there’s no place like home.” Home 
is the place where the subjective (consciousness) pours itself out in things (Levinas 1969: 153). Unlike the 
street (or city square) which is a public space presumably accessible to all citizens, home is not open to all. 
It is a topographically opaque spot on the surface of  public space. On closer inspection, of course, we 
notice that the city square is not open to everyone, either. It is open only to citizens (similar to Habermasian 
public autonomy (Habermas 1996: 34) and the boundaries of nation). Yet it remains an intersubjective 
realm. By contrast, home is a subjective realm, an exclusive space corresponding to the private autonomy 
of the individual in liberal political philosophy (Arendt 1998). The private and public spheres are 




subjective recognition of a place as home is a temporal process. The subject appropriates 
a given space as home only after she projects into that space her subjective being, that is, 
when she dwells.48 This projection is also a construction of the subjective world which 
becomes the ground for the production of the intersubjective world (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966: 20). In short, “with the dwelling the latent birth of the world is 
produced” (Levinas 1969: 157). 
Simmel provided an early sociological account of the tension or lack of 
equilibrium between subjective and objective cultures (Simmel 1971, Frisby and 
Featherstone 1997: 55-75). His discussion of the crisis in culture is in many ways a 
pioneering study on the topic of homelessness in the general sense of the “homeless 
mind” of modernity (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974). Simmel argued that the 
increasing division of labor and proliferation of cultural products (objective culture) 
placed a disproportionate strain on the subject, who could no longer have a true 
comprehension of her cultural environment. This process of alienation from the 
environment, or in Simmel’s own terms, the loss of equilibrium between subjective 
culture and objective culture, was a tragic consequence of modernity. 
     Arendt also treated the idea of home as a staging ground for entry into the 
intersubjective realm (Arendt 1998: 207) where different subjects meet and where the 
encounter of different subjects produces objects (natural or social). Thus we feel at home 
where everything is subjective. That is, all objects are subjectivized (e.g., the IKEA desk 
that is now my late-night refuge) and subjective elements objectivized (e.g., the 
arrangement of things on my desk). The Simmelian idea of cultural crisis refers to the 
collapse of the flow between the subjective and the objective cultures. 




In their treatise on the sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann provide a 
fascinating discussion of the way common sense (i.e., reality, the world as we know it) is 
produced and maintained (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Any given society is an arena of 
reality construction where individual members participate in the production of objective 
reality. This reality is sustained as long as the intersubjective realm of lifeworld that 
underpins it remains available. Thus, any common sense or reality is precarious because 
All societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of 
anomic terror is actualized whenever the legitimations that obscure the 
precariousness are threatened or collapse (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 103). 
 
Here, there are several themes that need to be made explicit. First, the reality that 
each society produces is constructed against a background of chaos. That is, it is 
produced through the introduction of nomos into a realm that is otherwise chaotic. Nomos 
(rule, law, regularity, sense) translates chaos into order and nature into culture. The idea 
of homeland is one such cultural construction produced on the surface of bare geography. 
Second, the reality to which nomos gives rise is historical, contingent and fragile. 
Therefore, anomie, which is the loss of nomos, has a terrorizing effect, causing anxiety 
and insecurity. This includes the anxiety one feels in prolonged distance from home, or 
the insecurity of an unfamiliar abode. That is also why things and places unfamiliar or 
mentally inaccessible are associated with the uncanny. Referring to the fear of the 
unfamiliar, Freud links the uncanny to the unhomely and homeless (Freud 2003).  
Third, the anxiety and insecurity, normally repressed and swept under the carpet 
by intersubjective dwelling and everyday language, burst in when either the protective 
shield is removed (internal collapse) or those protected within it move outside it. Hence, 
anomic terror can happen either temporally (crisis) or spatially (finding oneself outside 
 111
 
the coverage area of the shield). In other words, anomie, chaos, and bare nature all 
manifest themselves in marginal or liminal situations (Turner 1969: 95). That is to say, 
they manifest themselves either under the shield or beyond its limits. Outside the shield⎯ 
or to use Berger’s own term, outside the “canopy” (Berger 1969)⎯ all the distinctions 
dissolve. In the words of a political philosopher, “man erects around himself an artificial 
netting which conceals from him the abyss” (Strauss 1989: 36). The structure expires and 
anti-structure (Turner 1969) begins. The margins reveal the historicity of the structure. At 
the edges and on the frontiers, the nomothetic format (i.e., constructed reality) ends and 
the unformatted surface (chaos) appears, or to put it more precisely, what is beyond 
appears as chaotic. The relationship between nomos and chaos/anomie is crucial for a 
proper understanding of the experience of people who are displaced. The Durkheimian 
discussion of anomic suicide is directly linked to such displacement (Durkheim 1951: 
241). Displacement in this sense might entail encounter with a radically different culture 
and/or language. 
Immigration is one such displacement.49 For immigrants, the most obvious 
challenge to their sense of reality is the requirement to speak another language, since 
language is the depository of common sense par excellence. But there are other 
challenges, especially if their religion is different and/or has a history of conflict with the 
religion of the host culture. In the next section, I trace the experience of Muslim 
immigrants who either find themselves at the frontiers or outside of the juridical concept 
of Muslim homeland (dar al Islam). 
 
                                                 
49 An extreme case would be the situation of individuals kidnapped into slavery, which results in social 
death (Patterson 2005). 
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Muslims Outside the Islamic Canopy? 
 Medieval Muslim jurists developed a binary opposition to distinguish the legal 
status of Muslim-controlled lands from the rest of the world. They designated as dar al 
Islam (abode of Islam, abode of peace) the lands where Islam is dominant or has been 
naturalized as mainstream culture. By that classification, all other places fell under the 
category of dar al harb (abode of war, abode of chaos) or dar al kufr (abode of disbelief). 
In this conception, dar al Islam becomes a spatial or geographic projection of the Islamic 
sacred canopy. Scholars have different opinions as to whether the canopy is held up by an 
Islamic political rule or by an Islamic mainstream culture even when the ruler is not 
necessarily Islamic (Al-Alwani 2003: 28, Ramadan 2002: 166). What is decisive in either 
case is whether a certain land has been subject to Islamic nomos and thus become 
conducive to an unrestricted, free practice of Islam. In short, dar al Islam describes a 
legal order (and not necessarily a political one50) where geography is codified through the 
imaginary inscription of Islamic law. The remainder of that geography is mentally 
“nihilated” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 114) in order to create the sharp contrast that 
preserves “mental hygiene”(Zerubavel 1991: 37, Berger and Luckmann 1966: 156). This 
spiritual appropriation of land finds still another abstract expression in the juridical order 
of things. Identification of qibla, the direction of Mecca, is yet another form of religious 
appropriation of land, that is, introduction of nomos.51 
                                                 
50 Islamic law is not necessarily state law. It is produced by jurists who are often outside the control of the 
state. 
51 The Jewish religious idea of eruv stands between the Muslim idea of qibla and the notion of dar al Islam. 
An eruv is a symbolically appropriated place where space is codified and made –literally- navigable during 
the Sabbath. The single most important social function of the eruv is the creation of a communal domain 
through a religious marking of the public sphere. The eruv sets aside a portion of the public sphere and 
symbolically transforms it into a communal sphere (Rosen Zvi 2004, Cooper 1998).  
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As a juridical sphere, dar al Islam refers to the pacified, codified space enclosed  
within the canopy. Muslims living within dar al Islam are inhabitants of a familiar abode 
and members of a bounded community. This sphere that is under public law and familiar 
for jurisprudential purposes is surrounded by its constitutive other, dar al harb. What 
remains outside, therefore, becomes an extrajuridical, agonistic sphere. In that sense, dar 
al harb is similar to the Greek conception of “barbarian lands.” Muslims venture into this 
unfamiliar abode, the uncanny, only at their spiritual peril. 
Concerned with the protection of Islamic identity, the classical Muslim jurists saw 
no reason why Muslims should move to dar al harb permanently. They strongly 
discouraged people from leaving the abode of Islam unless their departure was due to 
darura (necessity)52. This extrajuridical sphere was thus incorporated into the legal 
canopy through the state of emergency; stay in that sphere fell under the paradigm of 
exception. 
 
The Significance of Darura 
Darura or necessity occupies a special place in all legal traditions because it is the 
foundation of exception (Agamben 2005: 24). As a limit concept it is the borderline 
between juridical order and bare life, between facticity and norms (Habermas 1996). 
Where public law (in this case, Islam) ends, political fact (the agonistic sphere) begins. 
Therefore, law melts under the conditions of necessity, as implied by the ancient maxim 
                                                 
52 American Muslim scholar Nuh Ha Mim Keller describes darura as vital interest:  “How is it possible that 
the ruling of Allah could vary from place to place? One scholarly answer is found in the Islamic legal 
concept of darura or "vital interest" that sometimes affects the shari'a rulings otherwise normally in force. 
Although the fundamental basis of Islamic law is that it is valid for all times and places, Allah Most High, 
in His divine wisdom, stipulates in Surat al-Hajj that "He has not placed any hardship upon you in 
religion" (Qur’an 22:78) (Keller 1995). 
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necessitas legem non habet [necessity has no law] (Agamben 2005: 1). For the necessity 
has the power to render the illicit (haram) licit (halal).53 But this is not generalizable: 
necessity justifies only specific, individual cases of transgression through exception.54 
 The movement of Muslims from dar al Islam to dar al harb is a movement from 
inside legal order to outside of it, from law to exception. According to Carl Schmitt, law 
has two fundamental elements: norm and decision (Schmitt 1976: 10). In the state of 
exception, that is in dar al harb, the decision remains while the norm recedes. Put 
differently, the law loses its objective normalizing power and taken-for-granted character. 
More specifically, it loses its power of “convention,” which is what makes a law law. The 
new environment does not lend itself to the applicability of the norm developed inside the 
canopy and demands (a new) decision, an act of construction. At that very moment the 
agency attributed to the law through reification falls back into the hands of the lawmaker. 
 The movement from rule (norm) to exception (decision) shifts our attention from 
the law itself to the lawmaker(s). What had been given, now becomes an explicit object 
of human construction. It is a shift from an already naturalized, habitualized reality to a 
reality that is witnessed at the moment of its construction by human subjects. This de-
routinization also corresponds to what Agamben calls “force-of-law without law” 
(Agamben 2005: 39). 
                                                 
53 An illustration of an everyday case of darura: if a Muslim is marooned on a desert island with nothing to 
eat but a ham sandwich, he or she may eat it. 
54 A Shia handbook that I obtained from the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, where it is used as a 
textbook for English-speaking youth and converts, addresses the issues of Muslim minorities in the West.  
It states that, “A believer is allowed to travel to non-Muslim countries provided that he is sure or feels 
confident that the journey would not have a negative impact on his faith. Similarly a believer is allowed to 
reside in non-Muslim countries provided that his residing there does not become a hurdle in the fulfillment 




Therefore, as will become evident later in this chapter, the analogies made by 
Muslims themselves to the time of the Prophet Muhammad are not in vain: there are very 
real similarities between the contemporary frontiers (margins) of Islam and its center, its 
beginning. The similarities are both temporal (hijra, the early migration of Muslims and 
the first establishment of Islam)55 and spatial (choosing qibla and operating on a land that 
is not yet dar al Islam).56 Therefore, stepping outside the canopy is a return to the pre-
history of the canopy. At the frontiers, where nomos is absent, there is an originary 
indistinction (chaos, anomie). After all, necessity is the first and originary source of all 
law. It is this character of necessity and exception that explains the law and rule 
(Agamben 2005: 27, Schmitt 1976: 15). In that sense, it reveals the historicity and 
contingency of the law. At the spatial margins of Islam, Muslims have to reenact what 
those who codified Islam in the Muslim lands did many centuries ago. As Michel de 
Certeau has observed, “other lands restore to us what our own culture has seen fit to 
exclude from its own discourse” (de Certeau 1988: 14). 
There are two possibilities for those who find themselves outside the canopy: they 
can either extend the canopy to cover their spot or engage in the construction of a new 
one. It will become clear in the case of Muslims that choosing the first seems to lead to 
the second, as far as the distinction between dar al Islam and dar al harb is concerned. 
 Extending the canopy under the paradigm of exception (darura) may be done for 
individual necessities, but if there is a large number of people residing not temporarily 
                                                 
55 “During the early days of Islam, a number of Muslims took refuge in the non-Muslim land of Abyssinia 
in order to preserve their faith. This episode bears particular significance [to the situation of Muslim 
minorities today] because it occurred at a time when the foundations of Islamic law and fiqh 
[jurisprudence] were still being established” (Al-Alwani 2003: 30-1). 
56 A previous chapter on qibla, the Muslim direction to Mecca, also reveals the starting point of the canopy 
and its end point. Perhaps nowhere else do we have mosques with two qiblas but in Medina and Detroit. 
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but permanently in what early jurists designated as dar al harb, can they still rely on 
darura as a paradigm?  
 The paradigm of darura enabled Muslims to make brief forays into dar al harb. 
Now that Muslims have permanently settled in what used to be seen as dar al harb, they 
have to transform necessity into law— bare life into canopy— and cultivate nomos on an 
anomic space. As the examples I give later will clarify, the movement from canopy to 
anomie is always temporary: it inevitably ends with arrival at a new canopy. Canopy 
construction, which is the construction of new reality, is similar to dwelling and has a 
temporal character. In plain terms, a guest who stays for too long is no longer a guest but 
a lodger. Whether temporal or spatial, the anomic liminality of darura expires either with 
a return to the canopy or the emergence of a new one. 
 So far, in my discussion of darura, the zone of exception, I have touched upon the 
relationship between darura and law and its manifestations in time and space. Before 
concluding this section, I shall briefly explain the reason why it came to prominence and 
the type of ethos darura engenders. 
As a space of unenforceability of law or dispensation from the application of law, 
darura implies the impossibility of experiencing a given place as a fully justified home. 
Thus it works as a temporary protective juridical shield (like a raincoat) for limited 
exposure to dar al harb. Darura gained jurisprudential prominence in modern times as a 
result of the processes that caused (dis)placement of Muslims into non-Muslim lands. 
These processes include colonialism in the past and globalization and Muslim 
immigration in contemporary times. 
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A juridical term designating the condition of “crisis times” and “unhomely 
places,” darura has a particular ethos. This ethos is a “deficient mode of care” in the  
Heideggerian sense.57 In other words, the ethics of darura is negative. It demands 
avoidance, minimal involvement and unsettlement. It thus corresponds to the condition 
and experience of sojourners who do not feel at home. In a more strict sense, this ethos is 
a diasporic ethos, where home/land is elsewhere and the heart is there. In the next section, 
I give a quick overview of some prominent topoi of Muslim diasporic culture. Each topos 
tells us a certain aspect of the experience of Muslim immigrants. 
 
Topoi of Muslim Diasporic Imagination 
                                                 
57 In Being and Time, a phenomenological critique of the Cartesian division of the world, Heidegger argues 
that modern rationalism assumes “a worldless subject” (Heidegger 1962: 144) and ignores the idea of 
worldhood. As human beings, we are not self-contained subjects but entities in an existential state of 
Being-in (Heidegger 1962: 84). Unlike objects, we are always oriented, we are in the world and we have a 
world. Our being in the world is quite different from a chair’s being in the room (Heidegger 1962: 81). Our 
residence in the world is made possible by our involvement with it. While our relationship to our 
environment is one of encounter, that of two objects is not. They are in that sense worldless. Our practical 
experience of being-in-the world is 
such that [our] Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite 
ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do 
with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of 
something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
interrogating, considering, discussing, determining… All these ways of Being-in have concern as 
their kind of Being... Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest – these too are ways of 
concern; but these are all deficient modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a ‘bare 
minimum’ (Heidegger 1962: 83). 
  
In Heidegger’s later thought, the idea of being-in-the world evolves into the concept of “dwelling”. Once 
anchored, the subject can produce sustained interaction which leads to habitualization and the construction 
of the world (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Heidegger’s paragraph above makes clear that there is an 
intimate link between dwelling and ethics. For being-in-the-world or dwelling is understood in terms of 
care, involvement, the disposition that allows something to matter to us. Dwelling situates us in a world, 
not in the sense in which a chair is in a room, but rather in the sense in which someone is in a family or in 
love with someone else (Foltz 1995: 156). To put it in more familiar sociological terms, Bourdieu’s notion 
of habitus is a simple inversion of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling. Dwelling is us in the world and habitus 
is the world in us. Thus as a term that captures both habit and ethos, habitus has dwelling as its history. 
Ethics develops through involvement with the environment. In that sense, there is a homology between the 
degrees of involvement and the nature of the ethics (or ideology) one has toward that environment. This 
will be further illustrated in the case of Muslims in America, where different degrees of involvement with 
American habitat is linked to different conceptions of America, ranging from the abode of war (Dar al 
Harb) to the abode of Islam (Dar al Islam). 
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Under the conditions of immigration, Muslims are displaced and disembedded 
from their original national environments. With immigration, they find themselves in a 
diasporic condition and interstitial location. For example, they are in American society 
but not (yet) of it. In order to explore how “Muslims in America” become “American 
Muslims” we need to first understand the consequences of displacement (immigration). 
Diasporic conditions trigger the release of some Muslim idioms from their otherwise 
marginal status and pull them to the surface of Muslim imagination. There are several 
prominent root-paradigms (Turner 1974: 67) that immigrant Muslims in America employ 
in making sense of their experience. These58 include  
1) hijra (the Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina),  
2) ummah (the universal Muslim community),  
3) dawah (mission or propagation of Islam).  
4) jihad (struggle, just war) 
 
HIJRA: When the Prophet Muhammad and his followers were persecuted by the 
pagan Arab establishment of Mecca, he migrated to the nearby city of Medina in the year 
622 CE. This event occupies such a central place in the Muslim imagination that it marks 
the starting point of the Muslim calendar (called the Hijri calendar). Hijra as a movement 
from Mecca to Medina represents a flight from chaos and oppression to a place of 
                                                 
58 A note on transliteration: Except for jihad, these terms have no standard transliterations. The reason why 
we have a standard transliteration for jihad is that, thanks to mass media and global terrorism, it has 
“settled” or sedimented in English language, albeit –Muslims believe- with some distortion. The same 
cannot be said for the other words, which can be spelled as hijrah, umma, daawah ( or da’wah) 
respectively. I am using the most common spellings. For an extended discussion of the fate of Islamic terms 




freedom that represents “the city” and “civilization” all at once.59 The Prophet’s hijra 
thus constitutes the primary referent for the Muslim topos of hijra, migration. There is 
also a second event from the early days of Islam that contributes to the term’s symbolic 
meaning: the migration of Muslim refugees to Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia) in 615 
CE. Fearing that the Meccans’ hostility to his teachings might lead to the destruction of 
the nascent Muslim community, Muhammad sent a group of his disciples to seek refuge 
in the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The Meccans sent their own emissaries after 
them, asking that the king hand over these “insurgents” for punishment. The king instead 
questioned the refugees and discovered that their “subversive beliefs” differed little from 
his own Christian doctrine. He granted them amnesty, much to the disgruntlement of their 
pursuers. For Muslims this historical moment has become a touchstone of solidarity 
among Ahl ul Kitab (“Peoples of the Book,” i.e., followers of revealed scripture) and an 
emblem of the potential benefits of hijra.  
Hijra is the primary idiom for Muslim immigrants who seek to frame their 
displacement—voluntary or not—in religious terms. It is not only the movement from 
one place to another or departure from one’s native land that makes these historical 
events relevant to contemporary migrants, but also the fact that the destinations were in 
both cases non-Muslim. Thus, hijra gained prominence among Muslims in the United 
States in a way that it provided a framework for their contemporary experience as 
immigrants (Haddad and Lummis 1987: 156). African-American Muslims even interpret 
their experience of slavery with reference to hijra and call hijra “The Greatest Migration” 
(Dannin 2002b: 59, Dannin 2002a). At the other end of the spectrum, a fringe radical 
                                                 
59 “Medina” is both the Arabic word for city and the root of  “madaniyyah”, civilization. 
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group of  Muslim immigrants based in Britain employs the self-identification Al-
Muhajiroun (the emigrants) (Wiktorowicz 2005). 
 
UMMAH: This concept designates the global community of Muslims 
(Mandaville 2003, Roy 2006). It also refers to the community of followers of any 
prophet. Some Muslim scholars link ummah to the concept to shahada (witnessing). “The 
greatness of the Islamic ummah is to be understood in the fact that it is a community of 
the middle path which must bear witness to the faith before all mankind” (Ramadan 
2002: 158-9). A non-territorial concept, it allows Muslims to transcend their ethnic, 
linguistic and racial differences. In this imagined community, the members of which are 
tied to each other through exposure to the scripture and belief in one God, Muslims relate 
to each other across time and space. In the words of Benedict Anderson, 
The strange physical juxtaposition of Malays, Persians, Indians, Berbers and 
Turks in Mecca is something incomprehensible without an idea of their 
community in some form. The Berber encountering the Malay before the Kaaba 
must, as it were, ask himself: ‘Why is this man doing what I am doing, uttering 
the same words that I am uttering, even though we cannot talk to one another?’ 
There is only one answer, once one has learnt it: ‘Because we…are Muslims’ 
(Anderson 1991: 54) 
 
Muslim experience of America is often compared to the Muslim experience in 
Mecca because Muslims discover and feel the extreme diversity within the Muslim 
community both during their pilgrimage in Mecca and upon their arrival in America. It is 
at that moment that the concept of ummah gains prominence as a way of acknowledging 
and overcoming differences. The appeal of the concept of ummah comes from both the 
diversity of Muslim communities and their minority status vis-à-vis non-Muslim majority 




DAWAH: Dawah means religious propagation, fulfillment of the religious 
obligation of representing the faith to outsiders. Dawah is the primary mode of relating to 
the outside of the Muslim community. Dawah is not limited to proselytizing, but can 
include charity work and participation in community service. As much as it targets     
outsiders, the more immediate motivation for its deployment in the foreign setting is the 
protection of the identity of insiders. As such it becomes a means of preserving religious 
identity and authenticity. It is an internally articulated means of engaging with the social 
environment. This sense of dawah is particularly relevant, for instance, for members of 
Muslim Student Associations on university campuses. A female undergraduate Muslim 
student at the University of Michigan once told me “I am Muslim. I wear my Muslim 
identity wherever I go. Every action I make publicly is an act of dawah. It is especially 
important to me because I know that everything I do, every stance that I take, reflects the 
entire Muslim ummah whether I want it or not.” 
 
JIHAD: Of all the terms discussed here jihad looms largest in the American 
psyche. It is a contested concept for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Jihad refers to the 
constant structuration of the self and the world along the lines of Islam. It literally means 
struggle; it is the equivalent of self-discipline in Protestant cultures. The concept covers a 
variety of struggles, ranging from spiritual self-restraint to the collective execution of a 
just war. Recent uses of the term in ethnic nationalism and global terrorism have, 
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however, undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of non-Muslims.60 Muslims themselves, 
in turn, employ the term increasingly reluctantly and uncomfortably. Yet they cannot do 
away with it, since it is part of Islam. 
 
These key idioms have almost nothing to do with America per se as a destination 
for Muslim immigrants. They are root-paradigms that help Muslims make sense of their 
mobility/movement. The prominence the terms enjoy here is absent in Muslim majority 
lands. The exception would be places where colonialism has had a disproportionate 
impact and thus induced the feeling of being a minority, if we accept the definition of 
minority in terms of power and not numbers. For a very long time, the Muslim idea of 
ummah was quite marginal and would be felt explicitly only during the once-in-a-lifetime 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Globalization has altered this fact, but only recently. The power of 
ummah— or for that matter hijra and dawah— as primary topoi derives entirely from the 
diasporic moment. Therefore, although American Muslims use these topoi from early on, 
they are like a certificate that authorizes their departure but does not deal with their 
destination. These topoi are extensions of old homelands; they hardly touch America.61  
 
A Theoretical Note 
We need to recognize that ideal types are and have to be grounded in experience. 
This is similar to the recognition of the link between law and darura (necessity). The law 
                                                 
60 The author of Jihad vs. McWorld, for example, notes that “while for many Muslims it may signify only 
ardor in the name of a religion that can properly be regarded as universalizing, I borrow its meaning from 
those militants who make the slaughter of the ‘other’ a higher duty” (Barber 1996: 17). 
61 The list of Muslim immigrant topoi can be extended to include tropes like ijtihad, which refers to the 
mechanism for new codification and extension of the Islamic juridical canopy so that it includes new legal 




is generated out of necessity and experience but when it becomes alienated from its ever 
changing source (darura, charisma) the law faces suspension. Its hardened layer has to be 
cracked or thinned so that the experience beneath can manifest itself. 
What appears beneath the melting layer of law itself will soon become a new 
hardened layer. This means that just as anomie is temporally limited (transitional) and has 
to disappear, so does charisma, which is always in statu nascendi, nascent status (Weber 
1946: 246, Shils 1972: 110). One person’s charisma or anomie is someone else’s 
rationality or reality. In other words, a foreign reality and rationality would always seem 
anomic and, depending on taste, charismatic. It is always a matter of time and location for 
the charisma and anomie to (routinize or fade away and thus) become rationality and 
reality, that is, to become a new canopy⎯ whether you call it a “sacred canopy” (Berger 
1969) or a secular “iron cage” (Weber 1946, Weber 1992: 181). 
Therefore, we cannot rely on ideal types without bringing in the freshness of 
experience. We cannot conceptually understand habitus without understanding dwelling, 
rationality without charisma, or law/nomos without darura/anomie. It is this linking of 
binaries that allow us to lay bare the dynamics and origin of social constructions whether 
they are of home, homeland, the world or law and rationality. The question is how 
concrete experience, practices of lifeworld, face-to-face interactions and everyday 
experience in general congeal and theoretically sediment into ideal types, abstract images 
and commonsense. The understanding of experience and ideal types as mutually 
embedded in each other in an ever-expanding net that encapsulates us in the form of “the 
world,” allowing us to historicize the cultural objects of our analysis. 
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In The Phenomenology of the Social World, Alfred Schutz provides a rich 
framework for the study of the relationship between experience and ideal types. 
According to Schutz we experience other people through their immediate physical 
presence, but our comprehension of them is based on ideal types. Think of meeting a 
person. After we part ways, 
We make transition from direct to indirect social experience simply by following 
this spectrum of decreasing vividness. The first steps beyond the realm of 
immediacy are marked by a decrease in the number of perceptions within which I 
view him (Schutz 1967: 177). 
 
As we move away from the experience and yet maintain a certain comprehension 
of the person by means of ideal types, he undergoes “a continuous series of ever 
increasing anonymization.” My friend Mr. Q whom I met yesterday may later become “a 
friend” and even further he can sink into the most general type of “one” or “someone.”  
 
the other has now become anonymous; we may even say that he has been replaced 
by an ideal type that has been constructed out of previously given experiences of a 
certain course of action…The more anonymous my partner, the less direct and 
personal the relationship and the more conceptualized must my dealings with him 
be” (Schutz 1967: 219). 
 
 
In this example, we have moved from the vividness of concrete experience to the 
anonymity of a general ideal type. Berger and Luckmann also provide a similar 
formulation of this relationship, 
The social reality of everyday life is thus apprehended in a continuum of 
typifications, which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the 
“here and now” of the face-to-face situation. At one pole of the continuum are 
those others with whom I frequently and intensively interact in face to face 
situations. At the other pole are highly anonymous abstractions which by their 





Going back to the situation we deployed with Schutz, we can now think of a 
reverse procedure where experience comes back and transforms the ideal types we have 
formed about the person. When we meet again, “to this encounter with the other person, I 
bring a whole stock of previously constituted knowledge… My idea of him undergoes 
continuous revision as the concrete experience unfolds” (Schutz 1967: 169). 
For the purposes of our subject, the changing Muslim discourses on America, we 
need to keep in mind the important distinction that Schutz makes between directly 
experienced social reality and a social reality lying beyond the horizon of direct 
experience. As the types we develop grow more and more abstract, we are getting further 
and further away from the actual subjective meaning complexes or contexts of 
individuals. Therefore, where Muslims are in relation to America will inevitably shape 
what they know and how much they can know about America.  
 
Changing Muslim Discourses on America 
The immigrant Muslims’ encounter with America starts well before their arrival 
in America, because America has already entered the minds of Muslims as a 
phenomenon. The portrait that Muslims have of America is usually not based on direct 
experience but on powerful images or ideal types. With limited and oftentimes no direct 
experience, the image of America remains unchanged, unchallenged. Those images are 
not necessarily negative, but can range from positive, neutral to negative. Furthermore, 
not every Muslim who arrives with negative views of America ends up developing a 
positive one and vice versa. Nevertheless one thing is certain: in their own national 
cultures, Muslims have very little ground for knowing America and almost exclusively 
 126
 
rely on ideal types supplied by globalized American popular culture and the stereotypes 
of America. When the question is posed from a religious juridical point of view, the 
status of America becomes even more problematic. America is a non-Muslim, arguably a 
Christian country. Is America dar al harb? And if so is it religiously permissible to stay 
in America for an extended period of time or even permanently? Under what conditions 
are Muslims allowed to live in such places?  
Some Muslims ask these questions, others do not. Not all Muslims are interested 
in religious justification of their presence in America. Some might not even be aware of 
the juridical terms discussed below. Moreover, some of them might be aware yet choose 
to ignore them in the face of some incongruity between the terms’ implications and the 
reality of their own lives. People can choose to place themselves outside this particular 
juridical question by rejecting its relevance or avoid it altogether as a theoretical 
nuisance. Whether they embrace the relevance of the question or not, however,  all 
Muslims engage in interpretation and produce a certain perspective on America (Haddad 
2004: 32, Leonard 2003:154). 
These questions have come to occupy a central place in the American Muslim 
discourse. Especially after 9/11, according to an American Muslim pundit, such questions 
create a moral dilemma that needs to be solved: 
Many Muslims who see Islam and the U.S. in a state of conflict have enormous 
problems in beginning to think of themselves as American Muslims. They want 
the prosperity and the freedom of America, but not its foreign policy or its liberal 
culture. And Muslim leaders who oppose political assimilation without opposing 
[legal] naturalization inadvertently place Muslims in a morally delicate situation. 
There are no simple solutions to this moral dilemma. It will have to be resolved at 
the theological level. Changes in American attitudes and policies toward Islam 
and Muslims will also be helpful in this transition to citizenship within the mind 
of each American Muslim. The theological discussion will have to take American 
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Muslims beyond the dar-al-Islam (house of peace) and dar-al-harb (house of 
war) dichotomy (Khan 2002: 10). 
 
Early Muslims considered living in American society a dangerous venture. It 
meant the risk of assimilation and moral decay. The students who constituted the kernel 
of American Muslim identity in the 1960’s and 1970’s wanted only to avoid the negative 
influence of American society (Schumann 2007: 11). This perception, however, changed 
over time (Mattson 2003: 203). 
The terms or rather juridical tools available to Muslims for making sense of 
American space have outflanked the binary of dar al Islam versus dar al harb. The 
dichotomy, which existed so long as it was not challenged by direct experience, becomes 
problematic and insufficient when Muslims are actually in America. Reality interferes. 
The alternative or complementary concepts that were historically marginalized in the 
production of this binary are remembered, re-appropriated and even possibly invented by 
Muslims.62 Therefore, in addition to dar al harb and dar al Islam Muslims in minority 
settings have brought back several notions, the most important two of which are dar al 
                                                 
62 Recent Muslim perspectives on this subject include calls for a generalized darura and reclamation of 
alternative juridical concepts. Below is an example of such a call. 
The juristic discourse on Muslim minorities with regard to whether or not Muslims may reside in a 
non-Muslim territory and under what circumstances, the relationship of these Muslims to dar al-
Islam and the ethical and legal duties that these Muslims owe to the Muslim law and to their host 
non-Muslim polity have been debated since the eighth century. Indeed, the juristic discourse on 
the issue has not been dogmatic. Other than the mutually exclusive concepts  of dar al-harb and 
dar al-Islam, the persistent existence of Muslim minorities voluntarily residing outside dar al-
Islam challenged this dichotomous view. In that regard, Islamic jurisprudence has developed 
several mechanisms and concepts that facilitate compromise, such as duress (ikrah), necessity 
(darura), and public welfare (maslaha). As a result, an understanding of dar al-ahd (country of 
treaty, covenant), dar al-aman (country of security), dar al-sulh (country of truce), and dar al-
darura (country of necessity) have come to be recognized as situations and environments in which 
Muslims may live in non-Muslim territories. Perhaps, in modern times, it is more precise to speak 
of “asr al-darura” (time of necessity) instead of dar al-darura, since for Muslims, to a great 
extent, living under darura conditions has become the norm in the global village and is more 





dawah (abode of call, propagation) and dar al ahd (abode of treaty, contract). In place of 
the dar al harb -- dar al Islam dichotomy, we now have a continuum. 
  
The continuum of abodes:  Dar al harb – Dar al dawah – Dar al ahd – Dar al Islam 
 
This continuum, of course, implies no teleology. It is rather a spectrum of 
juridical terms providing religious meaning or justification for different discourses 
Muslims develop with respect to America. In this part of the chapter, I shall highlight 
what is specific to each of these categories and the relationship between them as phases 
of a possible process of settlement. This process or spectrum can be both temporal and 
spatial. 
 There are two broad paradigms under which we can classify the major juridical 
tools. They are either mobilized under the paradigm of darura or they are construed as 
part of an existing legal order or products of a newly articulated code that caters to the 
needs of Muslims in the minority status. The first two categories, which fall under the 
paradigm of darura, are diasporic with respect to the American setting. The last two 
come under the paradigm of law and are employed by Muslims in their post-diasporic 
moment, those who see or want to see America as home. A more comprehensive 
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Figure 4.1. Stages and juridical tools of Muslim cultural settlement in the US. 
 
In the following sections, I shall discuss the specifics of each of these categories. 
What are the consequences of perceiving America as abode of war (dar al harb)? Who 
sees it as such and when? Such questions will be answered for each of the four categories 
used by Muslims as juridical tools or, to put it in Ann Swidler’s terms, as part of their 
juridical “toolkit” (Swidler, 1986). These juridical terms can be interpreted as symbolic 
stations in the cultural settlement of Muslims or moments of their internalization of 
America as a habitat. 
 
ABODE OF WAR: An impossible homeland 
For the perspective that sees America as abode of war (dar al harb), America is 
external to Islam, and, as such, it is a source of anxiety and cultural threat.63 This 
perception is based on a lack of knowledge about what goes on inside America. America, 
                                                 
63 It would be interesting to compare early American frontier discourse with the Muslim discourse 
depicting America as frontier. My intuition tells me that the association of the frontier with chaos, the devil 
and risk is a common thread in both cases. A topic not much discussed and yet worthy of noting here is that 
certain threads in the discussion of Muslim presence in America portray Islam and Muslims as a “frontier 
within” that needs to be (re)moved and pushed back. The calls for internment of Muslims and the alarmist 
idea of  an “enemy within” espoused by some conservative pundits illustrate the persistence of frontier 




in this view, is a monolith—it is completely profane and without legitimately perceptible 
nomos. It has to be avoided unless there is emergency (darura, exception). America is a 
black box that can be treated only in its totality since it can be grasped⎯ in this 
understanding⎯ only from without.64 The ideal type for this conception is a visitor; it 
can be said to represent the common understanding of Muslim immigrants in the 1970s. 
                                                
Changing immigration policies in the 1960s and Cold War politics opened the 
door for Muslim immigrants and students. Interestingly enough, the students from 
Muslim countries who came to America to study not only created the nucleus of a 
Muslim community, but also laid the ground for the formation of a number of major 
organizations, including the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and later the Islamic 
Society of North America (ISNA). Those Muslims who happened to be in America in this 
period believed that they were there under darura. They saw themselves as an outpost of 
Islam inside American space. In keeping with this view, they had no connection to the 
space except for being in it for a short time of necessity. They were geographic and 
cultural orphans, people out of place. Their plans to go back home kept them always in a 
precarious position, unsettled. Dar al harb (abode of war) characterized the perception of 
those Muslims, mostly students from Muslim countries, who were either religious or 
became religious due to diasporic pressures during their studies at American institutions 
of higher education in the 1960s and 1970s. They set out to acquire American science and 
technology without getting contaminated by its culture. Their plan to return home after 
the completion of their studies and their desire to avoid the influence of American culture 
 
64 The same can be said for the perspective of some of the Muslims in Europe. In Tariq Ramadan’s words, 
such Muslims are “living in Europe out of Europe. To avoid being absorbed into Western societies, they 
have found a refuge within community life… The aim is to be ‘at home,’ in Europe but at home” 
(Ramadan 1999: 186) [italics original].  
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were two defining features of their attitude towards American space. These students 







utral space for the encounter and education of Muslim activists from Islamic 
countri
                                                
nds.65 
America was simply a meeting ground for Muslims from various countries. 
Within the framework of a Heideggerian conception of space, their “American space” did
not fully exist. To the extent that care and involvement produce space (the world) 
situated subject, their American space was very small; their primary concern was 
political and cultural solidarity with the Muslim world and its rehabilitation through the 
acquisition of American scientific/technological knowledge. The institutions built in thi
era catered to students and were concerned almost exclusively with the preservation of 
Islamic identity against the corrosive influence of American society. Publications of the 
time, such as MSA News and later Islamic Horizons, depicted the American environm
as an undifferentiated culture having nothing to do with Islam (Schumann 2007: 16). 
America was technologically superior but morally bankrupt, a perception that echo
Sayyid Qutb’s image of America.66 In the eyes of these identity-centric, diasporic 
Muslims, America was an undifferentiated mass. America was at worst an impure place, 
at best a ne
es. 
 
65 Oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia had disproportionate ideological influence during the early 
decades of Muslim immigration to the United States. 
66 Sayyid Qutb, chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, visited and spent two years in the United 
States in 1948-50. Upon his return to Egypt he wrote an essay, “The America I Have Seen,” in which 
America represented everything that Islam was not. (Qutb 2000 [1951]). One section of the piece bears the 
title: “America: The Peak of Advancement and the Depth of Primitiveness.” Most of his analysis seems to 
be based on a cultural translation problem. In this almost unprecedented encounter between America and an 
Islamist, American reality is slaughtered in translation. Qutb hated America not for what America really 
was but for what he understood it to be. 
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Their orientation was thus overseas, towards the Islamic world. Their American 
location gave them extra space and allowed them to mobilize technical and ideological 
resources for what Benedict Anderson calls “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson 1998
58), which in this case meant long-distance Islamism. Even the notion of dawah which 
was activated in response to displacement – its temporariness notwithstanding—was a
introvert dawah directed at students themselves. The purpose was to have “an impact on 
homelands by educating Islamic activists and preparing them for their future return” 
(Schumann 2007: 18). Inspired by the Islamic revivalist movements in Muslim countries,
they interpreted their own experiences in terms of mobility, movement or mobilization. 




ning home turned their stay into a prolonged transit. America was not a 
place to cient 
have 
                                                
 dwell, it was not home. Therefore the ethos of living in America was a “defi
mode of care.”  
Today, most Muslims would reject the idea of America as abode of war and 
might even contest the applicability of the term altogether. The culture of “America as 
dar al harb,” survives, therefore, mostly in old community literature and biographical 
narratives about “Muslims then.” One would expect the culture of dar al harb to 
disappeared entirely over the last couple of decades, since today almost every Muslim 
sees Muslim presence in America as permanent. But it has not. I discovered this 
persistence when I talked to the imam of a mosque67 in Detroit in 2007. This mosque, 
which has an Arabic name, is self-acknowledgedly salafi.68 In terms of congregation, it 
 
67 I have chosen to suppress the name of the mosque and refer to its imam by a pseudonym in deference to 
his concerns about publicity. He also expressed reluctance at the idea of recording the interview. The 
dialogue is based on my notes taken during our conversation. 
68 A movement in Sunni Islam, Salafism seeks to restore the golden age of Islam by purging what it 
perceives to be later cultural influences and innovations. This simplistic conception of Islam is a modern 
form of Puritanism.  
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appears to be predominantly Yemeni. Imam Talib, also from Yemen, is on a long-te
visa and has been here for the last few years. One of the striking things about this mosque
is that the imam does not speak any English at all and delivers his sermons only in 
Arabic. He does, however, use 
rm 
 
a translator. I interviewed him through one of the people 
who he
rview. 
I started e 
to com
English and Arabic]. That made 
it easy es, it 
 it 
spending enough time on aqeedah [creed]. Kids 
in this c
t and khurafat [violations of monotheism and 
deviatio  
ho is dominant. The dominant identity in this country is 
kuffar.  
ld teach them. 
y, 
ose who are going to stay. 
 
hard he
lp translate his sermons and weekend classes. The following exchanges are 
selections from the inte
 by asking his opinion about the English language, since we were not abl
municate in it.  
Question: When one immigrates to America, a lot of things change. For 
example, here all the Muslims speak English. What do you think about the 
English language? 
Answer: English is good for giving dawah. When I came here there were 
some brothers who could speak both languages [
for me to do my own Islamic studies. If I go to English language class
will take a lot of driving. Also you know classes are mixed, men and women… 
Muslims should learn this language, of course. If you do not know the language,
is going to be hard. We should give dawah. 
There are a lot of masjids [mosques] which claim to be ahlul sunnah 
[Sunni] but they actually are not 
ountry get very little Islam. Here in this masjid we try to focus more on 
Islam so that kids don’t get shirkiya
n]. We want them to stay away from shirk [worshipping things other than
the one God]. This is our focus. 
Q: What do you think about the dar al harb and dar al Islam distinction? 
What is America in your view? 
A: America is a kuffar country [the land of disbelief, dar al kufr / dar al 
harb]. It is a matter of w
If we can have dawah, that is the most important thing. We need to show
the people what Islam is. We shou
Q: But Muslims have more freedoms here than in Muslim countries. Think 
of hijab, for example. 
A: It is true we have more freedoms but it does not mean this country is 
better than the Muslim countries. 
Q: Since you have plans to return to Yemen and won’t stay in this countr
what do you say to Muslims here, th
A: I say, if they can go back, it is better for them. The future seems very
re. It is hard to live as a family. It is hard. If something happens that will 
 134
 
be good: if the government puts all the Muslims in one place, that will be good. 
Then we can live without mixing.  
A: Well, we can mix with them to give dawah but we should not lose our 
 
I left the mosque with some degree of bewilderment in that even though I had 
observed a whole spectrum of Muslims in the American context, this was a truly 
extraordinary case: even though many American Muslims believe that they live in 
“electronic internment” since 9/11, I have never met one who considered internment⎯ be 
it electronic surveillance or physical imprisonment like what happened to Japanese-
Americans during the second World War⎯ to be desirable. Here was a Muslim who was 
“in” America and believed that the best thing that could happen to Muslims living in this 
country was to be placed in a ghetto or camp. Interestingly enough, the Detroit-Dearborn 
area is currently the only place in America that could approximate a ghetto (Abraham and 
Shryock 2000). Yet the significant concentration of Arab Muslims in the area still seemed 
insufficient to this imam, as far as the protection of Islamic identity was concerned. The 
only justification for Muslims to stay in this country was dawah; otherwise, America was 
a kuffar (infidel) country, dar al harb (an abode of war), and to protect their religion, 
Muslims should leave as soon as possible. America was an insecure place and could 
never qualify as a homeland. This insecurity was not so much about civil rights and 
liberties— concerns shared by many Muslims— but about religious reproduction and 
spiritual purity.  
To inquire further into his mosque’s relationship to the American environment, I 
asked if they were involved in any interfaith activities. He replied: “No interfaith activity 
here. All our information (about Islam) is on the website. I say, go to call them to Islam 
Q: So you would like Muslims to be more isolated and by themselves? 





ues who visited this 





cted at other Muslim but the non-Muslim other. This 
                                                
 to listen to them. Those who go and say ‘We are the same, no difference,’ they 
are wrong. Call them to Islam.” 
According to this introverted view of Islam and the Muslim community, America 
had to be avoided and when that was not possible, then the only legitimate form of 
involvement was dawah, which for this imam meant conversion. Any other form of 
involvement should be shunned. “Interaction” with the outside world was thus not a t
way street.69 It is not surprising that this was the only mosque where they try to convert 
visitors, even Muslim ones, to their form of Islam. Other colleag
osque told me that they were approached with an intention to convert even thoug
they had made it clear that they were there for research alone.   
Most past Muslim immigrants had and some Muslims in the early stage of their 
immigration today still have a slightly tamer view of the American environment and the 
role of Muslims in that they perceive themselves as an outpost of Muslim geography in 
an alien land. As long as their presence is temporary, they comfortably continue to hold
the view that America can be abode of war. This ideal typical perception of America a
abode of war/chaos changes only under the influence of direct experience, interaction 
and the recognition of dwelling that is usually outside the control of the subjects. The 
concept of dawah (mission, call to Islam), which together with darura (necessity) is one 
of the two justifications for being in America, eventually outgrows the juridical category 
of abode of war  and becomes the point of reference in itself. Limited engagement in t
form of dawah ultimately leads to a perception of America as an open field for unl
dawah. Dawah is no longer dire
 
69 Although the imam and his mosque identify themselves as salafi, not all salafi imams would hold these 
ideas. The development of diplomatic language among immigrant imams and community leaders is an 
interesting thread for further research. 
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change of orientation also marks the transition to the next stage where America is 
 
 
t is at 
on 





 aimed at contributing to 
perceived as a land of mission. 
ABODE OF MISSION: An outpost in “the Land of Possibilities” 
As abode of war, America represented the absolute outside and an anti-homeland.
As abode of mission, while still external to Islam, America is recognized as an adjacent 
space. As such, it becomes a frontier. It is a target of concernful interest or a destination 
of risky spiritual venture. In this conception, America is a field of exploration tha
once dangerous and potentially beneficial. The most significant change in the percepti
from the earlier one is that America is no longer a monolith. First, weak signs of 
differentiation
a or approaches it with caution. His presence is most likely temporary or in its 
early stages. 
In the stage of abode of mission, the notion of dawah (mission) undergoes a shift 
in terms of orientation: now it explicitly targets non-Muslims. The introvert con
replaced by an extrovert one as some involvement with America becomes possible
primary concern is still the preservation of identity through a narrowly defined 
engagement with American society. Even though America is still in moral decay, 
Muslims are now seen as capable of contributing to its positive transformation and 
reluctant involvement comes to designate a desirable partial participation. A shift a







the 198 and 
 
 In 
” One can stay, but only to 
perform y. A 
 
rwise threatening environment. In this transformation, the Qur’anic idea of 
“promoting good and preventing evil” becomes a touchstone.70 
If previously the Muslim world and America were polar opposites, this time 
around, even though they are still largely monoliths, they each acquire negative and
positive aspects⎯ the problems the Muslim world  and some virtues of America a
acknowledged. The Muslim world or past homelands now lose their sharpness and 
complexity in the mind’s eye of the immigrant, and this distancing from the past 
homeland is compensated by the development of a comparably limited “nearness” to the 
American environment. In terms of community development, this approach characteriz
0’s. Early signs of recognizing America as a “nation of immigrants” emerge 
the possibility of somehow fitting in becomes imaginable for the Muslim immigrant.  
Yet even though the beginnings of settlement are observed, America is still 
diasporic: this settlement has not yet fully disengaged itself from a movement that began
elsewhere. Muslims who were in transit are now settled into “mobility” and outreach.
the process, darura (exception) becomes a conditional “stay.
 dawah! That is, a shift occurs from conditional visit to conditional sta
necessity-based risk has become an opportunity-based one.  
As a consequence of the shift, calling America abode of war becomes 
increasingly difficult and the term itself is seldom employed. As Mustapha, a young 
Muslim I interviewed, stated, “If America is dar al harb [abode of war], what does that
add to you? What matters more is whether you as a Muslim change yourself and your 




consider it an Islamic basis for social justice work.  
ur’anic injunction charges Muslims with the responsibility of changing their environment in a 
way. It lends itself to multiple interpretations. Some groups use it as a justification for 





Islamic laims that, 
 
n 
ample of this new transformation. 
Now a 
ca as a 
vement transforms 
the nature of the Muslim community from being a thin “outpost” of Muslims in an alien 
ment.” The formerly monolithic and impure surface of America is now seen as 
e to the inscription of Islam. Along the same lines, an essay published in 1985 i
 Horizons c
We cannot continue to throw out the baby of dawah with the bathwater of our 
disaffection towards this government and society. For clearly we have been 
placed here with a purpose… If we plan to leave tomorrow, we still have today to
work, to do our share in remodeling what has been called a dar al harb –a home 
of hostility- into a dar al Islam –a home in which all Muslims can seek shelter. 
For wherever we are, our Home is Islam. (Omar 1985: 10, quoted in Schuman
2007: 21). 
 
So Muslim institutions either change their orientation, or institutions with a new 
orientation emerge in their stead: institutions oriented toward “non-American” Muslims 
in America and the Muslim world are replaced by a “global Muslim” discourse with 
some localization. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), established in 1982 in 
response to the fact that more and more of the students who planned to return ended up 
staying and forming families in the US, is a perfect ex
Muslim community occupying North American space came into existence with 
early and small signs of localization and settlement. For instance, the essay quoted above 
and published in Islamic Horizons was titled, “Participation of Muslims in Ameri
Land of Possibilities” (Omar 1985: 9) [italics mine]. 
In addition, the Muslim community is no longer identified with students but with 
their families: ISNA would cater to this emergent community which is still diasporic but 
is now inclined toward settlement. Its institutions begin to engage the American 
environment, but only on the grounds of ideology and self interest aimed solely at the 
dissemination of Islam. Still this reluctant settlement and narrow invol
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s opinion on several issues. Although 
very co
nuance
though xt was unusual. 
America is different. There are some necessities. You cannot say that women 
r, 






 the grass. She did not know us but 
e invited us to pray at her house. 
     [America] is Allah’s country. We’re here to invite people to Islam. We are 
here for the guidance. Some scholars say it is not permissible to stay in a non-
 a “thicker” extension of the global Muslim community at large. To sum u
ideological transition from 1970s to 1980s is one from students to families, from M
ISNA, from avoidance to protectionism through partial involvement. 
Though this mindset had its heyday in the 1980s, it can still be found in 
contemporary Muslim community within the US. I saw it reflected in some of my 
conversations with Muslim community leaders. One such example was Imam Haroon of 
“Masjidun-Nur” (Mosque of Light) in Detroit. Established in 1978, this inner-city 
mosque is at present predominantly African American. The imam himself is from th
Caribbean (the island of Granada) and is ethnically South Asian. He had been servi
imam at this mosque since 1984 when I asked hi
nservative and introverted, his views about the American setting were more 
d than those of the previous imam in that⎯ at least on a few registers⎯ he 
t that the American conte
Sometimes ulama overseas do not know the life here. They do not know how 
should not drive. If she is Muslim and her family is non-Muslim and against he
necessities in America. 
When asked about the distinction between abode of war and abode of Islam, he 
d to avoid the binary and emphasized instead the perception of America as “
 possibilities” in the following manner: 
I have been able to pray at the airport, at the mall or at the bus station. Since I’v
been here it has been very easy to live Islam. I don’t know what category Ame
fits but we are free to live Islam and do dawah. Sometimes people are more 
welcoming. Once there was a non-Muslim woman, she invited us to her house 




Muslim land. But what about those who are from here? Where will they go? The 
of the prophet] did both living and dawah. 
earth is vast and for making a living anywhere is OK. Some sahabas [companions 
 
When asked how he views the future of Islam here, he noted, “I see a great future 
because of the saying of the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Islam will dominate and not be 
dominated.’” Despite the relative openness to and appreciation of the American 
environment, his response to my question on interfaith activism, which I use as an index 
of invo ed 
by the p
 need 
r it. They stay their way and we stay our way. We respect but don’t talk… I 
think it became more difficult after 9/11. But some non-Muslim African 
o 
support us. We have no hostility with others… The main thing is dawah, I don’t 
 
Dar al dawah basically takes Muslim immigrants to the threshold of settlement 
and as such marks the limits of diasporic orientation. The negative connection with the 
environment (through the juridical device of darura (necessity)) is now replaced by a 
narrowed yet positive connection (based on a redefinition of dawah (mission)). At this 
point, the neat division “anything Muslim is good, anything American is evil” starts to 
erode. Yet the Muslim subject is still mentally located in another homeland and has only 
a limited justification for his presence in America. 
 
ABODE OF ACCORD: From mission to dialogue 
As dar al ahd (abode of accord) America is neighbor to Islam and a party to an 
accord; it is a source of mutual benefit. America is religiously justified and protected by 
lvement with the social environment, revealed the striking ambivalence produc
erception of America as abode of mission. 
No, we don’t do interfaith activities. My personal opinion, I don’t feel the
fo
Americans started to wear kufi [Muslim skullcap] and say “as salamu alaikum” t
wanna use that word, but we work for dawah, it is an imperative for us.  
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religious laws such as the injunction that Muslims must obey the law of the land 
wherever they live. America thus becomes even more differentiated and emerges as a 
peaceful opportunity space for Muslims, but one that has not yet been fully internalized 
or naturalized. The benefits and opportunities now supersede the risks. This conce
ideal type is a resident: his presence is permanent with the reservation that it might one 
day be possible that he will have to leave. Abode of accord  represents a cautious 
embrace and the early stage of settlement. Many Muslims interpret abode of accor
relative comfort due to its resonance with the social contract theories of American 
society. Abode of accord, therefore, symbolizes the first cultural encounter of the 
immigrant Muslim with American citizenship. While for abode of war and abode of 
mission, the Muslim just happens to be in America, in the conception of abode of acco
he begins to see himself as part of a larger society in which he, too, has a stake. It thus 
allows Muslims to imagine a place of their own inside American society, creating the 
possibility of an American Muslim cultural “ghetto”— in the positive sense of the term⎯
within a liberal society. More specifically, abode of accord represents a communitarian 
understanding of membership in American society, where private autonomy is slightly 









e. The idea of abode of accord 
f belonging that abode of accord generates is located in the spectrum between a 
protected subject and a full citizen. 
Muslims who see their new environment in this way no longer hold themselves
apart from majority society, but still preserve their distinct identity. They share with the





stingly enough, the shaikh begins his 
lecture,
Muslim
ou are, in 
e" for bearing the burden of alienation. An Arab proverb is, "oh stranger in 
estrangement [is not that] you should not work with others or that you should 
1999) 
uslims in diaspora, the shaikh 




 So, the central aspect of international relationships with the Muslims is 
ggression; it is one of war. This idea is wrong. There are three abodes: there is 
the abode of peace, the abode of war, and then there is the abode of treaty where 
there is a contractual agreement between two abodes. (Bayyah 1999) [emphasis 
mine] 
                                                
re lends itself to a spectrum of existence from reluctant participation to hopeful 
and safe engagement with the American environment. 
In 1999, the Mauritanian shaikh Abdallah Bin Bayyah was invited by the Zayt
Institute, a neo-traditional center of Islamic learning based in California, to speak to 
American Muslims in the Bay Area. He delivered his lecture in Arabic, translated by 
American convert shaikh Hamza Yusuf.71 Intere
 a series of juridical recommendations for Muslims living as a minority in non-
 lands, with the recognition of this fact: 
In contrast to Muslims living in the dominant Muslim world at large, y
many ways, strangers in a strange land. The Messenger of Allah said that the 
conditions of the stranger are blessed conditions. It also means "they have 
paradis
a strange land, be a man of courtesy and cultivation." The meaning of 
avoid the dominant society and distance yourselves completely from it. (Bayyah 
After examining the needs and conditions of M
es th
otomy of abode of war and abode of Islam.  
 
Most people think that the world is divided into two abodes, the abode of peace 
and the abode of war. The abode of peace is the land of the Muslims, dar al-
Islam, and the abode of war is everywhere else. In [former President] Nixon's 
book that I read a translated version of called Seizing the Moment, Nixon wrote a
long chapter on the Islamic phenomenon of the modern world. One of the things
Nixon said after praising Islam a great deal and saying many nice things about 
Islam is that one of the most fundamental problems with the Muslims is that they 








The shaikh thus explains the relationship between immigrant Muslims in Americ






lationship of dialogue and a relationship of giving and taking. (Bayyah 1999) 





 is also an excellent citizen in the society that he lives in 
ayyah 1999). 
aikh 
tion can be traced through the writings of its leaders, among 
them Im 72
cized 
                                                
crossing becomes an illustration of entry into abode of accord/contract. 
For instance, when I came into this country, they issued me a visa, and I signed 
something. In the issuance of the visa and my signing of it, a legally binding 
contract occurred. It was an agreement that when I came into this country, I would 
obey the laws and would follow the restrictions that this visa demanded that I 
follow. This was a contractual agreement that is legally binding according even to
the divine laws. In looking at this, we have to understand that the relationship 
between the Muslims living in this land and the dominant authorities in this land





The first essential thing is that you respect the laws of the land that you are livin
in… In this country, the ruling people are allowing you to call people to Islam. 
They are not prohibiting you… It is necessary for us to show respect to these 
people. Islam prohibits us from showing aggression towards people who do n




Muslim discourses, including those of the Zaytuna Institute which hosted Sh
Bin Bayyah in 1999, have changed since then in response to the aftermath of 9/11. 
Zaytuna’s change of orienta
am Zaid Shakir.   
As far as Muslim community leadership is concerned, the idea of abode of accord 
appears to have been the dominant conception in 1990s. Since 9/11, it has been criti
 
72 As a matter of fact, the transformation that Shakir has personally experienced and which partly represents 
the trend in the Muslim community can be observed clearly in two interviews that Shakir gave to Bill 
Moyers of PBS in January 18, 2002 and in June 22, 2007. 
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by Muslim public intellectuals who urge a complete transition to the conception of 
America as an abode of Islam. Muqtedar Khan, a Muslim professor of political science, 
who became prominent after 9/11, finds the idea of abode of accord an inadequate and








dawah (space of testimony/mission) where Muslims “bear witness before 
all mankind.” 
ABOD
                                                
73 Tariq Ramadan, a European Muslim intellectual, finds the same 
term untenable due to its dependence on the old dichotomy of abode of war / abode of 
Islam. Instead he proposes dar al dawah (abode of call)—using a sense different from my
own discussion above⎯ and he even calls for a total abandonment of the idea of abodes: 
“At a time when we are witnessing a strong current of globalization, it is difficult to refer
to the notion of dar (abode) unless we consider the whole world as an abode. Our wo
has become a small village and, as such, it is henceforth an open world.” The whole
world, according to Ramadan, is therefore abode of call/mission. We should “stop 
translating the notion of dar in its restrictive meaning of “abode” and prefer the notion
space, which more clearly expresses the idea of an opening of the world, for Muslim 
populations are now scattered all over the world” (Ramadan 2002: 147). This global 
space is dar al 
 
E OF ISLAM: “Thinking without accent” 
 
73 In my discussion, while talking about the cultural settlement of Islam in the United States, I take the 
liberty of drawing on the European perspective. This is not because I treat both cases under the general 
rubric of Western Islam—although that would be fully justified— but because intellectual discourses 
circulate back and forth across the Atlantic and need to be analyzed in conversation with each other. A 
simple illustration of this is the attempt on the part of Notre Dame University to hire Tariq Ramadan, which 
created enthusiasm among the new generation of American Muslims and stirred a debate on academic 
freedom when the State Department revoked Ramadan’s visa on obscure grounds and denied him entry to 
the United States in 2004. 
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Muslim political activist and president of the American Muslim Alliance, Agha 
Saeed, encouraging Muslim political participation, wrote that Muslims need generation
who “not only speak without accent but also think without accent” (Saeed 2002: 55). To
him “thinking without accent” means changing the orientation of Muslims in America 
from preoccupation with the Muslim world to taking an interest in American domestic








in an American 
habitat.
f 
rn, we have settled 
here.” W
the dist
. I take one poet, he said: [quotes first in Bengali, then translates freely] 
China is mine. Arabian peninsula is mine. Japan is mine. America is mine. I’m a 
Muslim. All the world is my country.” That is my understanding. I decided to live 
country.  
untries of origin, Saeed finds hope in new generations of Muslims who would 
instead regard America as both home and homeland. 
In the conception of abode of Islam or abode of peace, the ideal type is a citize
person who feels at home in America thereby achieving equilibrium or symmetry
between the subjective culture (Muslim identity) and the objective culture (American 
culture).  America no longer remains a mismatched habitat for a Muslim habitus 
developed elsewhere. Rather it becomes an American Muslim habitus 
 As such, even immigrant parents who might not consider America their 
homeland would not hesitate to call it the homeland of their children. 
When I asked a Bangladeshi imam in Hamtramck, Michigan, what he thought o
America as a new home for Muslims, he replied, “There is no retu
hen I said, “But you know there are Muslims who have reluctance because of 
inction of two abodes…” his response came very quickly. 
Oh no, no
“




In the three previous perceptions of America, Muslims had remained in their pre-
political state in relation to American politics. It is only with the conception of America
as abode of Islam/peace that membership in American society begins to translate into 
active citizenship and political participation. If abode of accord (dar al ahd) designated 




lost or tes: 
f American 
entity is the attempt to show that the constitutional democratic structure of 
America is almost equivalent to the political structure of an ideal Islamic state—in 
definition of America so that American democracy is identified with Islamic 
statement “there is no compulsion in religion.” (Mattson 2003: 207).  






itizen. Whereas one might have feared a conflict of loyalties, one 
annot but note that it is in fact the reverse, since faithfulness to Islamic teachings 
74
                                                
tes an American environment that is actually perceived as Islamic. Muslims who 
America as abode of peace (dar al Islam) actually consider American values to be 
alienated Islamic values. As Ingrid Mattson, the current president of ISNA, no
Among the most interesting efforts to permit Muslims a full embrace o
id
other words, a dialectic in which a redefinition of Islam meets a particular 
shura (consultation) and freedom of religion is identified with the Qur’anic 
 
l order, if not an unnoticed embodiment of it. On the European front, Tariq 
an argues that abiding by the law of the land is an extension of following Islamic 
Implementing the Sharia [Islamic law], for a Muslim citizen or resident in Eu
is explicitly to respect the constitutional and legal framework of the country in
which he is a c
c
results in an even more exacting legal implantation in the new environment. 
Loyalty to one’s faith and conscience requires firm and honest loyalty to one’s 
country: the Sharia requires honest citizenship within the frame of reference 
constituted by the positive law of the European country concerned (Ramadan 
2002: 172).  
 
74 “Wherever a Muslim, saying ‘I testify that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His 
Messenger’ is in security and able to perform his/her fundamental religious duties, he/she is at home for the 





The perspective identifying Islam with American values tends to emerge am
American-born children of immigrants (i.e., second and third generations) and conver
Americans seeking harmony in their double identity. For example, Robert Dickson 
Crane, a former advisor to President Nixon and convert to Islam, writes in his Shaping 
the Future: Challenge and Response, that “the basic principles of Islamic law are 
identical to the basic premises of America’s founding fathers, but both Muslims and 




the key o 
d, but American Muslims are the true inheritors and present-day bearers of 
“old-fa
essay p  
democr
e cherish the constitution and the bill of rights. America is 
ur home and our children’s future. [my emphasis-- MB] 
e 
tee 
note speech that Hamza Yusuf of Zaytuna Institute delivered in 2007 in Chicag
at the annual convention of ISNA. He argued that not only are Muslim and American 
values aligne
shioned American values” which otherwise have been lost in the modern world. 
Similarly Mirza A. Beg, a Muslim freelance writer, wrote the following in an 
osted on several Muslim websites advocating Muslim participation in American
acy. 
America has been a land of immigrants ever since the founding of the Republic. 
Though European in the beginning, in the last few decades, it has welcomed all, 
irrespective of color, ethnicity or religion. […] 
     As Muslims, Islam enjoins us to be just and truthful, in thought, works and 
deeds; as well as be respectful of other religions while practicing the tenets of 
slam. As Americans wI
o
     Democratic norms are embedded in Islamic heritage. […] The only way for a 
peaceful religion to flourish is in a democratic setting, without coercion. Freedom 
is a yearning of all-human souls. The quest of centuries for equality and justic
led to the realization, that the only guaranty of individual freedom is to guaran





This new ‘Muslim homeland’ can be considered more Islamic than most if not all 
Muslim countries. A land of freedom (especially religious freedom) and democracy, 
America is a heterogeneous arena of good and bad, right and wrong. Just like historically 
Muslim lands, America also has its share of bad things. But it is up to Muslims to live 
Islam. They can contribute to its culture and society not only by their faith but also 
through their hard work and service. America is no longer an opportunity space or
of possibil
 a land 
ities; it is a privilege for Muslims. As such it places them in a special status 










gard to both America and the Muslim community at large. American Muslims se
themselves as having a special location and a historical responsibility—indeed, a number
of  contemporary Muslim intellectuals have called it a “manifest destiny” (Khan, 2002:1
American Muslims could even come to lead the Muslim community at large (the 
ummah).  
Muslim writers publish articles with such titles as “Life, Liberty and Pursu
Happiness are Islamic Values.” The pursuit of happiness⎯ which had been regarded by 
Qutb, under the paradigm of abode of war/chaos, as antithetical to Islam⎯ is now seen 
as part of Islam. Islam becomes an American religion, part of the landscape of Americ
civil religion in the mind of Muslims themselves. Interfaith consciousness matures an
th activism intensifies. Victor Ghalib Begg, a local champion of interfaith 
activism and board member of the Muslim Unity Center in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan
asked at the 2007 ISNA convention, “Where is Muslim ecumenicalism? Protestants and
Catholics had their “ecumenical” moment and are now well past it, this is a stage we 
Muslims should also go through, both among Muslims and with the non-Muslims.”
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Now America is home and the Muslim world is the target of outreach. At
stage of America as abode of Islam, the shift of perspectives is complete. Muslims see 
things from the “point of view” (i.e., location) of  their new home/land, America. They 
are now set to make strategic incursions into the Muslim world, seeking to derive benef
from it (in the form of cultural resources) while avoiding its problems (corruption, 
authoritarianism). Whereas previously only converts had behaved in this way, it now 
becomes a common practice among the children of American immigrants. New 








fold eidetic appearances while the 
Muslim world shrinks to a few ideal types. The process of autonomization of American 
in 
mmigrant confusion of culture with religion. They want to dissociate Islam from 
its Middle Eastern or South Asian “baggage” and make it an American religion. Ofte
they ignore the fact that America also comes with its own “culture,” that “pure Islam” 
without a local culture is nowhere to be found. What had once been approached with 
suspicion (i.e., America, the abode of war/chaos) is now naturalized and what 
natural for their parents (i.e., overseas culture) has now become an object of suspicion. 
The signs of autonomization of Islam can be seen in the words of Maher Hathout
a Muslim community leader, who spoke at a Muslim conference in the early 2000s, 
stating: “As much as we can make clear that Muslim-American identity is not a natural 
extension of the Middle East, the better off we will be.”75 As American Muslims gain
relative autonomy vis-à-vis other Muslims, America becomes in their eyes an 
increasingly complex entity. America presents mani
Islam is best illustrated in a piece that Imam Zaid Shakir of Zaytuna Institute wrote 
                                                 
75 I should note that the change of political orientation is still ongoing. There has been a shift in the 
American Muslim “political qibla” from Jerusalem to Washington, from the question of Palestine to 
domestic American Muslim issues.  
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ate the symbols of 
ther religions, trample on their honor, discard their values and mores, and 
massacre their fellow Muslims. If any of that undermines the works of Muslims in 
 
people and Islam, when many of those people are in the most desperate need of 
, 
had responded to those who abused him in Ta’if with similar disregard, none of 





tances, then it will be hard for 
s to consider them allies… No one from the Muslim east consults us before 
launching these campaigns. We have a generation of Muslim children here who 
pressure. Their faith is challenged and many decide to simply stop identifying 
women, who out of necessity must work, usually in places where they are the only 
                                                
e to the Danish cartoon crisis76 that broke out in September 2005. In “Clas
ized: A Response to the Cartoon Controversy,” Shakir criticized the Muslim 
rs in the Middle East and elsewhere for ignoring the consequences of their 
al behavior for Muslims living in the West. 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current campaign to “Assist the 
Prophet,” for many converts, like this writer, is the implicit assumption that there
is no dawah work being undertaken here in the West, and no one is currently, or
will in the future enter Islam in these lands. Therefore, it does not matter what 
transpires in the Muslim East. Muslims can behave in the most barbaric fas
murder, plunder, pillage, brutalize and kidnap civilians, desecr
o
these Western lands, it does not matter. If it places a barrier between the Western
Islam, it does not matter. If our Prophet, peace and blessings of God upon him
the generations of Muslims who have come from the descendants of those 
 
Shakir’s critique of “Muslims in the East” represents a threshold moment in the 
ion of American Islam from its imagined origins in a Muslim world growin
ingly unrecognizable in the eyes of American Muslim. And as he goes on to n
bolic separation is something truly remarkable: 
As Muslims in the West, we may be approaching the day when we will have to
"go it alone." If our coreligionists in the East cannot respect the fact that we are 
trying to accomplish things here in the West, and that their oftentimes ill-
considered actions undermine that work in many ins
u
have to go to schools where most of them are small minorities facing severe peer 
with Islam. Is that what they deserve? We have obedient, pious Hijab wearing 
 
76 A Danish newspaper, the Jyllands-Posten, published twelve highly unflattering cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammad, which provoked responses in the Muslim world that ranged from a boycott of Danish goods to 
violent street protests, including the torching of the Danish embassy in Syria.   
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Muslims. Should their safety, dignity, and honor be jeopardized by the actions of 
 
The process of autonomization of American Islam is accelerated by the arrival o
second and third generation American Muslims who make fun of their immigrant par
and Islamophobic non-Muslim compatriots. The rise of Muslim comedians, especially in 
the post-9/11 era, am
Muslims halfway around the world? (Shakir 2006) 
f 
ents 
ply attests to this transformation.77 The emergence of an American 
Muslim thos and the development of a sense of being at home in America reverses the 
etween the abode of peace and the abode of chaos. America becomes the 
land of  
a 
es 
eraction between habitus and habitat reaches equilibrium, the 
view through American lenses springs into focus. The immigrant Muslim is re-situated as 
                                                
 e
relationship b
 order and pure reality, while the homeland of immigrant parents retreats into
chaos and anomie. Now, the Muslim world is seen through an American lens and judged 
from that location. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has taken a phenomenological approach to the way immigrant 
Muslims eliminate their sense of homeland insecurity and gradually come to see Americ
as a new homeland. As Muslims dwell in America, either the American nomos becom
legible to them or they introduce a new Islamic nomos onto the American surface. Often 
the two possibilities converge. 
This discussion of the juridical tools that help immigrant Muslims feel at home 
offers some theoretical insights. The cultural transition from immigrant to citizen, from 
being “in” to being “of” America is made possible by a gradual internalization of the 
American habitat. Once int
 












r established categories. This chapter demonstrates how the abode of chaos / 
abode of peace binary faces an eruption of experience and is shattered into a plurality of 
new categories (abode of mission and abode of accord) and how, with these new 
categories, the Muslim lifeworld in America becomes religiously meaningful and 
legitimate. 
 
rican Muslim. Phenomenologically speaking, as we cannot be everywhere, there 
is no view from nowhere. Our situatedness creates nearness and distance. Muslim vie
of  America are shaped by their relative exposure to American space and the degree o
their involvement with it. 
Acquiring a new
trates how an initially negative ethos turns into a positive one as the Muslim 
immigrant who shied from contact with the American environment is replaced by a 
citizen who is fully immersed in it, through such modes of care as interfaith activism
political participation. 
As I have noted earlier, a guest who stays for too long is no longer a guest but a 
lodger. Naturalization and citizenship are temporal processes; they involve something
beyond the inclusion of the immigrant in the new homeland. The sense of cultural 
membership develops only after the immigrant internalizes his or her new habitat. 
Transition from exception (darura) as a paradigm to the reconstruction of legal 
order on a previously anomic space also has wider implications. The way exception 
(darura) culminates in law parallels the process by which the lifeworld yields idea










Citizen Aliens: CAIR and the Rights of Muslims in the U.S. 
 
The best criteria by which to decide whether someone has been forced outside the 
pale of the law is to ask if he would benefit by committing a crime. If a small 
burglary is likely to improve his legal position, at least temporarily, one may be 
sure he has been deprived of human rights. For then a criminal offense becomes 
the best opportunity to regain some kind of human equality, even if it be as a 
recognized exception to the norm. The one important fact is that this exception is 
provided for by law. As a criminal even a stateless person will not be treated 
worse than another criminal, that is, he will be treated like everybody else. Only 
as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it. 
–Hannah Arendt (1973: 286) 
 
Introduction 
I decided to start this chapter with an epigraph from Arendt, who wrote about the 
philosophical meaning and historical consequences of statelessness in interwar Europe. 
What she says about statelessness is crucial for understanding the nature of the 
relationship between people and the law. As the most radical form of exclusion and 
dehumanization, statelessness is a condition where human rights and civil rights are de-
linked, where bare life is detached from the law that assigns it a place and a voice. In 
Foucauldian language, subjectedness to the law is what produces human beings as 
subjects. A stateless person falls outside the pale of the law: he lacks nomos. Because he 
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is metaphysically unformatted, it becomes impossible to commit a crime against him⎯ 
there are no boundaries to be transgressed. Modern day prisoners at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo fall into this category; we see them stripped of their clothes, toyed with and 
humiliated, piled into pyramids of bodies. People of this category, says Agamben, “may 
be killed but cannot be sacrificed” (Agamben 1998: 8). When law⎯ the metaphysical 
mantle that produces human beings⎯ is lifted from over them, they lose their “right to 
have rights” (Arendt 1973: 296, Somers 2006: 35-63).  
The conditions I am going to discuss here are by no means that severe, but a 
similar logic applies. Statelessness certainly reduces human beings to what Arendt calls 
“the scum of the earth.” Arendt’s reasoning, I believe, also implies that there are varying 
degrees of being “within the pale of the law.” One can imagine a continuum ranging from 
a dehumanized stateless person, to a legally recognized criminal, to a legally neglected 
citizen, to a legally recognized citizen. Even for those within the compass of the law, 
there are varying degress of protection (Bosniak 2006: 4).  
Let me turn now to the relationship between Muslim life and American law after 
9/11. In the introduction to this dissertation I argued that as a collective neurosis, 9/11 has 
produced a situation where the status of Muslims shifted from “invisible strangers” to 
that of “extremely visible strangers.” If Muslims inside America were in some sense 
“legally neglected citizens,” the crime of 9/11, although connected to them in the most 
tenuous possible fashion, imposed on them a variety of new legal forms. I will touch 
briefly on a few of these accidents of citizenship here, before turning to the real meat of 
my discussion.  
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9/11 has transformed non-citizen, non-American Muslims (in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and elsewhere) into objects of American sovereignty, differentiating them into enemy and 
friend or good Muslim and bad Muslim (Mamdani 2004). Those who were outside the 
scope of American law were nonetheless touched by her sovereignty. Those who were 
encompassed by the law, however, experienced a tectonic shock. And a few of them fell 
off. Some citizens were designated as “enemy combatants” and removed outside the pale 
of the law, albeit temporarily. John Walker Lindh (the so-called American taliban) and 
Yasser Hamdi (also an American citizen) are two famous cases (Cole 2003: 4). The 
metaphysical mantle of the law was lifted from over them. Actually, the receding 
boundary of law landed squarely between them: while Walker was eventually brought 
back into the legal fold, Hamdi was forced to renounce his American citizenship as a 
condition of his deportation to another country. From the beginning, Hamdi’s citizenship 
was treated as “accidental” (Nyers 2006: 22).  
As you trace the receding shoreline of the law, you begin to come across new 
categories of people. Some are citizens whose connections with foreigners seem to have 
been used to implicate them in crimes. In this group are two Muslim members of the U.S. 
army, Ahmad Al Halabi and Chaplain James Yee, both married to Syrian nationals, who 
were accused of espionage while stationed at Guantanamo. The story of James Yee, in 
particular, is reminiscent of the Dreyfus Affair. The government was finally compelled to 
drop all charges against him, but only after much legal posturing and expense. Others are 
illegal immigrants⎯ many of whom have lived here peacably and productively for 
years⎯ who, caught by the immigration authorities, seek only to return to their countries 
of origin, but find themselves stuck between the law and extralegality. Osama Siblani, the 
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publisher of Arab American News, a Michigan weekly, said in a public lecture 
(03/23/2007): “I receive letters from prisons. Lebanese, Iraqi, Pakistani… all kinds of 
people who need to be deported but can’t because they don’t have passports. They beg to 
be helped.” Legal scholars like David Cole argue that sacrificing the rights of 
immigrants/aliens for the security of citizens will eventually lead to the loss of the rights 
of citizens themselves (2003: 17). Arendt observed a similar phenomenon: “Once a 
number of stateless people were admitted to an otherwise normal country, statelessness 
spread like a contagious disease” (1973: 285).  
Having crossed this littoral of fractured and receding citizenship, we reach the 
body of mainstream Muslims who are full legal citizens. They are protected by the law 
but, unlike their non-Muslim fellow citizens, are under intense scrutiny and surveillance. 
Many of them believe that they are seen as “guilty until proven innocent.” 
The impact of 9/11 on this final and largest group of Muslims, I would like to 
argue, has been ambiguous. It includes the distress of exclusion and surveillance but also, 
counterintuitively, the benefits of recognition. Though painfully, the gap between 
American Muslims and the law has been narrowed. A law that was not particularly 
sensitive to them became much more so after 9/11. This close encounter between Muslim 
citizens and the law has produced the category of “victim citizen.” 
In what follows, I engage in a discussion of the relationship between victimhood 
and citizenship as it is articulated in the advocacy work of the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR). I begin with a brief history of CAIR and then move on to the 
ways in which CAIR contributes to protecting the civil rights of Muslims and producing 




American Muslim Organizations in the 1990s 
 The history of Muslim institutions in the United States at the national level is not 
very long. The Islamic Society of North America, today the largest umbrella organization 
for Muslims, was started in 1982 when the members of the diasporic Muslim Student 
Association (founded in 1963) came to the realization that their stay in America was not 
temporary, after all. In the naming of those institutions, Muslims treated America as an 
undifferentiated entity. Foreign Muslim students, reflecting their experience as outsiders 
in America, and Black Muslims, for whom Islam was then an oppositional identity, all 
defined themselves in an external relation to America. When the Lost-Found Nation of 
Islam in the Wilderness of North America was transformed into an orthodox Islamic 
community under the leadership of Warith Deen Muhammad, Black American Muslims 
named their new organization The World Community of Al-Islam in America. 
 Over time, however, we see increasing differentiation of America in the eyes of 
Muslims and a consequent specialization in the institutions dealing with the complex 
entity called America. At the same time there was also a change in focus from overseas to 
domestic affairs. This shift is discernible in the character of organizations launched in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The 1990s, in particular, saw a real explosion of Muslim 
insitutions. This was partly in response to a growth spurt on the part of the Muslim 
community. Formation of civil rights advocacy groups and professional associations in 
the 1990’s marked the transition from diasporic orientation to cultural settlement. CAIR 
is one of the many organizations launched in this period. Others include the American 
Muslim Council and the  American Muslim Alliance. By the end of the decade, despite 
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their youth, American Muslim organizations were celebrating their first  concrete 
achievements. The first stamp celebrating Muslim holidays (Eid ul adha and Eid ul fitr) 
was released in 2001, shortly before 9/11. The Clinton administration and the State 
Department hosted Ramadan iftaar dinners with American Muslim leaders. The year 
2001 was also a threshold year in Muslim political participation. An umbrella 
organizaton of various Muslim political affairs committees endorsed George W. Bush in 
exchange for his promise to repeal the Secret Evidence Act. Over the objections of 
African American Muslim organizations, most immigrant Muslims voted Republican in 
expectation of the greater recognition promised by Bush. 
9/11 brought this string of successes to a screeching halt. The American Muslim 
Committee, perhaps the most active Muslim lobbying organization, fell into obscurity. 
One of its officials told me in 2003 that the White House was no longer answering their  
phone calls. The organization became practically defunct. CAIR was perphaps the only 
Washington-based Muslim advocacy organization to survive the fallout of 9/11. 
 
Development of CAIR 
CAIR was established in 1994 by Omar Ahmad, Nihad Awad and Ibrahim 
Hooper. Ahmad is currently a board member, Awad is executive director and Hooper is 
communications director of the organization. Ahmad and Awad are students turned 
activists and naturalized immigrants, while Hooper is a journalist and a convert to Islam. 
When they opened a two-person office on K Street in Washington, as Awad writes in an 
essay that he gave me,  
We inherited two great challenges. The first was the negative image of Islam and 
Muslims in the American media, and the effects of that negative image on public 
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perception and public policy. The second challenge was the lack of interest and 
motivation among Muslims themselves to do anything about it. 
 
Awad is an ethnic Palestinian who came to America from Jordan in 1984. While 
pursuing his studies in engineering, he also became active in Muslim community affairs 
in Minnesota, but he grew somewhat disillusioned with their efforts.  
We had annual conventions held by ISNA-like organizations for Muslim students 
and their families since the 1960s, but their focus was on spiritual development, 
internal affairs and the problems of Muslims abroad. 
 
What was lacking was engagement with the larger society and public institutions. 
Awad believes that his awakening to the need for a Muslim institution oriented toward 
improving the image of Muslims and promoting their engagement with American society 
happened at the time of the Gulf War. “Though tragic for the Middle East, it proved 
catalytic for the Muslim community in America.” Muslim Americans were in a sense 
forced out of their lethargy when they became targets of anti-Arab sentiment.  
 In the first year of its establishment, CAIR organized a few anti-discrimination 
campaigns. In September of 1994, a Muslim woman reported an offensive greeting card 
to the CAIR office. The card depicts a veiled woman with the words, “Rather than 
confront her morbid fear of germs, Millicent changed her name to Yazmine and moved to 
Tehran.” Inside the card read: “So you’re feeling like Shiite. Don’t Mecca big deal out of 
it.” The campaign against the postcard company, Recycled Paper Greetings, lasted for 
two months. Eventually CAIR persuaded RPG to apologize and stop producing the card.  
The real turning point in CAIR’s young lfe, however, came with the Oklahoma 
City bombing. When Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in 
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Oklahoma in 1995 there was an immediate backlash against Muslims. When I asked 
Awad about CAIR’s response, he said: 
When that happened we had less than a thousand dollars in our account. I got a 
ticket and borrowed a cell phone. A reporter got me inside the area closed for 
investigation. Ibrahim sent a news release that we’ll have a press conference on 
the spot. That press conference was historic. Later we met with the governor of 
Oklahoma and gave a check from the local Muslim community in Oklahoma to 
help the victims. 
 
The same year, CAIR published its first civil rights report, “Rush to Judgment” 
and started to raise more funds. In Awad’s words, “one success led to another” and CAIR 
emerged as the main civil rights group for American Muslims. CAIR owes its rise to a 
series of crises that have led to backlash against American Muslims. Each crisis becomes 
an opportunity for CAIR to establish itself as the legitimate voice of the American 
Muslim community.  
CAIR is involved in a variety of advocacy work. Among other projects, the 
organization has tackled survey research  (producing “The Mosque in America: A 
National Portrait”), grassroots mobilization (a voter registration drive), condemnation of 
acts of terrorism (declaring a “fatwa against terrorism” in cooperation with the Fiqh 
Council of North America), protesting and preempting media stereotypes (the villains in 
“The Sum of All Fears,” a film by Paramount Pictures, were changed to neo-Nazis 
following objections from CAIR about stereotyping of Muslim characters), and 
mediating cases of commercial- and employment-based discrimination (Nike was 
prevented from selling sneakers emblazoned with “Allah” in Arabic script ; Liz Claiborn 
was discouraged from producing pants with Qur’anic verses printed on them). 
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When an opportunity for an internship at CAIR arose, I took it. In a way, CAIR 
became my entry point to the world of Muslims in the United States. CAIR provided me 
with the exposure to the flows of people, ideas and practices I needed to familiarize 
myself with the community and its national-level institutions.  
 
Inside CAIR 
During the summer of 2003, I spent two months working as an intern at CAIR’s 
national headquarters in Washington. I was one of a dozen interns. I was assigned to the 
research department, where my task was to update a database of Muslim institutions in 
several states. I would place phone calls to those institutions to verify the contact 
information listed on the database. I was struck by the fact that, even though I introduced 
myself as calling from CAIR, a significant number of the contacts were reluctant to give 
information about their institutions. Around this time the government crackdown on 
Muslim charities was intensifying. A second lesson I learned from my otherwise boring 
phone job was the degree of mobility of American mosques. Many “masjids” (mosques) 
were no longer to be found at their old phone numbers. Small mosques⎯ which tend to 
have informal congregations⎯ were even more mobile than established ones.  I 
wondered if this had to do with the 9/11 backlash and growing sense of insecurity within 
the community. Even large mosques’ answering machines would sometimes say that they 
could not give directions to the mosque because of security concerns. 
I would occasionally have informal conversations with the people at the other end 
of the phone. Some of the respondents told me that they “had never heard of CAIR.” 
(CAIR’s community outreach department needed to work harder, I realized.) A 
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Bangladeshi respondent explained how there are “more liberties in America than in 
Muslim countries”⎯ a statement you can hear from many Muslims. The tone of another 
respondent’s comments was different. He was the representative of a Muslim charity in 
the Midwest. He said that their organization had been visited by the FBI. Since then “the 
name of our organization is on the news. This has a negative impact. People are scared 
about donating.” When I asked what it meant to be an American Muslim, his response 
was: “You live by the laws of the land. You expect protection and equality. There should 
not be any difference.” He went on to complain about “some media outlets show[ing] 
Islam as evil. We need to inform people about Muslims. Muslims are regular folks who 
eat, drink etc… We want to educate our children… Americans are nice, open to learn. 
They want to listen. We should build bridges.” 
Since CAIR was located two blocks from the Capitol, we attended numerous 
congressional hearings. On the second day of my internship I found myself in the halls of 
the capitol building attending a public forum organized by the American Civil Liberties 
Union. The forum, “Justice for All: Selective Enforcement in Post 9/11 America,” took 
place before Senators Edward Kennedy and Patty Murray. The testimony discussed 
mandatory detention, lengthy detentions without charge, holding immigrants ordered 
deported, selective enforcement of obscure immigration infractions, secrecy in 
immigration detention, and eroding accountability. It also touched on the alienation of 
immigrant communities, including “voluntary” interviews of Arab and Muslim males, 




The ACLU presentation was accompanied by the stories of four victims of 
detention and discrimination. One of them, Asif Iqbal, was a New York Muslim who 
found himself on the “No-Fly List” because he shared the name of a terrorist suspect held 
at Guantanamo Bay. After being repeatedly denied boarding or interrogated by law 
enforcement authorities prior to boarding, Iqbal sought assistance from CAIR. He gave 
spoken testimony that day. It is a long quote, but a useful illustration of the post-9/11 
challenges some citizens and civil rights groups face. 
I have been repeatedly discriminated against at airports across America solely 
because of my name, “Asif Iqbal.” I think it is important to note that in Pakistan, 
my name is as common as John Smith is here. Since the initial implementation of 
the “No-Fly List” by TSA, passengers like myself have been denied boarding 
simply because our names are the same or similar to that of a suspect on the no-
fly list. Let me describe you what it is like for people like myself to go through 
the routine process of checking in at the airport. Every time I check in for a flight, 
the airline computer terminal locks up because my name matches a name on the 
No-Fly List. I am then asked to step aside while they contact local law 
enforcement. Upon their arrival, I am questioned, often in front of a whole line of 
passengers and eventually given clearance from them. Unfortunately this isn’t the 
end of it. After I’m given clearance by local officers, the airline representative is 
then prompted to contact the FBI and other government agencies for further 
clearance. In some instances, the FBI has responded by coming to the airport to 
further interrogate me. Finally, after a tedious run of questions and answers and 
clearance from the appropriate persons, I am allowed to board my flight. The 
sense of relief I feel when finally cleared for boarding is quickly diminished when 
I remember that I will have to repeat this whole process again on my return flight. 
On several occasions this process has caused me to miss my flights and in some 
instances has forced me to lose a day’s work.  
My travel goes well beyond vacation travel once in a while. I work for 
BearingPoint Inc. as a Senior Consultant out of the Manhattan office. My job 
requires 100% travel and therefore I hold Elite Status with Continental and US 
Airways. I typically travel every Monday morning to my client’s site and fly 
every Thursday evening to my home in Rochester, NY. Like many other 
Americans, I had my own apprehensions about traveling after the September 11 
attacks and I must admit that initially, seeing the extra security helped to lessen 
my feelings of anxiety. While I understand the need for some of the vigorous 
measures taken by airport security, I feel there must be a better way to handle this 
situation. Being stopped the first time was acceptable, but each and every time I 
travel?  Not to mention the fact that each and every experience has been 
extremely humiliating and emotionally draining. Since February of 2002, I have 
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been trying to get some kind of relief from the government so that I do not have to 
be subjected to this when I travel.  
CAIR and ACLU have been consistently following up with TSA to get 
updates on when a new procedure would be implemented, however, as yet, no 
definitive timeline has been given. Instead, TSA and other government agencies 
involved passed the buck when questioned about the implementation of a relief 
procedure. Which leaves me today wondering when, if ever, a new system will be 
activated to give me relief and allow me to travel as freely as other Americans? 
 
 When we came back to the office I asked Laurie, a CAIR staff member, about 
Iqbal’s case. Laurie said she was frustrated with the lack of progress in this case despite 
her prolonged efforts. “His name,” she said, “is like John Smith” and because “there is a 
terrorist with the same name they don’t clear his name from the list.” “There are multiple 
lists” she complained. “They keep shuffling everything around. Bureaucracy is expanding 
and moving. I think it is part of the strategy so that people would not know where to go.” 
Even when we cannot solve the problem, she said “it makes a difference for any 
Muslim to have the  support of an organization like CAIR. 
 
It makes a huge difference. I have several people who we never worked on their 
case at all but they call me once every two months to let me know that they’re still 
OK, they are still alive, and that they haven’t been deported. Knowing that 
someone else is paying attention and watching out what is happening to them is 
huge. Especially in areas where you are the only Muslim, the only one dealing 
with this thing… 
 
Laurie works on issues related to government affairs, the FBI, and Homeland 
Security.  She once told me about the case of a young American Muslim who had been 
court martialed. She attended the hearing and said that “they are paying attention a little 
more” when someone is observing the proceedings. Coming from CAIR makes people 
react differently, she said: 
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The minute they notice there is an outside organization watching, they’ve 
changed. Alhamdulillah [thank God], it ended positively. I have no doubt if we 
were not involved it would be negative. At the time we were involved his attorney 
was telling him to plead guilty. We fired the attorney… When you say Council on 
American-Islamic Relations in DC, they pay more attention, a little bit more… 
They said ‘we didn’t think it would go that far.’ 
 
Victimhood and Citizenship 
On July 15, 2003, CAIR held a press conference for the release of its 2003 Civil 
Rights Report, “Guilt by Association.” Journalists from the Associated Press, CNN, C-
Span and many others were present. There were four speakers. Ibrahim Hooper made the 
introduction and Nihad Awad gave a brief speech. He said that old violations of rights 
were coming from persons and were due to ignorance and bias. But new violations are 
the result of government policies. When the government is the problem, the government 
has to be the solution. Civil rights are central to our lives, he said, “But this 
administration let down the community.” He added that civil rights cannot be sacrificed 
for security. The Muslim community must defend its rights by being more politically 
involved.  After Awad’s speech, CAIR’s research director presented his statistics on the 
rise in violations of the rights of Muslims across the country. He also mentioned nine 
successful hate-crime prosecutions. The fourth speaker at the press conference was a 
Muslim woman, Aysha Nadrat Yunes, who was a victim of civil rights violation. Federal 
agents broke into her house. She was handcuffed and forced to remove her headscarf. 
Then they took her picture. She said “I chose to become a citizen of the USA for liberties. 
I voted for President Bush.” 
9/11 generated a polarized response from Muslims in the U.S.. They either 
withdrew from a visible Muslim identity or decided to reclaim it through mobilization 
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and participation. Some of those who took the first track chose to disappear into the 
larger society by renouncing their Arab, Pakistani or even Muslim identities. Some chose 
to dissociate themselves from the community to avoid risks that might be caused by other 
members. Some have even changed their names to avoid discrimination in employment 
and other interactions with rest of the society. In short, a significant segment of the 
American Muslim community has been culturally and psychologically inhibited.  
 The alternate trajectory⎯the one the majority of American Muslims are in the 
process of taking⎯ is to fight back for equality and legitimacy. The search for ways of 
expressing and facilitating an American Muslim identity has resulted in an increasing 
emphasis on advocacy work. In this climate, organizations like CAIR attract a great deal 
of interest and support from the community. 
Some members of CAIR’s staff are direct victims of post-9/11 civil rights 
violations. Laurie, for example, told me that she used to be a high school teacher. She 
decided to work for CAIR after her house in Virginia was raided in 2002 by federal 
agents. (Her husband is an Arab Muslim).  
When our house was raided… it was March 2002. That was the day when I 
decided that I needed to come and work for CAIR full time. You know, it was 
shocking that this kind of thing could happen. Even though you read about it here 
and there, when it actually happens to you then you get out and talking about the 
issue and you start hearing other people’s stories and they are devastating, I mean 
really. To see what people were going through. And you know then I decided I 
would. I called Ibrahim back in April and you know I said if you have any 
opening I am interested. And we talked and I ended up in the civil rights 
department. 
 
Victims of civil rights violations tend to become active citizens with an enhanced 
appreciation for the values surrounding civil and human rights. In a sense, as victims 
Muslims become sensitized to civil rights work. Of course this does not happen 
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automatically. If an immigrant who lacks cultural means of expressing himself and 
finding his way around events is victimized, his victimization may not translate into 
activism and participation. Furthermore, the link between victimhood and active 
citizenship holds true only for those who are fully protected by the law.  
 
CAIR and the American Muslim Public Sphere 
 There are two historical moments in the formation of a national Muslim public 
sphere in the U.S. They are the founding of the Muslim Student Association in 1963, 
(which marks the diasporic moment), and the launch of the CAIR-NET email list in 1996 
(the post-diasporic moment). For a religious minority dispersed across the country, 
collective spaces of interaction and spheres of representation are crucial for the 
development of codes and standards that define the group. This is particularly important 
in the case of American Muslims, who are divided along many lines. Hundreds of 
thousands of Muslims receive emails from CAIR on a daily basis. In each dispatch, one 
typically sees news about Muslims across the country and about CAIR’s activities and 
“Action Alerts” calling on Muslim citizens to react to a particular incident. The reaction 
requested can be positive or negative, it often takes the form of asking subscribers to 
write to public officials commending or criticizing them for some recent action or 
statement. Muslims also learn about the media coverage of Muslim communities across 
the country through these emails. 
 Occasionally you’ll hear Muslims say, “You’re on the CAIR list, right?” (Much 
as a certain group of liberal, educated Americans is apt to say, “Did you hear the other 
day on NPR…?”) Through this email list Muslim Americans learn about goings-on in 
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Muslim communities across the country. In an interesting way, CAIR’s email list has 
become an internal clock, an agenda-setting device. It is not that Muslims are told what to 
do, except in Action Alerts, but they are exposed to stories about Muslims in other parts 
of the country that they probably wouldn’t hear about otherwise. These are not always 
stories about hate crimes. They can be about a lawsuit won by a Muslim employee or an 
award won by a Muslim high school student. In Ramadan the list fills up with stories 
from what feels like every small-town newspaper in the country, all titled “Local 
Muslims Share Fast-breaking Meal with Non-Muslim Neighbors.” In short, CAIR-NET 
has created a virtual American Muslim public sphere within which the triumphs, fears, 
and hopes of the community are propagated. It also appears to be a popular source of 
material for Friday sermons. The list, moreover, has contributed to CAIR’s image in the 
minds of American Muslims by giving it relevance and continuity. CAIR’s pan-Muslim 
advocacy work also places it above the Shia/Sunni divide. As such it has become an 
important avenue for articulating a common Muslim identity in the U.S. One can observe 
this characteristic of CAIR in the successful outreach of its Michigan chapter. Executive 
director of Michigan chapter, Dawud Walid, has been devoting a great deal of work to 
overcoming the sectarian differences, especially when it comes to issues of civil rights 
and communal solidarity. 
 
Crises and Citizenship Capital 
 If at the individual level, being victimized leads to greater participation in the 
struggle for civil rights and internalization of the values associated with it, being 
victimized generates a different kind of benefit at the collective level: citizenship capital. 
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Crises open space for displays of Muslim identity, allow Muslim leaders access to 
network television, and force government to recognize Muslims as a particular American 
community. It is almost surprising now to remember that President George W. Bush has 
indeed said positive things about Islam. Immediately after 9/11 he visited the Islamic 
Center of Washington D.C. After meeting with the Muslim leaders, including CAIR 
representatives, President Bush said that “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. 
That’s not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace.” (“A Decade of Growth,” CAIR Tenth 
Anniversary Report 1994-2004).  
Every crisis that involved Muslims placed CAIR in the position of interlocutor 
with both the government and the media. Every crisis has inadvertently made CAIR into 
a partner for coalition building and public recognition, and a source of information on the 
Muslim community. Let us consider some of these crises and CAIR’s response to them. 
 On April 30, 2005, Newsweek published a piece by Michael Isikoff claiming that 
interrogators at Guantanamo had flushed a Qur’an down the toilet in an effort to 
demoralize the prisoners. Newsweek later retracted the story because its main source, a 
government employee, changed his story. But subsequent Pentagon investigation turned 
up several instances of Qur’an “mishandling.” 
 The report triggered anti-American riots at various places in the Muslim world, 
most notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan in May of 2005. On May 11, CAIR issued a 
statement urging President Bush “to initiate an open probe of the incident, make public 
its findings and punish those responsible.” The following weekend, CAIR sponsored a 
conference on “Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism.” On May 18, CAIR issued another 
press release, urging members to call their Representatives in support of a House 
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Resolution authored by Rep. John Conyers of Michigan, recognizing “that the Qur’an as 
any other holy book of any religion should be treated with dignity and respect.”  
In response to this crisis, CAIR launched its “Explore the Qur’an” campaign. 
Posters and brochures were printed and ads placed in various media outlets, offering 
copies of the Qur’an to anyone who requested one. In the meantime, CAIR initiated a 
major fundraising campaign, asking its members to support the production and 
distribution of the holy books. Thousands of copies of the Qur’an were sent to interested 
citizens.  Later, when the controversy over the Danish cartoons escalated into a full 
blown crisis, CAIR launched another campaign: “Explore the Life of Prophet 
Muhammad.” Among the distributed material were Karen Armstrong’s influential book 
on the Prophet Muhammad and a DVD of a recent PBS documentary by an American 
Convert, Michael Wolfe, Muhammad: The Legacy of A Prophet (2002). 
On a similar front, in response to the growing interest in Islam after 9/11, CAIR 
launched The Library Project (“Bring Islam to Your Library”). The aim was to send a 
package of books and audio-visual material to every public library in the country. The 
package included 18 items, ranging from the PBS documentary “Islam: Empire of Faith” 
to the “Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Islam.” The project was intended to reach out to 
more than 16,000 public libraries in the U.S. CAIR’s library project is one of its few 
purely “proactive” projects. CAIR generally responds to events and crises, although the 
organization has become more inclined to proactive work since 9/11.  
 In each of these crises, CAIR increased its publicity, taking them as opportunities 
to inform the wider public about various aspects of Islam (the Qur’an, the Prophet 
Muhammad, Islamic perspectives on torture etc). At the same time, CAIR called on 
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government institutions to acknowledge and recognize the rights of Muslims. CAIR’s 
various “civil rights” work includes frequent media appearances, collection of data on 
cases of discrimination against Muslim citizens, coalition building and lobbying. 
 
“We did not reinvent the wheel” 
The Muslim encounter with American civil rights discourse is relatively new but 
it is evolving fast. Muslims began to appreciate the civic contributions of earlier 
generations of mistreated communities. Nihad Awad told me that when they first started 
they got a welcoming message from the Anti-Defamation League. “We expressed our 
willingness to work together on issues of common interest” he said, but noted that not 
much has developed out of this initial contact. Awad also said,  
We used the experiences of other groups and the Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s. Today, Muslims are at the forefront of defense of civil rights. We’ve built 
coalitions with different civic groups. We need to fill in the information gap 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. The system in this country works for all. 
Muslims are learning how to communicate and work with the system. 
 
 In 2005 CAIR named a scholarship after Rosa Parks. The award is offered to 
students who are studying in fields that promote civil rights, social justice and conflict 
resolution. Muslims increasingly draw on the legacy and experience of African-
American, Jewish and other communities. In May 2008, a group of Muslims in Los 
Angeles joined the 39th Annual Manzanar Pilgrimage in recognition and remembrance of 
the suffering of Japanese-Americans who were put in internment camps. CAIR-LA 
executive director Hussam Ayloush told those gathered at the event:  
We know now what it feels like when people look at you with suspicion, or treat 
you like you are a second-class citizen. Our presence here today isn’t meant to 
suggest Arab-Americans are facing the threat and the loss of freedom of those 
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Manzanar internees, but we want to stand with our Japanese-American citizens 
wishing to ensure this could never happen again. Like them, we want to 
remember the past and to learn from it.  
 
Muslims today not only learn from earlier cohorts of the civil rights movement, 
they also help newer cohorts learn from them. Nihad Awad once told me that “people are 
learning from CAIR’s experience from New Zealand, Germany, Australia. We are a 
model to be emulated around the world.” American Muslim organizations like CAIR 
have started to offer help and mediation to other (Muslim) minority communities in 
Europe and elsewhere. And it is not only Muslims who are learning from CAIR. “After 
9/11,” Awad told me, “Sikhs started to get organized and CAIR helped them. Their 
organization is called SMART.” 
 
“Know Your Rights” 
What if the FBI comes to visit you at your home or at your workplace, what can 
you do, what are your rights? We have seen cases where the FBI has come to 
Muslim homes. The man’s gone to work. They know, they know the schedule of 
the person they are going to see. They wait for the man to go to work. They come 
to the home, knowing there will be only the wife. They knock on the door. They 
say we are the FBI, can we ask some questions. Normally they are smart enough 
to bring with them a woman officer because they know that a woman would not 
just let them in. They know the community. So they come with a male officer and 
a female officer. And then she does not know her rights. So she is scared. She 
opens the door. So they start asking questions about, “your husband’s trip to 
Pakistan and your son went to Karachi this and that. You don’t mind if we take a 
look at your books, etc.” The woman or even the husband doesn’t know their 
rights. If the FBI comes to speak to you, you have the legal right not to say 
anything to them. One word. Irrespective if they are accusing you of something or 
they are asking you about someone else. You can respectfully say, “I don’t mind 
speaking with you but I would like to do that in the presence of a lawyer. This 
should be the response. Even if you have nothing to hide… Most people don’t 




 Muslims in the United States have lately become students of civil rights. This 
thought crossed my mind as I listened to a lecture at the Ann Arbor mosque on August 
24, 2007. The program was titled, “Knowing Your Rights;” the speaker was Dawud 
Walid, the local representative of CAIR. He had a lot of issues to cover that night: the 
crackdown on Muslim charities and the rights pertaining to charitable donations; new 
regulations made by the transportation department with respect to traveling; citizenship 
delays; employment related rights; body search procedures for female travelers, and so 
on. The audience was large and lively. Afterwards they peppered the speaker with 
anxious questions about airport experiences, awkward encounters at their children’s 
schools, and obnoxious comments in the local media. Such lectures are common these 
days at mosques around the country. Through these presentations Muslims, most of them 
immigrants, learn about the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the experience of Japanese-
Americans who were put in internment camps after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the laws 
pertaining to religious expression in public schools, and the cultural codes of how to act if 
you’re pulled over by the cops. CAIR is one of the institutions that plays a key role in this 
learning process. In this process African American Muslims often share their knowledge 
with the immigrants. That evening at the end of the lecture, those in attendance were 
given a tiny laminated booklet called the American Muslim Civic Pocket Guide: Your 
Rights and Responsibilities as an American Muslim. In miniscule type, the accordion-
folded page covers a surprising amount of citizenship know-how: sections include 
“Writing a Letter to the Editor,” “Communicating with Congress,” “Your Legal Rights as 
an Employee,” “Your Legal Rights as a Student,” “Reacting to Anti-Muslim Hate 
Crimes,” and several more. Yet teaching the Muslim community its civil rights is only 
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half of what CAIR does. The other half is to sensitize corporate/legal structures (i.e., 
private and public institutions) to Islam and Muslims.  
CAIR offers a variety of publications addressing the needs of Muslims and the 
public at large. Those publications include practical handbooks such as the Pocket Guide, 
The U.S. Congress Handbook, An Employer’s Guide to Islamic Religious Practices, Law 
Enforcement Official’s Guide to the Muslim Community, A Correctional Institution’s 
Guide to Islamic Religious Practices, An Educator’s Guide to Islamic Religious 
Practices, A Health Care Provider’s Guide to Islamic Religious Practices, Muslim 
Community Safety Kit, Ramadan Publicity Guide, Hajj/Eid Publicity Guide, and Voter 
Registration Guide. 
 
The “Islam in America” Ad Campaign 
CAIR’s role with respect to private and public corporations and government is 
symmetrical with its role in the Muslim community. CAIR teaches each side the 
necessity of the other in the language it understands. In 2003, CAIR launched an 
expensive ad campaign called Islam in America. Published in the New York Times, these 
ads depicted American Muslims as normal, regular citizens with mainstream American 
values (see Figure 5.1.). Although CAIR could not keep up the campaign for long due to 
financial constraints, the ads were later made available for local use by Muslim 
communities. The common message of the ads is the normality of being both Muslim and 
American. One of the ads is entitled, “I’m an American and I’m a Muslim.” It provides a  
good example of how the profile of a Muslim professional woman can be presented as 
the perfect embodiment of the compatibility between American and Muslim identities. 
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(Other ads in the series featured an image of a Muslim Girl Scout Troop from Santa 
Clara, CA, and a profile of a Muslim American family of Puerto Rican descent.) 
 
Figure 5.1. CAIR’s “Islam in America” ad campaign. 
I’M AN AMERICAN and I’M A MUSLIM 
My name is Dr. Aisha Simon. I attended the Medical College of Virginia, 
completed my residency at Georgetown University and I’ll be attending Harvard 
University to earn a master’s degree in public health. I’m a family physician, a 
wife and a mother. I’m also involved in international relief work, traveling to 
places like Bosnia and Africa, and coordinating medical volunteers to serve in 
Guatemala. I was previously a regional coordinator for an anti-tobacco education 
campaign for elementary school children and I’ve served as an advocate for 
domestic violence survivors. 
I’m an American Muslim woman and I believe in the importance of 
charity and service to my community. 
The values I learned from my family and my religion while growing up in 
America have led me to a life of service. Islam calls upon us to strive with one 
another in hastening to good deeds, and to care for the less fortunate as we care 
for ourselves. The Prophet Muhammad taught us that when we serve our brother 
and sister, we are serving God. 





According to CAIR the campaign was “designed to foster greater understanding 
of Islam and to counter a rising tide of anti-Muslim rhetoric.” One of the ads starts with a 
question: “We are all Americans… But which One of Us is a Muslim?” The ad features 
pictures of three people from different ethnic and racial backgrounds⎯ a white man, an 
African American schoolgirl, and an East Asian young man. Their warm smiles are 
accompanied by a text explaining the ethnic composition of Muslims in the U.S. (and of 
course the answer is that they’re all Muslim).  
 
Digression: An Anecdote from the Field 
It is my last night in Washington DC. My flight back to Michigan is the next day. 
A box of field material including books, documents and other heavy stuff needs to be 
shipped back, but I am not able to take them with me due to limitations on the number of 
bags I can check in. One alternative is to have it sent through the publications department 
at the office. So I drive all the way from Fairfax to downtown DC, where my office⎯ 
and research site⎯  is located. It is very quiet. It is two blocks to Capitol Hill, after all, 
and you can hardly see anybody there at night. I unload the box from the car and make 
sure that the address sticker is well stuck. I have already asked Joseph in the publications 
department to ship it as soon as he can. My days in DC are over. The next day I fly back 
to Michigan. The material I collected while in Washington arrives a week later. The news 
from the field, however, just keeps coming. Several weeks later, I am startled to read on 
the CAIR email list (in a story reprinted from the Charlotte Observer titled “Ballenger 




U.S. Rep. Cass Ballenger blames the breakup of his 50-year marriage partly on 
the stress of living near a leading American Muslim advocacy group that he and 
his wife worried was so close to the U.S. Capitol that “they could blow the place 
up.” … Ballenger, a Republican from Hickory, called the Council on American-
Islamic Relations ⎯ whose headquarters are across the street from his Capitol 
Hill home⎯ a “fund-raising arm” for terrorist groups and said he reported CAIR 
to the FBI and CIA. 
 
The nine term Republican made those comments during an interview discussing 
his legal separation from his wife, Donna. He told the reporter that the couple’s proximity 
to CAIR after September 11 “bugged the hell” out of his wife.  
“Diagonally across from my house, up goes a sign– CAIR… the fund-raising arm 
for Hezbollah,” said Ballenger, 76, referring to a Lebanese militia group the 
United States has labeled a terrorist organization. “I reported them to the FBI and 
CIA.” Ballenger said in the post 9-11 environment in Washington, his wife, a 
homemaker, was anxious about all the activity at CAIR, including people 
unloading boxes and women “wearing hoods,” or headscarves, going in and out of 
the office building on New Jersey Avenue. “That’s 2 ½ blocks from the Capitol,” 
he added, “and they could blow it up.” 
 
I was amused by Mr. Ballenger’s comments but CAIR handled it differently. 
Reading Ibrahim Hooper’s press release made me feel a bit less guilty: “Unloading boxes 
is no crime.” In response to Ballenger’s statements, CAIR filed a defamation lawsuit 
against the North Carolina congressman and called on national Republican leaders to 
repudiate his bigoted statements. 
 
Conclusion 
A major implication of the story of CAIR is that Muslim interaction with law and 
legal structure has taken on a new density. Despite the fact that the cause of that 
interaction is, for the most part, negative, the mere fact of being close and dealing with 
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the law has had a transformative impact on both Muslims (by pushing them towards the 
discovery and exercise of their own rights) and the legal and administrative institutions 
(by pushing them towards recognition and accommodation of Muslim needs and 
sensibilities).  
The struggle for civil rights is nonetheless only one avenue of securing one’s 
membership in society. While full legal citizens, Muslims in the United States have found 
themselves suffering from some degree of alienage and alienation. Their legally intact 
citizenship can be seen as insufficient or accidental and their membership in American 
society suspect. Here the role played by CAIR is crucial. With its rational, legal plea for 
inclusion, it invites both violators of Muslim rights and uninformed Muslims to recognize  
and honor the nation’s rules. By bringing cases to the public they strengthen the social 
fabric against future violations. The institution of citizenship is a process that needs to be 
maintained through practices and right-claims by the members of a given society. 
CAIR plays two very important roles: On the one hand it unifies the Muslim 
community around discourses of victimhood and solidarity. Thus it gives rise to a pan-
Muslim, non-sectarian, civic Muslim identity. It seeks to turn crises to the community’s 
advantage. On the other hand, CAIR sensitizes the government, the law and the corporate 
culture to the existence and rights of Muslims. 9/11 has given CAIR the necessary 
publicity, raw material and community support to accomplish this mediating role. 
Institutions like CAIR facilitate the progression of Muslims in America from legal-yet-














I found myself in the most ecumenical environment I had ever seen in my life 
when I walked into Christ Church in Cranbrook, a big church located in a northern 
suburb of Detroit. The event was the World Sabbath of Reconciliation, also known as the 
“Sixth Annual Interfaith Holy Day of Peace among the Religions of the World.” The 
evening was a mix of music, dance, and ritual. After seven “calls to prayer” by Muslim, 
Jewish, Buddhist, Sikh, Christian, Native American and Hindu representatives, a rabbi, 
two pastors, and an imam were scheduled to give brief speeches. Though on the program, 
Imam Hassan Qazwini of the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn was not back from 
hajj and therefore was represented by his spokesman, Eide Alawan. The talks were very 
general⎯ all about love, peace, and tolerance. Eide Alawan, however, took the 
opportunity to invoke the tragedy of 9/11 and the difficulties Muslims faced. He spoke 
about his work on the interfaith coalition and then read a prayer written by Imam 
Qazwini about not blaming the innocent for the tragedy, coming together, taking hatred 
from our hearts and ignorance from our minds, and making our country a safe haven and 
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the earth an oasis of peace.  He ended with “May God bless America,” repeated three 
times. 
I noticed that Eide was the only one at the World Sabbath of Religious 
Reconciliation to specifically mention America. But he was not the only Muslim at the 
event. Two other Muslims were given “Peace Awards” for their contributions to 
interfaith dialogue:  Imam Abdullah El-Amin of the Detroit Muslim Center, for his work 
in the production of the Children of Abraham Project, and Najah Bazzy, a nurse who 
specializes in transcultural health care and is known for her social service and interfaith 
work. The evening ended with the participants signing a Call to Peace and the entire 
congregation joining together in prayer. 
Ecumenical events like the World Sabbath are now quite common in the Metro 
Detroit area and across the country. There has been an explosion of such events since 
9/11 and  American Muslims are increasingly becoming visible on the ecumenical scene. 
They participate in interfaith dialogue as new partners, a process that started before 9/11 
but took on a different quality after it. Contemporary Muslim vocabulary draws heavily 
on the shared origin of the three monotheistic religions and can be safely summarized as 
Abrahamic discourse. Interfaith dialogue constitutes a significant part of the work of 
Muslim citizenship in the post-9/11 era. In this chapter, I explore the background against 
which such activities are carried out, the actors involved in this work and the discourses 
they develop. I also ask why Muslims resort to Abrahamic discourse/language rather than 
liberal pluralism. 
In order to explore the nature and meaning of interfaith activism for American 
Muslims, I talked to leading Muslim practitioners of interfaith work in the Metro Detroit 
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area. In the following pages, I first describe the kind of misconceptions that exclude 
Muslims and deny Islam a place in the American religious landscape. Next, I discuss in 
detail how Muslim activists re-construct Islam as an American religion through interfaith 
dialogue. Taking a close look at the profiles of interfaith workers, this section provides a 
detailed picture of Muslim involvement in Metro Detroit’s local interfaith scene. The 
final section is a rethinking of interfaith work as a citizenship practice. 
 
Islam as the Religion of the Enemy 
 For many Muslim Americans the greatest damage caused by 9/11 is that it 
seriously undermined the legitimacy of their religion. They often note that 9/11 was an 
attack on both their country and their religion. Seen as the religion of the terrorists, Islam 
and its associated culture became a liability in public life. Even non-political, mundane 
concepts of the faith became subject to contestation and controversy. By way of 
illustration, let me describe three instances where the legitimacy of Islam as a faith has 
become an issue. 
 
Allah: An American God? 
One aspect of the 9/11 backlash has been an amplification of the belief that 
Muslims worship a god different from the God worshipped by Jews and Christians. In 
2003, Lt. Gen. William Boykin, a deputy undersecretary of defense, made headlines by 
suggesting that Allah is “not a real God.” He told church audiences that he is in “the army 
of God” and claimed that Muslims worship an “idol” (CNN, October 17, 2003). Similar 
remarks have been frequently made by some evangelical Christian leaders. Pat Robertson 
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has on various occasions claimed that today's world conflicts concern “whether Hubal, 
the moon god of Mecca known as Allah, is supreme, or whether the Judeo-Christian 
Jehovah, God of the Bible, is supreme.”78 Lt. General Boykin’s statements, in particular 
the moon god libel, belong to a genre of stereotypes that date back to medieval times. 
They depict Muhammad as a Christian schismatic and idolater. After his statements 
became public, General Boykin faced pressure from civil rights groups and the media. A 
New York Times editorial later called for him to be fired (New York Times, August 26, 
2004). Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense at the time, rejected all such calls. 
Lt. General Boykin’s perception of Islam is clearly not shared by the majority of 
Americans. Nevertheless it reflects a growing tendency to see Islam negatively. 
According to a Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life survey, the number of Americans 
who believe their own religion to have a lot in common with Islam is declining. 22% 
believed so in 2003, as compared with 27% in 2002, and 31% shortly after 9/11. The 
same survey also revealed that in 2003 44% of Americans believed Islam encourages 
violence.  
Even though the idea that Muslims worship an idol is clearly wrong, Muslims 
suffer the consequences of such statements. In January 2007, the old mosque complex of 
the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn was vandalized. The perpetrators spray- 
painted hateful graffiti on the front of the mosque: “You Idol Worship(pers), Go Home 
911 Murderers” (Figure 6.1). The Islamic Center of America is one of the oldest mosques 
still active in the metro Detroit area. Ironically, members of this mosque are among the 
earliest Muslim immigrants, some of them third generation Americans, and it is an 
                                                 
78 Along the same lines, conservative talk radio hosts have echoed Ann Coulter’s call to “invade their 
countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity.” 
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institution that champions dialogue with other faith groups. (A more detailed description 
of the mosque and its community comes later in this chapter). 
 
Figure 6.1. Hate graffiti painted on the front of the old Islamic Center of America in 
Dearborn, Michigan. 
 
Boykin’s remarks, nevertheless, caused both journalists and Muslim community 
leaders to discuss whether the word “God” should take the place of  “Allah.” Journalist 
John Kearney, for example, wrote in an op-ed in the New York Times that “when 
journalists write about Muslims, or translate from Arabic, Urdu, Farsi or other languages, 
they should translate ‘Allah’ as ‘God’.” He noted that those who think otherwise “might 
be surprised that Christian Arabs use “Allah” for God, as do Arabic-speaking Jews. In 
Aramaic, the language of Jesus, God is “Allaha,” just a syllable away from Allah.” 
Kearney concluded his piece with a suggestion for the media: 
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Of course, there are distinctions to be made between religions, which the press 
shouldn’t shy away from. But there is no need to augment these differences 
artificially, especially at the cost of an accurate understanding of the origins of the 
Abrahamic faiths (John Kearney, “My God is Your God”, New York Times, 
January 28, 2004). 
 
 Umar Faruq Abdallah, a convert Muslim intellectual and director of the Chicago-
based Nawawi Foundation published an article that tackled the same question (Abdallah 
2004). He observed that it is not only non-Muslims who insist that Allah is not God, but 
some Muslims also insist on the exclusive use of Allah.79 In “One God, Many Names,” 
Abdallah wrote: 
The fact that Allah and the Biblical God are identical is evident from Biblical 
etymology. From the standpoint of Islamic theology and salvation history, it is 
simply unacceptable to deem the Biblical God and that of the Qur’an to be 
anything but the same, despite the fact that, in recent years, many English-
speaking Muslims have developed an ill-advised convention of avoiding the word 
“God” under the mistaken assumption that only the Arabic word “Allah” carries a 
linguistic guarantee of theological authenticity.”  
 
After a detailed discussion of Biblical and Islamic sources on different names of 
one God and the need for Muslims to use the same word, Abdallah concludes his paper 
with the following remarks: 
Use of “God” emphasizes the extensive middle ground we share with other 
Abrahamic and universal traditions and provides a simple and cogent means by 
which Muslims may act upon the Qur’anic injunction to stress the similarities 
between us. Failure to use “God” conceals our common belief in the God of 
Abraham and the continuity of the Abrahamic tradition, which are fundamentals 
of our faith. We must overcome our misgivings about “God” both because of the 
word’s intrinsic, historical merit and because it empowers us to communicate with 
                                                 
79 Muslims themselves are increasingly becoming aware of negative consequences of the confusion over 
the equivalence between Allah and God. Community leaders frequently lecture on how to present the 
community to the larger public. At a recent event (February 23, 2008) with the theme “Presenting Islam to 
Fellow Americans” at the Islamic Center of America (co-organized by CAIR-Michigan and the Young 
Muslim Association, the youth organization of ICA), Dawud Walid recommended that his audience “keep 




our Jewish and Christian, and other English-speaking neighbors in a meaningful 
way (Abdallah 2004: 8). 
 
“My American Jihad” 
The second controversy80 involves a commencement speech. Zayed Yasin, 22, 
was one of the three students who made the commencement speech at Harvard University 
on June 6, 2002. When the title of his speech, “American Jihad,” appeared on the list of 
speakers in The Harvard Crimson a group of students started a protest against him. They 
asked for an explicit condemnation of violent jihad. A petition signed by his fellow 
students asked the university administration to withdraw his speech. He received hate e-
mails and a death threat. In the meantime, experts and community leaders discussed the 
meaning of jihad. The controversy soon spilled over into the national papers and wire 
services. Under tremendous pressure from his critics and parts of the university 
administration, Zayed Yasin agreed to change the title of his speech from “American 
Jihad” to “Of Faith and Citizenship” with the subtitle “My American Jihad.” He also 
agreed to make references to the September 11 terrorist attacks. He told a reporter: “I am 
confronted with the assumption that because of my name I came from some other 
country, that I’m a foreign student, that I’m not American…” (“War of Words,” ABC 
News, June 5, 2002). 
When I talked to him over the phone on August 22, 2003, he described the 
attempts to depict him as un-American as a “dishonest abuse of patriotism.” When he 
eventually made his speech, he started with a discussion of his personal experience as a 
Muslim and as an American.   
                                                 
80 Elsewhere (Bilici 2005) I engage in a more detailed discussion of this controversy and the competing 
uses of “American Jihad.”  
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I am one of you, but I am also one of “them.” What do I mean? When I am told 
that this is a world at war, a war between the great civilizations and religions of 
the earth, I don’t know whether to laugh or cry. “What about me?” I ask. As a 
practicing Muslim and a registered voter in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
am I, through the combination of my faith and my citizenship, an inherent 
contradiction? I think not. Both the Qur’an and the Constitution teach ideals of 
peace, justice and compassion, ideals that command my love, and my belief. Each 
of these texts, one the heart of my religion the other that of my country, demand a 
constant struggle to do what is right (Yasin 2002). 
 
After affirming the compatibility between American identity and Muslim 
identity⎯ or as he puts it, between his faith and his citizenship⎯ Yasin discusses the 
meaning of jihad in an attempt to draw attention to what he sees as jihad’s primary 
meaning. 
I choose the word "struggle" very deliberately, for its connotations of turmoil and 
tribulation, both internal and external. The word for struggle in Arabic, in the 
language of my faith, is jihad. It is a word that has been corrupted and 
misinterpreted, both by those who do and do not claim to be Muslims, and we saw 
last fall, to our great national and personal loss, the results of this corruption. 
Jihad, in its truest and purest form, the form to which all Muslims aspire, is the 
determination to do right, to do justice even against your own interests. It is an 
individual struggle for personal moral behavior. Especially today, it is a struggle 
that exists on many levels: self-purification and awareness, public service and 
social justice… So where is our jihad, where is our struggle as we move on from 
Harvard's sheltering walls? 
By raising the alternative meanings of the concept of jihad, Yasin not only makes 
the concept familiar for non-Muslims but also translates it into universal terms. Jihad as 
determination to do right, to do justice and as an individual struggle for personal, moral 
behavior is something that any American citizen would support. “My opponents tried to 
separate me from America. I wanted to give the opposite message: the harmony of 
values,” he said to me over the phone. He also concluded his speech by linking jihad and 
the American dream:  
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The true American Dream is a universal dream, and it is more than a set of 
materialistic aspirations. It is the power and opportunity to shape one's own life: 
to house and feed a family, with security and dignity, and to practice your faith in 
peace. This is our American Struggle, our American Jihad. As a Muslim, and as 
an American, I am commanded to stand up for the protection of life and liberty, to 
serve the poor and the weak, to celebrate the diversity of humankind. There is no 
contradiction. Not for me, and not for anyone, of any combination of faith, culture 
and nationality, who believes in a community of the human spirit. 
 
Authenticating the Qur’an as an American Scripture 
A similar controversy broke out in late 2006 when Rep. Keith Ellison of 
Minnesota, the first Muslim elected to Congress, stated his intention to take the oath on 
the Qur’an instead of the Bible. In fact the Qur’an was only to be used for a photo-op 
reenactment of the swearing-in ceremony. The official ceremony, where all newly elected 
members take the oath, is done collectively and without any books, but individual 
members are allowed to use their holy books later in reenactments. When a conservative 
columnist, Dennis Prager, attacked Ellison in an article where he said, “Ellison has 
announced that he will not take his oath of office on the Bible, but on the bible of Islam, 
the Koran. He should not be allowed to do so—not because of any American hostility to 
the Koran, but because the act undermines American civilization” (Dennis Prager, 
“America, not Keith Ellison, decides what book a congressman takes his oath on,” 
Townhall Magazine, November 28, 2006). A congressman from Virginia, Rep. Virgil 
Goode, also called Ellison’s plan to use the Qur’an “a threat to the values and beliefs 
traditional to the United States of America” and added that “if American citizens don’t 
wake up and adopt the Virgil Goode position on immigration there will likely be many 
more Muslims elected to office and demanding the use of the Koran” (CNN, January 4, 
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2007). Such statements drew criticism from organizations including CAIR (Council on 
American Islamic Relations) and the ADL (Anti-Defamation League). 
 One of the first things Ellison did on the House floor was to shake Goode’s hand 
and ask him out for a cup of coffee. He told CNN that “by reaching out to Congressman 
Goode I’m not trying to be accepted, I’m trying to build bridges… In this world there are 
too many misunderstandings. I want to put a human face on things” (CNN, January 4, 
2007). 
 Eventually, Keith Ellison took the official oath along with the other incoming 
members of the House. In the ceremonial photo-op he used a copy of the Qur’an that was 
once owned by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson’s copy of the Qur’an is a two-volume 
English translation which Ellison borrowed from the rare books division of the Library of 
Congress. As suggested in a piece in The Washington Post, the holy book Ellison used 
had “an unassailably all-American provenance” (“But It’s Thomas Jefferson’s Koran,” 
The Washington Post, January 3, 2007). By using Jefferson’s Qur’an, which has 
Jefferson’s handwritten initials and notes in the margins, Ellison authenticated the Qur’an 
as a legitimate American scripture. 
 The above discussion of the controversies around the words Allah and jihad and 
the Qur’an as a holy book illustrate the multiple ways in which the legitimacy of Islam as 
a faith is contested in post-9/11 America. A common Muslim response to the exclusion 
faced in such situations is to assert that the contested Islamic elements are legitimate. 
They do so by reformulating them as American. Muslims increasingly prefer the use of 
God over Allah; they re-define the stigmatized word “jihad” in relation to the ethos of the 
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American dream; and they frequently assert the compatibility of the Qur’an and the 
Constitution. 
American Muslims today live in an age where the state has been colonized by the 
nation (Arendt 1973: 275). 9/11 triggered an eclipse of national identity and resurgence 
of nativism. To make itself part of the landscape of American religion, Islam must prove 
its loyalty to the nation. In the following section, I switch from examples of national 
controversies, which I believe are symptomatic of Muslim exclusion in the post-9/11 
atmosphere, back to the efforts of local Muslim communities, whose representatives 
attempt to undo the exclusion through participation in the dialogue of faiths. What do 
Muslims do to make Islam an American religion? 
 
Metro Detroit Area Muslims as Interfaith Partners 
 There are more than 50 mosques or Muslim community spaces in the Metro 
Detroit area.81 The ethnic identity of Arab Detroit has been extensively studied (Abraham 
and Shryock 2000). Not surprisingly, the city’s emergent Muslim identity has gained 
greater attention after 9/11. I visited most of these mosques, some of them multiple times, 
some of them only once.82 Most of these mosque communities engage in some sort of 
                                                 
81 The diversity of the Muslim community is bewildering. Muslims in the Detroit area are divided along 
ethnic, sectarian, racial and temporal lines. Some of these mosques are predominantly Iraqi, Lebanese, 
Yemeni, Bangladeshi, Bosnian, Albanian, Indo-Pakistani, African American, immigrant African. Some of 
them are well-established communities, while others are not-yet-settled, diasporic (e.g., the Senegalese 
Mourids). Some of them are proud to be American and display their pride through flags and critique of 
Muslim cultures overseas; others are too new to know whether they should be proud or how to show it. 
While immigrant mosques and imams authenticate themselves through the English language and American 
flags, some African-American mosques and imams authenticate themselves through conspicuous use of 
Arabic vocabulary and displays of green flags with crescent and star. Some of them are interested in 
interfaith activities, some not. Some can afford to do such work, others cannot. 
 
82 In some of my visits, I was with colleagues from the Building Islam in Detroit Project, a project initiated 
by Andrew Shryock and Sally Howell to document various aspects of Detroit mosque cultures. BIID 
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interfaith dialogue, since it has become hard to avoid such encounters. Even when 
Muslims may not be interested in participating in such activities, they have to respond to 
the demands coming from non-Muslim groups and individuals who seek to reach out to 
Muslims as a gesture of solidarity. This structural push towards such participation, 
however, in itself does not tell us much about how Muslims themselves feel about their 
involvement in the interfaith world. While the demand for and intensity of interfaith 
activities have risen dramatically, it is still the work of a few individuals. I have talked to 
these people and also observed them on multiple occasions as partners in interfaith 
events. Here are some of the most active Muslims in the ecumenical scene in Detroit 
area: 
1. Eide Alawan (Islamic Center of America) 
2. Najah Bazzy (Islamic Center of America) 
3. Victor Begg (the Muslim Unity Center) 
4. Imam Abdullah El Amin (Muslim Center of Detroit) 
5. Dawud Walid (CAIR-Michigan) 
6. Imam Achmat Salie (the Muslim Unity Center).  
 
While these six individuals do not exhaust the list of all Muslim interfaith activists, 
they are the most visible ones. They have also institutionalized their involvement in 
interfaith work to a certain degree. Their mosques provide the infrastructure for them to 
work as a network. For the sake of contextualization, I shall briefly describe these 
mosques. These mosques deserve to be highlighted because their engagement in interfaith 
activities often goes beyond brief neighborhood encounters. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 




Islamic Center of America: This mosque was mentioned earlier as a victim of 
vandalism and hate graffiti. It is one of the three oldest mosques still active in the area. 
The Islamic Center is a Shia mosque serving both third generation, well-established 
Lebanese and first generation Iraqi immigrants. Unlike most of the mosques in Detroit, 
the Islamic Center was built as a mosque and opened its doors in 1963. (Its history, 
however, goes back even further, since it was an offshoot of the Dix Mosque which was 
established in 1937). In 2005, the Islamic Center of America moved to its new mosque 
complex. Now one of the largest mosques in North America, the new building is located 
on Ford Road and includes a large auditorium, a social hall and offices and can 
accommodate thousands of believers. While the congregation includes many new 
immigrants from Iraq and other places, the founding generation of Lebanese still control 
the board. The Islamic Center also attracts some African Americans and white converts. 
The imam of the mosque, Sayyid Hassan Qazwini, also active in interfaith dialogue, 
gives his sermons in both Arabic and English. Most of the immigrant members of the 
congregation prefer Arabic, while some older and American-born members prefer 
English. Eide Alawan, who is part of the center’s outreach committee, comes from a 
Lebanese-French family and does not speak Arabic. While he is a very visible face on 
interfaith scene, his profile seems to be an exception rather than  typical for his 
congregation. Now in his late 60’s, Eide is not satisfied with the level of Muslim 
participation in interfaith work: “Most of the time I try to get my community to 
participate in the same things that I’m doing so they see that I’m participating within the 
community as well as connecting to the outside community. But it’s very difficult to get 
our Muslim community involved.” 
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Another active member of the Islamic Center is Najah Bazzy, a nurse who specializes 
in transcultural health care. In her late 40s, Najah is a third generation Arab American. 
She is a senior advisor to the Islamic Center’s youth organization, the Young Muslim 
Association (YMA). A local celebrity, she makes many media appearances and 
frequently lectures about Islam to non-Muslim audiences. She wears hijab and does 
culturally sensitive nursing. She says it took some time and several crises⎯ such as the 
Iranian revolution and 9/11⎯ for people like her to re-think their ethnic and religious 
identity. During a lecture on a college campus on March 22, 2005, she told her audience 
that “when I decided to wear hijab, my family was opposed. My mother was against it. 
They wanted me to assimilate. But I did it.” She also points to a shift in her tripartite 
identity from “Arab-American-Muslim” to “Muslim-American-Arab.” She thinks that 
religion is an easier way of relating to American society than ethnicity, given the 
commonalities Islam has with the values of this society. Her involvement in interfaith 
activism bears the mark of her professional work. She wants to put interfaith dialogue 
and diversity to work in the social services and institutional settings such as hospitals. 
 
Muslim Center of Detroit: Established in 1985, the Muslim Center is an inner city 
African American mosque that is part of Imam Warith Deen Muhammed’s community. 
After the transition from Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam to orthodox Islam, the 
community’s self identification has changed several times: it is currently called the 
Muslim American Society. Not far from the Muslim Center is Masjid Wali Muhammad, 
the main mosque that follows W.D. Muhammad’s teachings more closely. While sharing 
a lot of history with Masjid Wali Muhammad, the Muslim Center is a more active and 
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diverse community. The Muslim center is located on Davison Avenue in Detroit and was 
converted to its current use from a former bank. It has recently been expanded. The 
chairman of the Muslim Center, Imam Abdullah El Amin, is an active leader on various 
fronts. In addition to his work at the Muslim Center, El Amin is one of the publishers of 
The Muslim Observer, a weekly Muslim newspaper based in Detroit but with a national 
readership. El Amin also runs a funeral home. 
Imam Abdullah El Amin converted to Islam in the mid-1970’s. He is now in his 
fifties. “I became Muslim about a year after Imam W.D. Muhammad came. I wasn’t part 
of the Nation of Islam back with Elijah Muhammad and that group. I didn’t take part in 
that, actually.” Unlike its sister mosques that exclusively serve African Americans, the 
Muslim Center has a large immigrant African membership, mostly from West Africa. It 
is also not unusual to come across immigrant and European American Muslims during 
the Friday prayers. In many ways, the Muslim Center represents the middle point 
between indigenous African American mosques and immigrant ones. El Amin says “this 
mosque is universal. As a matter of fact, we were thinking about changing our name to 
the Universal Muslim Center.” The Muslim Center has various social programs that also 
attract non-Muslims in the neighborhood. “The block association meets here. We have a 
group of Narcotics Anonymous that meets here… We have a soup kitchen where we feed 
the neighborhood around here every Saturday, and there’s also a free clinic, a medical 
clinic that we have here.” 
Another prominent African American interfaith activist is Dawud Walid. He is 
currently the executive director of the Michigan chapter of CAIR. The youngest on my 
list of prominent interfaith activists, Dawud has the rare combination of interest in civil 
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rights and social justice issues and a cleric’s knowledge of Islam. He used to be an 
assistant imam at Masjid Wali Muhammad. Dawud thus can easily claim both elements 
of authenticity. In his speeches he comfortably recites Qur’an and other religious sources 
in Arabic, while at the same time quoting leaders of the American civil rights movement. 
I have heard him speak on many occasions. He has increasingly become interested in 
Muslim intrafaith dialogue. The main theme of his campus lecture to members of the 
Muslim Student Association at the University of Michigan on February 2, 2006, was the 
notion of ummah. Dawud’s speech emphasized the need to bridge the gaps between the 
African American and immigrant Muslim communities, as well as between the Sunni and 
Shia communities. He referred to a well-known occurrence at the time of Prophet 
Muhammad, when the prophet paired the indigenous people of Medina with newly-
arrived immigrants from Mecca: the partners were to look out for one another’s spiritual 
and material well-being, with the locals helping the newcomers to adjust to their new 
environment. Dawud went on to make the analogy that today’s Muslims from the suburbs 
(immigrants) and Muslims in the inner city (African American) should pair up and 
engage in closer dialogue. He concluded by underlining the post-9/11 reality that “we 
should realize that we are all in the same boat. We either sink together or swim together.” 
 
Muslim Unity Center: The Unity Center was founded by Victor Begg in 1993 in 
Bloomfield Hills, an affluent suburb in the north of Detroit. Begg is originally from India 
and has been living in Detroit for decades. A successful businessman who used to attend 
services at the predominantly Indo-Pakistani IAGD (Islamic Association of Greater 
Detroit), he became dissatisfied and decided to start a mosque that was non-ethnic and 
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non-sectarian. Together with other Muslims, he decided to buy a school building and 
expand it into an Islamic center. When they purchased the building from the Pontiac 
School District, they faced opposition from the neighbors. After much furor and media 
attention, they managed to convince the neighbors “that they were not terrorists.” Among 
those who supported their case at the court hearing were Christian and Jewish clergy. 
Speaking at the Interfaith Symposium at Wayne State University on April 15, 2006, Begg 
recalled this experience in speaking about how far they have come as an interfaith 
community: 
Back in 1993 we wanted to have a mosque in Bloomfield Hills. We bought the 
school property. As you know, the neighbors thought “terrorists are moving in” 
… and we did a pretty good job working with the city and school district but 
forgot the neighbors. So we had problems… Back then many neighbors thought 
that we are some kind of Satan worshippers. 
 
Victor Begg’s dream of having an ecumenical mosque that would reach out not 
only to different Muslims but also to non-Muslims is today a reality. The Unity Center 
serves more than two hundred fifty families. Its inclusivity is reflected in the sermons, 
which always strike me as unusually ecumenical. The congregation is mostly affluent and 
professional. Ethnically diverse and open to all schools of thought, the Unity Center has 
also become a hub of interfaith work. The signs of this conscious engagement with faith 
groups in the larger society are everywhere to be seen. The official description of the 
center says it all: 
Established in 1993 as a center open to the ethnically diverse Muslim community 
in the area, the Unity Center is a place where families and individuals from all 
backgrounds can feel comfortable praying, learning about Islam, and socializing. 
The center is also a place where non-Muslims are welcome and can come and 
learn about Muslims and Islam.83 
                                                 
83 In addition to the usual Sunday school and other religious courses, the center offers various recreational 




 The Unity Center often celebrates its dual achievements of internal (pan-Muslim) 
ecumenism and external (interfaith) ecumenism. As visitors approach the entrance of the 
center, the first thing they see is a rock inscribed with a verse from the Qur’an. This verse 
is an explicit statement of Islam as an Abrahamic religion (Figure 6.2):  
Say, “We have believed in God and in what was revealed to us and what was 
revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the Descendants, and in what was 
given to Moses and Jesus and to the prophets from their Lord. We make no 
distinction between any of them, and we are Muslims submitting to Him.” -
Qur’an, Al-Imran 84. 
 
 





The religious leaders of the Unity Center⎯ both Imam Musa, the principal imam, 
and Imam Achmat Salie, who is affiliated with the center⎯ are always strikingly broad 
minded. Availability of resources informs the roles that spiritual leaders of places like the 
Unity Center take. After Imam Salie left another mosque and joined the Unity Center, I 
observed something of a bifurcation in the orientation of the two imams. While Imam 
Salie, who is from South Africa and has both native mastery of English and greater 
familiarity with Christianity, focuses on outreach activities and often seems to speak in 
the jargon of New Age Christianity (self-actualization through spirituality), Imam Musa, 
who is an immigrant from Egypt and has a more authoritative knowledge of Islam but 
lacks comfort with the English language, has become more reserved. He is increasingly 
interested in the preservation of Muslim identity. 
 
Who becomes an Interfaith Worker? 
Although they are a small group, Muslim interfaith workers are very diverse. Of 
the six individuals, two are African American (Imam El Amin and Dawud Walid), one is 
a woman (Najah Bazzy) and only two are professional clerics (El Amin and Achmat 
Salie). They are overwhelmingly American-born. Najah Bazzy, for example, always tells 
audiences with pride that she is a third generation American. Only Victor Begg is an 
immigrant (he migrated in the 1960s) but he is the one with the largest financial resources 
and strongest social standing. They come from both upper middle class suburban 
communities and lower class inner-city communities. What they all have in common is 
American cultural literacy, which includes the English language and mass 
communication skills. They collectively respond to a demand for the presentation of 
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Islam to members of other faith groups. Andrew Shryock provides a fascinating 
discussion of the strategies of community representation in his discussion of the “double 
remoteness” of Arab Detroit (Shryock 2004). 
In an article published on an Islamic website, an American Muslim community 
organizer, Altaf Hussain, asks whether Muslims are up to the challenge of interfaith 
dialogue (Hussain 2001). After discussing the various levels at which Muslims find 
themselves engaged in interfaith dialogue, he points to several challenges: 
One of the major challenges we face as Muslims in such discussions is agreeing 
on a common language for communication. In America, our imams and 
representatives must be well versed in the English language --in terms of 
possessing both a solid grasp of the English vocabulary and an understanding of 
American idioms. Too often, we minimize this element, and push for people to 
represent Islam in such discussions who are non-native English speakers. 
Although they possess the Islamic knowledge, they often have a difficult time 
trying to explain fundamental Islamic beliefs in plain language using phrases and 
expressions common to Americans. What happens is the speakers end up 
confusing listeners, and leaving them with more questions afterwards than before 
the dialogue…  
 
Adding that the ideal representative in an interfaith dialogue has to understand the 
religious perceptions of non-Muslims, Hussain points out the need for the Muslim 
community to develop standards for the  uncharted area of interfaith encounters. For 
example, should Muslim clergy shake hands with the opposite sex? Which rituals of other 
faiths should they participate in within the framework of interfaith dialogue? When 
Jennifer Granholm, the governor of the state of Michigan, visited the old Islamic Center 
of America after her election in 2002, she stepped into one such gray area. Before the 
visit she was advised by her staff (and representatives of the Islamic Center) that she 
should not shake hands with men at the mosque. During the visit she was confused to 
find herself surrounded by the men of the congregation, all wanting to shake her hand. 
 199
 
Most Muslim communities have yet to fully articulate a language of interaction 
with the outside world. An important form of that interaction, interfaith dialogue, remains 
the domain of just a few individuals. As the public faces of their communities, these 
individuals mediate the images and information presented to the wider public. As 
Andrew Shryock points out, their task is similar to our task as ethnographers⎯ except 
that theirs is performative, while we rely on writing. When Eide Alawan says that he 
feels more comfortable with Christians and Jews than Muslims, he partly reveals what he 
is usually expected to keep hidden: that some aspects of his community (especially the 
immigrant elements) embarrass him. Their “cultural intimacy” (Shryock 2004, Herzfeld 
1997)  instills in these individuals⎯ whose tastes and life trajectories often diverge 
significantly from the communities they represent⎯ both a fierce protectiveness and a 
certain degree of embarrassment. Meanwhile, people lacking cultural literacy (e.g., those 
who speak with an accent) are usually not put on display, even when they are more 
representative of the majority of a given community. Unlike the average members of their 
congregations, the public mediators are more Americanized and have the time and 
resources to devote to outreach activities. 
 
Interfaith Dialogue: Before and After 9/11 
 Muslim involvement in interfaith dialogue certainly has a longer history, but all 
activists agree that 9/11 had a tremendous impact on their level of engagement. Some 
Muslim commentators describe the new era as “a silent revolution” (Takim 2004: 343). I 
asked Eide Alawan in 2005 about the impact of 9/11. He said, 
Prior to September 11, it was more of a low-key situation. The occasional 
visitation, the occasional discussion. But after September 11, because of the 
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curiosity about Islam, really people wanted to know: is Islam a thing we should be 
fearful of? What is this religion? Although we’ve been here over 100 years in this 
country, 150 years. September 11 accelerated our interfaith work and it was  a 
positive situation. Most Muslims will feel that it was a negative situation. It 
wasn’t negative as far as I was concerned. There was a positive situation. The 
occurrence that happened was a bad thing, there’s no question about it, but what 
developed from that was a positive situation. The Jewish community, the 
Christian community came in and said, “Look, we’ve got to do something. We’ve 
got to understand that these are people of faith just like us. We all come from the 
same stem.” And this is how it all started to evolve. Victor Begg the very next day 
got together Jewish and Christian and Muslim friends and said, “We’ve got to do 
something. We can’t just continue to hold hands, we have to dialogue. Instead of 
Christians just with Muslims and Christians just with Jews, we have to all three 
get together.” And this has been occurring the last four or five years. It’s non-
stop. 
  
Alawan’s views on the impact of 9/11 are echoed by the experience of other 
interfaith workers. Najah Bazzy, for example, observes that  
before 9/11, I was pushing doors open for dialogue. After 9/11 doors were 
opening and I was walking in and that was the difference. 9/11 as well as tragedy 
the end result was that it gave many of us an opportunity to dialogue, to teach, to 
collaborate. Muslims were no longer forgotten at the table anymore. 
  
She also comments on the increase in her appearances in the media and at public 
venues, where she assumes the role of a mediator who represents a legible image of 
Islam. She believes her gender makes her particularly fit for this role. 
And in terms of post-9/11 I will tell you that I have spoken at more Christian 
pulpits than I have at Muslim mosques. So what that’s allowed, it’s allowed a 
visual, a female—which breaks the stereotypes—it allows a visual of a woman in 
hijab. It allows an auditory of a woman who is born and raised in this country, 
who really does not have an accent, so breaks that stereotype. And it allows the 
beauty of the faith to really flow. And to really talk about peace and justice and 
reconciliation and conflict resolution and all of those things that America is afraid 
to really believe about us.  So it’s trust, and humans need ambassadorship. And 




Activists like Najah Bazzy think the importance of the work they do cannot be 
exaggerated as far as the recognition and integration of Muslims is concerned. Yet they 
usually have difficulty mobilizing more Muslims for the task. Muslim scholars such as 
Suleyman Nyang argue that interfaith work can very well be treated as an index of 
Muslim acculturation in America (Smith 2004: 167).  
Most of the interfaith activities Muslims participate in are initiated by other faith 
groups, primarily Christians and Jews. As such, Muslims participate as “guests” while 
other faiths remain “hosts.” Muslims are increasingly recognizing the need to be involved 
in the dialogue on an equal basis as “hosts”. Therefore, one can observe that American 
Muslims have been undergoing a transition where their roles as participants of interfaith 
dialogue change from being guest to being co-hosts. Writing in the early 1980s, Muslim 
American thinker Ismail R. Al Faruqi recognized this problem in his Trialogue of the 
Abrahamic Faiths, when he wrote “no dialogue can succeed where one party is ‘host’ and 
the others are ‘invited guests.’ Every party must be host and feel itself so” (Faruqi 1982: 
ii). Muslims who engage in sustained interfaith activism are not diasporic immigrant 
communities but rather post-diasporic individuals and communities. 
Detroit area Muslims have been involved in organizations such as The National 
Conference for Community and Justice in Michigan. While before 9/11 Muslims were 
merely newly joined members in most of the interfaith organizations, since 9/11 they 
have begun to take part in the creation of new initiatives and organizations. Interfaith 
Partners is one such organization. A subgroup under the umbrella of NCCJ, it was formed 
on September 12, 2001. Interfaith Partners has been organizing annual interfaith 
symposiums since 9/11. I attended one on May 4, 2006, at Wayne State University where 
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a number of workshops were held. Among the interfaith work done under the umbrella of 
Interfaith Partners is something called the Children of Abraham Project. 
 
“We are all Children of Abraham” 
Interfaith encounters elevate one element of Muslim identity to a central position: 
the idea of Abraham as father of the three monotheistic religions. Muslims like Victor 
Begg often emphasize that the Judeo-Christian tradition is more accurately the Judeo-
Christian-Islamic tradition because all three are children of Abraham, the first prophet to 
receive God’s revelation. They share an Abrahamic faith with a common belief in God, 
prophets, revelation, a divinely-mandated community, and moral responsibility. While 
Jews and Christians trace their lineage to Abraham through Isaac, Muslims do so through 
Ishmael. 
Many Muslim activists, as well as non-Muslim partners in interfaith encounters, 
imagine themselves as members of a family who have been alienated and dispersed over 
time and geography. Interfaith dialogue is a sort of coming together, a family reunion. 
The Children of Abraham Project grew out of this thinking. The project organizes retreats 
where Jewish, Christian and Muslim students are brought together as a family to share 
their experiences. The project has also produced a play that bears the same title. Imam 
Abdullah El Amin, who first introduced the idea, said, 
This started with an idea I shared over lunch with my friend Brenda Rosenberg. 
We were talking about all the problems in the world that involve Muslims and 
Jews and Christians. And I said, “If we would only remember that we all share the 





After this conversation, Rosenberg went home and had a dream. In her dream she 
saw Isaac and Ishmael on a stage. She decided to put this idea into the form of a play. 
The play, Children of Abraham, would be a family reunification, the coming together of 
Ishmael and Isaac. The concept is to bring together teenagers from all three faiths, ask 
them to share their life stories, weave those stories into a play, then plan a short workshop 
to be held after the play to give audiences a chance to join in the discussion. I saw the 
play at Henry Ford Center for Performing Arts on February 28, 2005. Imam Abdullah El 
Amin and Brenda Rosenberg got several community service awards and their play was 
featured in a CBS network special on religious reconciliation. 
I was told by Muslims who participated in the production process that both Jewish 
and Muslim creators of the play had to make sacrifices to reach a common language 
acceptable to all parties. Describing how the process was emotionally difficult for them, 
Alawan said: “So this has been a family relationship. We don’t always get along. We 
argue, we disagree, we don’t talk to each other a couple of days at a time because we’re 
just upset, but this is no different than a family, we’re treating it as a family.” Alawan 
added that “these experiences basically go to show that families do differ, have 
disagreements, but they still can get along.” In such situations often the best equipped 
Muslims are convert Muslims who can navigate back and forth between the scriptures of 
the three faiths. The same dynamic that elevates the figure of Abraham to a central 
position also privileges convert Muslims in interfaith encounters. African American 
Muslims who were either themselves once Christian or have Christian relatives find it 
easier to relate to Christians in interfaith dialogue (Smith 2004: 181). Imam Abdullah El 
Amin once told me, 
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You see, by me having a Christian background, I can identify with American 
Christianity, you know. I have all that—Jesus, Mary, I know the Bible, the 
Biblical scriptures that correlate with the Qur’an. Someone that’s born in a totally 
Islamic environment wouldn’t have that. Same with people here where it’s all 
Christians, born in a primarily Christian environment They know nothing about 
Qur’an and so they can’t relate to it.  But by me having this Christian background 
I’m able to bridge the gap, speak the language, so to speak. 
 
Muslim interfaith dialogue conspicuously clusters around a number of elements 
Islam shares with Judaism and Christianity. Nor is this feature of American Islam limited 
to situations of interfaith dialogue. For instance, in 2006, when the California office of 
CAIR put out radio ads in recognition of the Muslim holiday of Eid-ul-Adha, they 
produced three spots highlighting three different themes: Abraham, Malcolm X and 
‘Mercy and Compassion.’ The radio ad focusing on Abraham had the following script: 
 
  This week, Muslims in America and around the world conclude the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca, “the Hajj,” with Islam’s most important holiday, called Eid-
ul-Adha or “Festival of the Sacrifice.” The central figure in this religious 
celebration is Prophet Abraham. Muslims believe that Abraham built the first 
House of Worship to God, known as Kaaba. The Hajj commemorates Abraham’s 
prayers at the Kaaba. The Qur’an, Islam’s holy book, states: “Who can be better 
in faith than one who submits his whole self to God, does good and follows the 
way of Abraham, the true in faith?” 
This fact offers an excellent opportunity for all of Abraham’s children—
Muslims, Christians and Jews—to recognize and cherish their shared religious 
heritage and to promote a harmonious future as people of faith. 
 
From Judeo-Christian to Abrahamic? 
 Muslims’ emphasis on Abraham allows them to establish a relationship of kinship 
with the dominant religious identity in the United States. Whether such a genealogical 
language is the best way to overcome the exclusion remains to be seen. Muslims are 
partly responding to an Islamophobic trend that was already started by evangelical 
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Christian movements and political God-talk, but intensified with 9/11. When individuals 
like Pat Robertson pit Allah and the biblical God against each other, Muslims are forced 
to prove that Allah is indeed the God of Abraham. 
 Muslims frequently note that Judeo-Christianity is not an adequate framework to 
express America’s religious diversity. Their Abrahamic language can be read as an 
argument on behalf of the expansion of boundaries to encompass themselves as a 
newcomer faith. Such potential boundary shifting can be compared to the shift from 
Christian to Judeo-Christian, which took place relatively recently in American history. 
Although the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition was around for some time, 
America continued to be seen up until 1950’s (and perhaps is still seen by some) as a 
“Christian nation” or a “Protestant country.” Widespread cultural and political acceptance 
of Jews under the rubric of Judeo-Christianity came shortly after the antisemitism in the 
United States reached its height at the end of the war. In response to the Holocaust and 
Cold War pressures to diminish differences among Western peoples, Jews (together with 
Catholics) were effectively “Christianized” in the public culture. “In the 1950s, then, the 
universalist theme in American culture and the call for ecumenism, along with anti-
Communism and the creation of Israel, were strong enough—all together—to overcome 
antisemitism and embrace Judeo-Christianity” (Mart 2004: 116). The transition from 
Christian to Judeo-Christian was thus possible only when  
a consensus emerged among liberal democracies on the unacceptability of 
institutionalized antisemitism, and the boundary was blurred by way of a 
redefinition of Christian civilization into Judeo-Christian civilization to 




The analogy between the shift from Christianity to Judeo-Christianity and the 
shift from Judeo-Christianity to Abrahamic religions has serious shortcomings. First of 
all, realpolitik conditions do not favor such a shift. Godless Communism no longer stands 
as a foil to religious ecumenism. Secondly, today’s political God talk seems to have taken 
Islam or Muslims as the enemy of choice. The same exclusionary forces also target 
liberal multiculturalism. Even if domestically Muslims can be considered victims, 
internationally they are more likely to be seen by the public as aggressors or terrorists. 
(The conflict in Israel/Palestine also casts a shadow over domestic Muslims’ chances for 
inclusion). In short, the conditions that led to the erection of a Judeo-Christian framework 
in response to antisemitism are not present, at least for now, to facilitate  a further shift 
towards an Abrahamic worldview. Moreover, Islamophobia, far from being a justification 
for acceptance of the Abrahamic framework, continues to haunt American Muslims. As 
Zolberg and Woon point out, in many Western nations “the boundary remains quite fixed 
in relation to Islam and, in some cases, became more clearly defined in the course of 
confrontations” (1999: 20). 
 
Abrahamic versus Liberal Pluralism 
American Muslims seems to be torn between two alternate paths. At a time of 
resurgent nativism, they gravitate towards Abrahamic discourse, the language of kinship. 
This option gives them what can be called a “monotheistic advantage” over other 
newcomer religions. But they are also aware of the exclusive effects a closure at the level 
of Abrahamic faiths may have on other faith groups. Therefore, they also resort to the 
alternative path,  liberal pluralism, which asks for de-emphasis of Judeo-Christianity. 
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They recognize that this alternative is under attack by the very forces that operate to the 
exclusion of Muslims. 
I could see ambivalence with respect to the two paths in the responses of Muslim 
interfaith activists. Speaking to an interfaith audience, Victor Begg once said, “I always 
thought America should be Abrahamic, not Judeo-Christian. Or maybe Judeo-Christian-
Islamic. But then we have other faiths that we need to think about.” Similarly, Najah 
Bazzy thinks that the Judeo-Christian framework needs to be transcended: 
The country seems to be understanding that this is a country of immigration and, 
you know, what is an American? Is it a Euro-American? And we’re starting to 
understand that no, we are a tapestry. So I think because of our foundation we 
have to appreciate that. Where we run into the struggle, though, is because this 
country is also, also calls itself a Judeo-Christian country, that it’s kind of 
stamped its level of acceptance. So the country itself, because of the identity it’s 
given itself—although it’s ethnically diverse, it’s really not religiously diverse in 
its identity, in how it identifies itself. 
  
While recognizing the need for transcending the current boundaries imposed by 
the Judeo-Christian identification, Bazzy remains satisfied neither with the Abrahamic 
model nor with its secular alternative. The ambivalence is most visible in her response to 
a question regarding whether the Abrahamic model will solve the problem of inclusion: 
No one can deny that Isaac and Ishmael were both sons of Abraham. And Judaism 
came way after Abraham. So do I think this is a country that’s going to be of 
Abrahamic faith? Yes, I do. Is that going to be a problem for Hindus and for 
Baha’i and for other people? I think so. And that I don’t like, to be honest with 
you. I don’t like that while you’re creating space for some people it’s at the 
expense of other people, ‘cause then to me what we’ve done is create the same 
thing that we had to fight against. What I fear, though, because of that, I fear that 
America is going to become much like France. I’m afraid of that. That it’s going 
to lose its identity to really truly just a secular tapestry of all kinds of people in 
order to avoid conflict. And that scares me, because to me when you eliminate 
faith from the tapestry of your country then what you’re producing is a lack of 
moral authority and then when you do that you run into the kinds of problems 
we’re running into already with crime and with lack of family values. And that’s 
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where 9/11 I think has been a wake-up call for America. Because it’s brought 
people back to the question of God and spirituality and family values….84 
 
External Ecumenism: American Civil Religion 
As Muslims engage in interfaith dialogue, they step into the public square where 
there is a specific form into which every particular religion is hailed by American culture. 
That form is American civil religion. Scholars of American culture have argued that 
American identity is no longer anchored in Christianity but rather in a more generic 
deistic civil religion (Bellah et al 1985: 225). This religion is characterized by belief in 
God, respect for difference and the belief that religion is a matter of individual choice. “If 
the primary contribution of religion to society is through the character and conduct of 
citizens, any religion, large or small, familiar or strange, can be of equal value to any 
other” (Bellah et al 1985; 225). This conception of religion has produced a specific 
vocabulary, a domain of its own, independent of any particular religion. Entry into that 
domain and language is a sign of citizenship. For the most part, the interfaith 
conversation takes place through that language. When Muslims who participate in this 
language through their involvement in interfaith work go back to their own communities, 
they might be seen as speaking another language or they might find themselves alienated 
                                                 
84 At a talk given to a predominantly non-Muslim audience on a college campus, Najah Bazzy (borrowing 
the language of  cell phone ads that were cluttering the airwaves at the time) compared the Sunni and Shia 
schools of Islam to the “friends”  and “family” plans. During my interview, I told her that I liked this 
distinction and asked whether one could apply it to the two options available to Muslims for 
accommodation in American society. I asked which plan she would prefer, Abrahamic (family plan) or 
liberal pluralism (friends plan)? She replied:  
   Well, I would say that I would prefer the family plan of Abrahamic faith with an invitation to 
friends, a true invitation to friends. I think if it’s just the family plan it’s not good, it’s almost 
coercion in faith. If it’s just the friends plan, I think we’re in serious trouble. Very serious trouble 
because then you lose moral authority. Core values that our society needs. So I do think the 
foundation needs to be belief in one God and then even, really, a closer examination of Hinduism 
and of Sikhism… they’re still rooted in the concept of one God. They really are. You know, they 
might have different variations of how to worship that God, but you know for the most part 
they’re all tied to one Creator, the Divine Creator. 
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from their (immigrant) communities. Eide Alawan, for example, told me on multiple 
occasions that 
I prefer to be with Christians and Jews more than Muslims. And what I mean by 
that is that there’s dialogue. You know one of the difficult things I find in my 
lifetime⎯ I’ve said this many years now⎯ is that we can seem to dialogue with 
Jews and Christians and Buddhists and talk and feel as though we are brothers, 
but we have a problem between Shi’a and Sunni and this is a barrier that I know 
that the American generation will overcome… All I’m saying is, appreciate what 
both sides bring to the table. If you don’t agree with someone that’s fine, it’s OK 
to disagree. It’s OK to disagree in a manner that’s saying… it’s just like between 
me and a Jew or a Christian. 
 
On another occasion he said “I’ve always been in interfaith work for years. My 
interest has always been to promote Islam. Promote it in the sense of not conversion but 
promote it in the sense of understanding in the non-Muslim community. In fact I feel 
much more comfortable being in a Christian or Jewish community than I do in a Muslim 
community.” I would like to think of Eide Alawan as a believer in American civil 
religion. Himself an American-born Shia, most of his congregation at the Islamic Center 
of America are immigrants, some of them very recent. What he finds in interfaith 
environments is his Muslim identity deployed within American civil religion. He prefers 
being in environments where non-Islamic forms of American religion are present, over 
environments where non-American forms of Islam are present. In the former he is at 
home; in the latter he is a stranger. 
I had similar thoughts when I attended an event in downtown Detroit. On the 
National Day of Prayer, Imam Abdullah El Amin and Imam Achmat Salie lined up on a 
stage with representatives of other faiths. Prayers from the representatives of each faith 
were read. El Amin made adhan, the Muslim call to prayer, in Arabic and then provided 
an English translation. When his turn came Imam Salie read a long prayer in English. It 
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started with “All praise is due to the God of all—of those who affirm and deny Him—the 
God of Adam and Eve –Noah, Abraham and Sarah, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, the 
Virgin Mary, Fatima and Aisha.” He used God, Allah and Lord interchangeably. The 
speech was colored by ecumenical language as well as the self-help language of generic 
spirituality: “Beloved Lord, help us in our transition from bigotry to balance, …from 
corporate greed to selflessness.” Imam Salie ended his prayer, just as he started it, by 
mentioning Abraham: “Lastly, we pray for the realization that compassion (not dogma) is 
the primary religious expression. Ameen –O Allah, Lord of Abraham, hear our prayers.” 
 One way Muslim interfaith activists, consciously or not, make Islam an American 
religion is to adopt the ecumenical mode of speech. Islam is detached from its earlier 
forms (what most American-born Muslims disapprovingly call the “cultural Islam” of 
immigrants). The process of pouring Islam into its new mold, its American form, gives 
rise to two kinds of ecumenism. Externally it neutralizes the differences between Islam 
and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Internally, it undermines internal divisions along 
ethnic, racial and sectarian lines. All of the interfaith activists, Dawud Walid in 
particular, take extra effort to cultivate an Islam which is beyond madhabs (juridical 
schools of thought). Of the impact of interfaith work on intrafaith Muslim life, Alawan 
says, “I think one of the things that interfaith is allowing me to see is that we should be 




Figure 6.3. Interfaith National Day of Prayer in downtown Detroit. Muslims on the stage 
are Imam Abdullah El Amin (first on the right) and Imam Achmat Salie (third on the 
left). 
 
Internal Ecumenism: From Interfaith to Intrafaith 
Interfaith work encourages two types of ecumenism: internal ecumenism and 
external ecumenism. As Muslim practitioners like Eide Alawan and Dawud Walid 
frequently note, interfaith encounter leads to self-critique and demands internal solidarity. 
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Internal ecumenism thus refers both to dialogue between Sunnis and Shias (what second 
and third generation college students call SuShi) and dialogue across ethnoracial divides 
(between various ethnic immigrant Muslims and indigenous African-American 
communities). Interfaith activism allows Muslims to reformulate Islam as an American 
religion. The emphasis on commonalities with other religions is an important 
characteristic of American Islam because through interfaith work, American Islam gains 
autonomy from the rest of the Muslim world, where the need for interfaith work is either 
not felt or remains very small. Critique of overseas Muslim cultures is an important 
ingredient of American Islam. As Abdullah El Amin remarked, 
I think that’s the only way that we can go here and now. We have the Shi’a and 
the Sunni in this area. We have a Sunni-Shi’a symposium, knocking down the 
walls between us. Because he’s a Muslim just like I’m a Muslim, it’s the same 
thing. We both believe in Allah, we both believe in the same Prophet, we both 
believe in the same Holy Qur’an, and so we have to  look more to this than we do 
to… many people mistake culture for religion. Take for instance in Saudi Arabia 
women don’t drive cars. Well, did Allah say women can’t drive cars, or did Saudi 
Arabian men say that women can’t drive cars? 
 
E Pluribus Unum: American Religious Diversity and Muslim Citizenship 
 It took some time for Muslims to develop interfaith consciousness. Muslim 
involvement in interfaith conversation evolved from a proselytizing, defensive mode of 
engagement (dawah) to a more self-confident style of interaction. The transition from 
dawah to dialogue and from conversion to conversation (Takim 2004: 343) is a milestone 
of Muslim cultural settlement in American society. Starting in the late 1990s, American 
Muslim institutions developed a more confident attitude toward their non-Muslim 
environment. A new appreciation of the universalistic “values” of the American 
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constitution and public culture in general began to claim the privileged place previously 
occupied by the concept of “dawah” (Schumann 2007: 12). 
 Interfaith dialogue is practiced by Muslims who want to transcend ethnicity. 
Although there are still many Muslims who consider interfaith work a dawah opportunity 
(or engage in interfaith work under the rubric of dawah to legitimate it), there is no doubt 
that Muslim participation has widened and deepened. For some participants interfaith 
dialogue can be a survival strategy. In a time of exclusion and anti-Muslim 
discrimination, interfaith dialogue is both a means of making allies and a form of self-
expression. 
Interfaith work can also become a status device for the well-established. It is a 
marker of citizenship and social prominence. Take the example of Victor Begg, a wealthy 
businessman and founder of the Unity Center. In one sense, he is like the Aristotelian 
citizens whose activities are a “mixture of character building and public activity among 
well-bred gentlemen with plenty of free time” (Shklar 1991: 30).  
Interfaith activism is linked to citizenship in several ways, not only for the well-
established, but for all Muslims involved in it. It is certainly an exercise of citizenship in 
the sense that it involves civic engagement and participation. Second, by granting status 
and positive public standing, it becomes an affirmation of equality. Third, it is a way of 
naturalizing Islam. By participating, Muslims remove a stigma that weights heavily on 
them. If we are to follow Judith Shklar’s analysis, what are central to citizenship in 
America are not only issues of agency and empowerment but also those of social 
standing: 
The struggle for citizenship in America has, therefore, been overwhelmingly a 
demand for inclusion in the polity, an effort to break down excluding barriers to 
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recognition, rather than an aspiration of civic participation as a deeply involving 
activity (Shklar 1991: 3).  
 
While factors such as race, gender, religious sect and the immigrant/native divide 
all play some role in which groups will engage in interfaith activities, the single most 
important variable appears to be what I call “cultural literacy.” Cultural literacy includes 
a certain degree of fluency in English and⎯ perhaps more important⎯ familiarity with 
mainstream American culture and its religious landscape. It is the importance of cultural 
literacy that puts African-Americans, women and second generation immigrants in the 
forefront of interfaith work. These individuals usually do not occupy the front line in the 
hierarchy of religious authority.  
  The figure of Abraham⎯ who does not occupy a central place in Muslim 
cultures in their conventional settings⎯ gains prominence in Muslim minority contexts. 
He is one of the few common threads through which Islam can enter the American 
(Western) imagination and find a foothold of legitimacy. A response to the exclusion 
generated by 9/11, Abrahamic discourse acknowledges the fact that (legal) citizenship 
alone is not enough to protect the Muslims from the public sentiment. If civil rights work 
is an appeal to the state, interfaith work is an appeal to the public. In the post-9/11 era, 
Muslims have gravitated more towards Abrahamic discourse than liberal pluralism. They 
rely on the tropes of genealogy and kinship to legitimate Islam as an American religion. 
As such, interfaith work becomes an emotional plea for inclusion in the nation. It draws 
on familial bonds to undo otherness. One reason Muslim interfaith activists are drawn to 
Abrahamic discourse, even though they are ambivalent about its merit over secular, 
liberal pluralism, is that they see secular pluralism as merely an extension of citizenship 
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discourse, which in their eyes has proven inadequate for protecting Muslims. Abrahamic 
discourse, on the other hand, is a discourse that works on the “nation” rather than the 
“state”. It is an attempt to erase differences in the public mind by assimilating Muslims 
into the category of  “fellow Abrahamic believer.” Therefore, if the post-WWII discourse 
of Judeo-Christianity allowed the “Christianization” or normalization of Jews, Abrahamic 
discourse in the post-9/11 era responds to a comparable Muslim demand for 
“Christianization” or normalization via inclusion, kinship and commonality. 
  
Conclusion 
As a prominent citizenship practice of Muslims in the post-9/11 era, acts of 
interfaith dialogue contribute to the inclusion of Islam as a legitimate “kindred” religion. 
Muslim claims to kinship and demand for the recognition of Islam as part of an extended 
Judeo-Christian tradition represent a demand for the shifting of boundaries that presently 
leave Islam outside the fold of American religion. Interfaith dialogue also takes its 
Muslim participants into the realm of American civil religion, which as an empty form is 
open to all religious contents. Through acquisition of its vocabulary and style, Islam 
becomes a civil religion, a generic American religion with an emphasis on diversity, 
moral universalism and toleration. Islam becomes one color among many. In this chapter, 
I have focused on interfaith dialogue as one type of Muslim response to 9/11 at the local 
level. Certainly race, socio-economic background and the immigrant-indigenous 
dichotomy shape the opportunity structure for interfaith activism. But in general terms, 
there seems to be a “confidence threshold” that has to be reached in order for Muslims to 
become involved in interfaith work in a sustained way. That threshold is reached mainly 
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when both cultural literacy and a certain degree of social and economic comfort are 
secured. That is why the number of Muslim participants is still disproportionately small, 












Fun and jihad? Many people are intrigued when they see the words “Muslim” and 
“comedy” in the same sentence. The very idea of “Muslim comedy” seems funny at least 
in one of the two senses of the word. When you say something is funny, people 
sometimes ask for clarification: “funny ha-ha” or “funny-peculiar”? Reactions to the idea 
of Muslim comedy usually belong to the second category. And this is not so peculiar. In 
American society, the dominant image of Muslims and Islam is far from funny. You 
rarely see a smiling Muslim face on TV. On the news or in the movies, Muslims look 
either angry or scared⎯ when they manage not to be terrorists. The typical Muslim 
image is stern, foreign and dangerous. Since the events that brought broad recognition to 
Muslim identity in American society are acts not of humor but of horror, Americans are 
likely to see a connection between jihad (or Muslims) and tragedy, rather than comedy. 
But in an interesting turn of events, there has been an upsurge of Muslim ethnic comedy 
since the events of 9/11. More and more Muslim individuals and groups are appearing on 
stage with comic routines. And they are attracting larger and larger non-Muslim 
audiences. This paradoxical outcome raises two related questions. The first can be posed 
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both empirically (why this surge after 9/11?) and theoretically (what is the link between 
tragic and comic in the context of minority groups?). The second question is a 
hermeneutical one: how can we interpret the phenomenon of Muslim comedy and more 
specifically, what does it tell us about Muslim citizenship in American society? The 
following discussion of emergent Muslim ethnic comedy is organized around these 
questions. It also proposes a new theoretical framework for the sociologically 
undertheorized phenomenon of ethnic comedy. 
 
The Impact of 9/11: Tragic Neurosis, Comic Symptom 
The tragic consequences of 9/11 are all too obvious: the deaths of innocent 
people, the collapse of the nation’s sense of security, and a backlash against people of 
Muslim and/or Middle Eastern backgrounds. The external reaction took the form of wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the internal response included securitization of domestic 
life, erosion of civil liberties, and an epidemic of fear and anxiety among American 
citizens. The impact of 9/11 on the American psyche is a cultural trauma (Smelser 2004) 
that can best be compared to neurosis. The heightened sense of “one nation under threat,” 
reinforced in the ensuing years by government policies, created a disjuncture between the 
state and the nation⎯ or to put it differently, a withdrawal from demos to ethnos (Balibar 
2004: 9). The assumed congruence between nation and state was lost. With this new 
understanding of “us,” the American community was re-imagined. As Engin Isin has 
observed, nation-states in the age of globalization increasingly rely on “governing 
through neurosis” (Isin 2004), a phenomenon that marks a new stage in contemporary 
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practices of governmentality (Foucault 1991).85 Regardless of whether the source of 
neurosis is imaginary or real, the fact remains: in times of crisis the nation shrinks. As it 
did after 9/11, a shrinking nation left behind an abandoned space that was inside the state 
and yet outside the nation. The relaxed and inclusive nature of American society gave 
way to an anxious and exclusive sense of what it means to be American. Some people 
with full legal citizenship suddenly came to be seen as cultural aliens. In short, the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 produced a neurosis in the nation and altered the landscape of 
American consciousness.86 A collective neurosis resulted in the release of collective 
psychosocial energies such as patriotism, solidarity and heightened symbolism (e.g., 
renewed interest in flags and emphasis on borders). This loss of membership in the nation 
also explains why Muslims, already caricatured as grim people, continue to display 
anxiety and fear.  
What I have described in psychoanalytic terms could be told in geological terms 
as well. The impact of 9/11 on the surface of American society is in effect an ethno-
quake or a socio-quake: it opened a fracture on the surface of the social body.87 This 
tectonic shock to the social landscape turned a formerly more or less unified surface (us, 
the citizenry) into two pieces. The crack separates a large piece⎯ into which the sense of 
“us” recedes⎯ from a very small piece where “not-us” remains. A nation which had been 
almost blind and certainly indifferent to the existence of this piece of itself (i.e., Muslims 
in America) now suddenly begins to see it because now that piece has been  externalized, 
                                                 
85 This new turn in politics is recognized by various observers including journalists like Naomi Klein, who 
discusses it under the rubric of Shock Doctrine (Klein 2007). 
86 This is certainly not limited to the exclusion of Muslims. Recent securitization and criminalization of 
“illegal” immigrants is also closely linked to 9/11 and the heightened sense of nationalism. 
87 There is an interesting connection between earthquakes and laughter. “One study reported that survivors 
of the San Francisco earthquake laughed at the slightest provocation” (Brottman 2004: 76). 
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objectified. Once the crack is produced, ethnic/religious stereotypes about Muslims begin 
to proliferate.88 In this process of hardening of stereotypes, the status of Muslims rapidly 
changed from invisible strangers to extremely visible strangers. I would argue that this 
status of extremely visible stranger is crucial to the question of why we have an upsurge 
of comedy right after a huge tragedy. 
We have seen an explosion of Muslim comedy since 9/11 because it created the 
double conditions necessary for the deployment of ethnic comedy: otherness and 
relevance. Otherness and relevance were simultaneously produced when America 
changed from being a society divided into citizens to a nation standing united. This split 
between the nation and the Muslim alien not only turned the spotlight on Muslims as an 
object of scrutiny and source of danger, it also turned the nation into an audience⎯ an 
audience that came to the ethnic theater with a newly calcified stereotype of Muslims in 
mind, an audience constantly reminded to report any suspicious people and activities to 
the authorities. This is most evident at airports, where the relationship between Muslim 
identity and American sovereignty comes into the open. Widespread anxiety about 
aviation security, ever-more-intrusive screening procedures, and the creation of no-fly 
lists all gave rise to a “surveillance society,” a “safety state” (Lyon 2003). The airport has 
become a site of passage with its own rites. At the airport, Muslim visibility and 
difference reach new heights. Ethnic, racial and religious profiling all assumed a new 
meaning after 9/11. Incidentally, Leon Rappoport, a scholar of ethnic comedy writing on 
the impact of 9/11 recently observed that 
                                                 
88 “Sometimes on the street” says Azhar Usman, “I say to people: relax… I am Muslim but I am an 
American Muslim. I consider myself a very patriotic American Muslim, which means I would die for this 
country … by blowing myself up … inside a Dunkin’ Donuts.” 
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There are good reasons to argue that 9/11 has had a more fundamental impact on 
the general meaning of race and ethnicity. Traditional differences between most 
ethnic groups are fading because terrorist attacks make no such distinctions. All 
of us are in the same boat, equally and impartially threatened… When any group 
of people, no matter how diverse, is facing a collective, life-threatening situation 
they invariably come together and set aside their differences… The one exception 
has been Muslims and others with a Near Eastern background. (Rappoport 2005: 
125) 
 
This in a sense summarizes the tragic consequence of 9/11 for American 
Muslims. With their newfound (negative) recognition, they moved to center stage as 
objects of suspicion, stereotyping and wiretapping. Two instances in the aftermath of 
9/11 where Muslim identity and humor were associated with each other provide good 
illustrations of the post-9/11 milieu.  
Looking for Comedy in the Muslim World, a movie released in 2006 starring 
comedian Albert Brooks, takes off from the following premise: the American government 
sends a down-on-his-luck Jewish comedian to the Muslim world to find out “what makes 
Muslims laugh.” Although the comedian visits only India and Pakistan⎯ countries 
which, despite their huge Muslim populations, remain peripheral to most Americans’ 
imagination of the Muslim world⎯ the implication is obvious: Muslims may seem dour, 
but deep down they must have some sense of humor waiting to be discovered. 
Interestingly, the film presents its Pakistani characters as more dangerous, more 
“authentic”, and much funnier than the Indians.89  
This almost optimistic view of Muslims’ relation to comedy was overshadowed 
by the explosive controversy of the Danish cartoon crisis, which began in late 2005. 
Muslim reactions to offensive cartoons published in a Danish newspaper were perceived 
                                                 
89 Commenting on the movie, one Muslim comedian said “I don’t like the title of that movie. That’s like 
saying looking for drug addiction in a crack house or looking for stupidity in the White House.” 
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by western publics as an example of Muslim intolerance for freedom of speech and lack 
of understanding for humor. Though some American Muslims felt obligated to comment 
on the film and the cartoon fiasco, both these events revolving around Muslim humor 
(and its lack) were in a sense external to the community.90 They both concerned Muslims 
outside America, and to the extent that American Muslims did wade into the issues, they 
frequently took them as opportunities to dissociate American Muslims from Muslims 
abroad. And as the issues became less acute, both the image of Muslims as lacking humor 
and the Danish cartoon crisis itself became the butt of jokes for Muslim comedians in 
America.  
 So, where does the comic come into the picture as this new epoch unfolds? If the 
tragedy of 9/11 contributed to the creation of certain “forms” (stereotypes about 
Muslims), comedy became possible when Muslims started to play with those forms. 
Mary Douglas’s characterization of humor as “play on forms” (Douglas 1975) helps us 
establish the link between tragic events and the emergence of Muslim comedy. Tragic 
events (crises) and the neuroses they trigger lead to the hardening of stereotypes (i.e. all 
Muslims are terrorists) and the objectification of ethnic groups. Some of the Muslims 
who see those incongruous forms thrown at them in the media and in personal encounters 
eventually decide to throw them back. The personal tragedy of being ethnic (an outsider, 
a stranger, different, stereotyped) is now made public through irony and comedy. And as 
has often been said, prejudice has no greater enemy than irony.  
 
                                                 
90 Dripping irony, another Muslim comedian says “to show that Muslims are not terrorists, there is no better 
way than to burn down the embassy or the KFC… have riots, kill people to show the world that Islam 
means peace: ‘if you don’t believe it, I will kill you!’” Jokes like this one also serve to dissociate Muslims 
in America from Muslims abroad. 
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Muslim Ethnic Comedy: Space, Players, Forms 
Ethnic comedy is intimately linked to the fortunes of ethnic communities. As my 
earlier discussion of the context points out, Muslim comedy is in a sense a form of 
“gallows humor” that “arises in a precarious or dangerous situation” (Koller 1988: 12). 
For Muslim communities in the United States, ethnic comedy grew out of danger. 
Islamophobia is what has made Muslim comedy a phenomenon of our times. The 
discrimination, prejudices and stereotypes from which other Muslims suffer are a 
godsend for the Muslim comedian. Muslim comics thus represent the experience of most 
Muslims, but in an inverted way. They are perhaps the only beneficiaries of the negative 
charisma associated with being Muslim. Muslim comedy is the world of Islamophobia 
turned upside down. 
The career of Muslim standup comedians resembles the story of Benjamin 
Disraeli, who in a totally different setting exploited the negative charisma that was 
associated with being Jewish in nineteenth century Britain. Hannah Arendt devotes part 
of her discussion of the history of antisemitism to Disraeli, who managed to float above 
its consequences (1973: 68-79). Far from being a disadvantage, he turned his Jewishness 
into a source of distinction and a privilege. This “potent wizard” says Arendt, recognized 
“how much more exciting it would be for himself and for others… to accentuate the fact 
that he was a Jew,” for he “discovered the secret of how to preserve luck, that natural 
miracle of pariahdom.” Despite the fact that he came from an entirely assimilated family 
and (according to Arendt) lacked any religious knowledge, he nonetheless exploited the 
negative charisma associated with being Jewish. “He knew instinctively that everything 
depended upon… an accentuation of his lucky ‘strangeness’.” In Disraeli’s own words, 
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“what is a crime among the multitude is only a vice among the few.” The crime of being 
Jewish “could be transformed at any moment into an attractive ‘vice’” (Arendt 1973: 69). 
In a similar vein, Muslim comedians are exploiting a kind of “lucky strangeness.” What 
makes other Muslims suffer becomes a career opportunity for them. 
Muslim comedy is an emerging “market.” Not only is its audience growing, but it 
is also a new career field for Muslim cultural entrepreneurs, mostly second generation 
young people and converts. “The time is right” says Zarqa Nawaz, the Muslim producer 
of a popular Canadian sitcom, “the marketplace has never been this curious about 
Muslims.” As cultural entrepreneurs, they claim the knowledge of both worlds: ethnic 
and mainstream. This is best illustrated in their ability to go back and forth between 
accented and normal speech.91 As arbiters of a cultural encounter and as field guides to a 
contact zone, these stand-up comedians are situated in a unique position. They can 
practice simultaneously the two ways of seeing things: ethnic and majority. They can 
“leap” from one side to the other. This position is often a tragic one, where a person 
belongs to both worlds and neither. The comic stands uneasily on the crack that separates 
the two, yet by standing there the comic becomes a sort of stitch that ties together the two 
sides of the divide. 
Muslim comedy is produced and consumed in different ways. Take three recent 
products of popular culture. Between 9/11 and the time of the writing of this dissertation, 
these comic enterprises gained national recognition.  
                                                 
91 It is important to remember the well-known distinction between an accent or a dialect and a language. An 
accent is an accent only in relation to a language.  What is crucial here is that the language itself is just 
another accent: the official, standard accent. Bourdieu has aptly drawn attention to the relationship between 
linguistic and political unifications (Bourdieu 1991: 45). An accent is imperfect and thus funny only from 
the point of view of the official accent (language). 
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First, a new TV sitcom, Little Mosque on the Prairie, started in January 2007. 
Little Mosque revolves around the daily experiences of a small Muslim (mostly 
immigrant) community living in Mercy, a fictional small town in Saskatchewan. It 
explores the funny side of adapting to life in post-9/11 North America. In the first 
episode, the community tries to establish a mosque in the parish hall of a church. A 
passer-by, seeing the group praying, rushes to call a “terrorist hot line” to report Muslims 
praying “just like on CNN.” In another episode the Muslim residents hire a Canadian-
born imam from Toronto. He is a lawyer but he quits his father’s law firm to take the job 
as an imam. This, his father thinks, is career suicide. The young imam is detained at the 
airport while speaking to his mother on his cell phone because he is overheard saying: “If 
dad thinks that’s suicide, so be it.” Security staff rush in when they hear what he says 
next: “This is Allah’s plan for me.” As Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times 
correspondent for American Muslim affairs, observes,  
that fictional moment is an all-too-possible occurrence as witnessed when six 
imams were hauled off a US Airways plane in Minnesota in November after 
apparently spooking at least one fellow passenger by murmuring prayers that 
included the word Allah.(“Sitcom’s Precarious Premise: Being Muslim Over 
Here,” New York Times, 12/07/2006). 
 
Though it began life with decidedly murky prospects, the show soon became the 
number one sitcom on Canada’s CBC network.92 During a visit to Detroit on April 5, 
2008, Zarqa Nawaz, the Muslim creator of Little Mosque, explained the reason why her 
show gained so much popularity: “It is appealing because it shows Muslims being 
normal. It humanizes Muslims.” She also adds “I want the broader society to look at us as 
                                                 
92 The series premiere attracted 2.09 million viewers, an impressive number for Canada, where an audience 
of one million is considered a runaway hit. The CBC reported that it had not had a show draw that size 




normal, with the same issues and concerns as anyone else.” Nawaz named her production 
company “FUNdamentalist Films.” When asked why, she says she wants to “put the fun 
back in fundamentalism.”93 
The other two success stories are the phenomenal rise of Allah Made Me Funny: 
The Official Muslim Comedy Tour  (AMMF) and Axis of Evil (AOE), two comedy 
troupes. In my discussion of Muslim ethnic comedy I will focus on these two groups 
which have gained prominence and national recognition in the world of Muslim 
American popular culture and even made tentative steps towards crossing over into 
mainstream culture.94 The AMMF troupe includes Preacher Moss, Azhar Usman and 
Mohammed Amer. Perhaps we should start with the official description of the group: 
Allah Made Me Funny: The Official Muslim Comedy Tour is the world’s first and 
only organized standup comedy tour featuring America’s top Muslim comedians. 
It is a community project centered around the promotion of shared core values. It 
simultaneously brings American Muslims out of their typical isolation to a 
mainstream comedy show and introduces mainstream American fans of standup 
to a uniquely Muslim perspective. (Allah Made Me Funny: The Official Muslim 
Comedy Tour 2008 Program, February 15, 2008, p.5) 
 
The ethnic and cultural origins of comedians are also important. Preacher Moss, 
now in his early forties and from the Washington D.C. area, is an African American 
                                                 
93 Nawaz’s first short film bears the title, “BBQ Muslims” (1996) and is inspired by her anger at the finger-
pointing at Muslims in the aftermath of Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In this short film, two Muslim 
brothers are suspected of being Middle Eastern terrorists after their backyard barbecue explodes. A radio 
news announcer says, at the start of the film, “this bombing has all the markings of Muslim 
fundamentalists: a large hole in the ground, charred grass and dead animals.” 
94 A dimension of the emergence of Muslim comedy which we cannot neglect is the creation of various 
Muslim media where a dispersed community finds a common public sphere. Of particular note  is the 
launch of Bridges TV in 2004 as the first Muslim American television channel in English. Muslim 
comedians are a staple of  Bridges TV. In addition to Bridges TV, Muslim community is experiencing a 
proliferation of online and print magazines and weeklies such as The Muslim Observer (published in 
Detroit, Michigan). The Muslim comedy and the Muslim minority in general are also taking advantage of 
the revolutionary opportunities opened by new media such as YouTube. Most rising comedians are still 
local and they use venues like YouTube to reach to audiences. Both AMMF and AOE also have pages on 
virtual networking sites like Facebook and MySpace and make a point during live performances of inviting 
their fans to visit their pages and to “poke ‘em.”  
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convert to Islam. He occasionally incorporates into his comedy his experience at his 
mother’s Baptist church. Preacher Moss founded AMMF in 2004 and looked for 
companions. He was soon joined by Azhar Usman.  
Axis of Evil is not quite a trio: it consists of Ahmed Ahmed, Maz Jobrani and 
Aron Kader, all from the West Coast, and Dean Obeidallah, their East coast “guest 
member.” While the larger social dynamics that brought both comedy groups to the stage 
are the same, they represent two different reactions. Therefore, one can see some overlaps 
as well as divergences between their primary identifications.  
Several things can be said by way of a quick comparison. In terms of orientation, 
AOE could be called ethnic-ethnic, whereas AMMF is Muslim pan-ethnic. While it is 
hard to separate the Middle East from Islam in the popular imagination, it is important to 
note that many Muslims in America are doubly “ethnic”: (1) ethnic in the sense of being 
Arab or Pakistani living in America, and (2) ethnic in the sense of being Muslim in 
America, regardless of their origin. Self-identifications like “Palestinian” or “Middle 
Easterner” correspond to the first sense of ethnicity, exemplified here by the Axis of Evil 
comedy troupe. This type of ethnicity maintains strong (cultural) ties to an overseas 
nation of origin. The second sense of ethnicity, which I’ve called pan-Muslim ethnicity 
(or just “Muslimness”), characterizes Allah Made Me Funny. It functions similarly to 
Jewish-American ethnicity. It is dissociated from any overseas ethnic origin, or 
acknowledges only a nominal link, yet still remains ethnic within the American context. 
In short, AMMF is Muslim first, ethnic second while AOE is ethnic first, Muslim second. 
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This distinction can be seen in the naming of the two groups. Azhar Usman 
explains the rationale behind the naming of Allah Made Me Funny in the beginning of 
their first DVD:  
Well, the word Allah⎯ which is a word that conjures up more negative images in 
the minds of non-Muslim Americans than any other word concerning Islam⎯ is 
actually beautiful. And it is nothing more, nothing less than the Arabic word for 
God. So Allah Made Me Funny is the Muslim answer to God Made Me Funky. 
 
Axis of Evil on the other hand, draws on President Bush’s famous 2002 State of 
the Union address, where he designated two Middle Eastern countries (Iran and Iraq) 
together with North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” The members of AOE are of Arab and 
Iranian descent, their routine always includes mention that they’re still looking for a 
North Korean comic to join them. Two of the performers were working in Hollywood 
(most often cast as terrorists) before they turned to stand-up in the aftermath of 9/11.   
One thing needs to be clarified at the outset: Muslim comedy did not begin with 
9/11. But it did take on a distinctive form and quality after it. 9/11 is a turning point in the 
history of American Muslim ethnicity as well as in the history of American Muslim 
comedy. Preacher Moss of AMMF was a comedian producing primarily but not 
exclusively African American humor. He was writing for George Lopez (The George 
Lopez Show) and Darrell Hammond (Saturday Night Live). He was a mainstream 
comedian with an African American edge. As an individual comedian he was Muslim. 
but this was not the primary framework defining his work.  
Similarly, Dean Obeidallah of AOE repeatedly says that before 9/11 he was a 
white guy doing generic comedy. After 9/11 he says he lost his white status and became 
Arab. The neurosis was thus at work not only in the production of an American nation 
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estranged from its Muslim members but also in the production of Obeidallah as an Arab 
and as an ethnic comedian.95 
The ethnic backgrounds of the AMMF trio mirror the overall composition of the 
American Muslim community. The three major groups, South Asians, Arab Americans 
and African Americans are represented by Azhar Usman, Mohammad Amer and Preacher 
Moss, respectively. And the convert experience, an increasingly important part of the 
Muslim community in the United States, is also represented by Preacher Moss. This last 
element is absent from  Axis of Evil, where the preferred identity is not Muslim but 
Middle Eastern. 
After these general notes on the comedy troupes we can now take a closer look at 
the profile of each group and their comic routines. But first it would be unfair to the 
standup comedians if I didn’t make one disclaimer about these jokes. I’ve noticed that 
when I write them down they lose a crucial element. Academic writing is just not the best 
venue for comedy. All I can do by way of giving due credit to the comedians is to say 
that I have seen audiences (myself included) laugh hard at most of these jokes. 
 
Allah Made Me Funny 
I had the opportunity to watch the members of both groups perform in various 
settings. The members of AMMF, in particular, appear almost every year at the annual 
convention of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and frequently at various 
local events organized by the Muslim Student Associations (MSAs). I had seen Azhar 
Usman perform at MSA’s annual Eid dinner in 2005 at the University of Michigan, Ann 
                                                 
95 There is a growing literature on “racialization” of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11. For a recent 
notable example see (Jamal and Naber 2008). 
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Arbor. There was an audience of three hundred students, some of them with their 
families. One of my early conclusions about the nature of Muslim comedy was that it is a 
second generation phenomenon. I saw the group most recently in mid-February 2008, 
when they performed at a fundraising event at the Lund Auditorium of Dominican 
University in the suburbs of Chicago. All the tickets were sold out. There were 
approximately fifteen hundred people. Most of them were young people, most likely 
second generation. The audience was predominantly of South Asian Muslim ethnic 
background (Indian and Pakistani), reflecting the ethnic composition of the Chicago area 
Muslim community. The audience also included Arab American and African American 
Muslims, as well as some non-Muslim Americans.  
The first stand-up comedian to appear on the stage that evening was Mohammed 
(“call me Mike”) Amer. He is ethnically Palestinian, born in Kuwait and raised in the 
United States (Houston, Texas). Amer began his comic career at a young age⎯ 20⎯ 
doing Arab ethnic and generic stand-up comedy. His jokes deal with issues of 
immigration, ethnic food and practices, and the symbolic burden of names like his own. 
That night, speaking of a recent trip to Europe, Mo Amer said this: 
I had such a good time in England. I am Palestinian-American, I have been here 
seventeen years, almost eighteen. I am getting my passport next year. [applause] 
Alhamdulillah… Alhamdulillah… But I am still “homeless” you know, I’m still 
homeless. You know when it really got to me? In England there was this poster 
when I went through immigration. At the airport they have them everywhere.  It is 
a poster with a dog. And he has a passport around his neck. A dog! It says “Get 
your dog’s citizenship today!” I am a human being and I have been waiting for 
seventeen years and (ruff ruff!) “get your citizenship”… And it’s not even an 
English bulldog. It’s a German shepherd!  
 
Immigration is not easy, right? Immigration is not an easy process. Try to call 
immigration. It just does not work out. One time I called immigration for my 
uncle. It says, “Hello, you have reached INS, naturalization processing. Please 




The comedy show that evening had a guest appearance by a 13-year-old comedian 
named Shaan Khan. Shaan is an eight grader who is developing a local reputation for his 
impersonation of Azhar Usman of AMMF. One of the early skits that Usman no longer 
uses in his routine involves an Indo-Pakistani immigrant uncle (he calls him “Uncle Let-
me-‘splain-you”) who fails to see how his broken English does more harm than good 
when he decides to act as a spokesperson for the local mosque in an interview on national 
television. As Shaan says, elaborating on Usman’s character: “I don’t care if you can’t 
speak English. I don’t mind. But why are you on TV?!!”96 
Preacher Moss, an African-American Muslim comedian whose real name is 
Bryant Reginald Moss, is in his early forties. He came up with the idea for Allah Made 
Me Funny and started the group in 2004. That evening Moss started his routine⎯ as he 
often does⎯ on a didactic note: “We have to battle stereotypes.” He continued, 
Like you never see Muslim comedians on TV. Because all the Muslims they can 
put on TV for notoriety are Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. Neither of 
these guys is funny. Think about it. First you got Bin Laden but you can’t find 
him. They can’t find him, but he releases a DVD every month and a half. He is 
like the Muslim Tupac! They can’t find him. They should change their name from 
Al Qaida to Al Hide-a. 
 
Preacher Moss’s jokes revolve around his conversion, issues of race including his 
own interracial marriage (to an Indian woman) and political satire. Preacher frequently 
jokes about the double jeopardy of being black and Muslim. Back when John Ashcroft 
                                                 
96 Elsewhere Azhar Usman complains about such uncles’ tendency to brag about the number of Muslims in 
the United States: “We have these uncles in the community who are always bragging about it. [he puts on 
an Indian accent] ‘We have 7 million Muslims in America. Can you imagine, Bob?’” Azhar continues: 
“Right! The funny thing is that he is bragging about it to his friend at work: ‘Can you believe it, Bob? 7 




was attorney general, he said in an interview, “I am worried they’re going to put race and 
religion on driver’s licenses… So when I get pulled over, I get two tickets.” 
One of the major themes in Muslim comedy is “immigrant time” in America. 
Preacher asks: how can Muslims speed everywhere and still be late to everything? After 
poking fun at immigrant Muslims for always being late, he jumps to current events: 
“People are saying crazy stuff about Muslims. Sometimes people blame 
everything on Muslims. Some might even blame natural disasters on Muslims.  
[speaks as a reporter] ‘We are now in Orlando and we are waiting for Hurricane 




The last of the comic trio to appear on stage that night was Azhar Usman. A 
native of the Chicago area, Usman is a lawyer turned comedian. He calls himself the 
Ayatollah of Comedy. He is a portly man in his early thirties and wears a full black beard 
and occasionally a kufi (skullcap). When ABC’s Nightline featured Azhar Usman as a 
Muslim comedian, after a brief introduction to the topic they cautioned their audience: 
So far you have not seen the face of the man our story is about. He is an attorney. 
He was born in Chicago, raised in Skokie, Illinois. Now he is trying to make it as 
a standup comic and he looks like this [pause… Azhar’s image appears on the 
screen]: Azhar Usman! He is a devout Muslim. Question: Does a guy who looks 
like this have any chance of making it in standup? Or when you first saw this did 
you think, just for a moment, “terrorist,” “Taliban”? (ABC Nightline, March 17, 
2005, 11:30pm) 
 
The Nightline people were not totally wrong. Azhar himself jokes that when he 
walks on the street, people who see him feel shocked and whisper to each other: 
“Osaaama, Saddaam, Talibaaan, Obama!” He goes on, 
I am glad that you guys are laughing. Sometimes I am on stage and people are 
scared. People are looking at me as if I am responsible for 9/11. Can you believe 




Azhar Usman’s “Muslim shtick” pokes fun at both the Muslim community and 
the larger society. The second half of his routine that evening was devoted to jokes about 
various ethnicities. He would ask, “Any Malaysians in the house? any Egyptians? any 
Pakistanis?” etc. then poke fun at a cultural element specific to that group. His own 
ethnic background (Indian) informs a significant portion of his ethnic jokes. I have 
observed, however, that he tailors his ethnic jokes to his audience. 
 What looms largest in Azhar’s performance is his airport jokes. If Azhar Usman 
himself is the very model of a post-9/11 Muslim standup comedian, his jokes about the 
airport experience are the epitome of today’s emergent Muslim comedy. 
My least favorite thing about being a comedian is all the traveling. That’s right. 
The moment I have to walk into the airport. Heads turn simultaneously. The 
security… [As though speaking into a walkie-talkie] ‘We got a Mohammad at 4 
o’clock.’ ‘Can I see your ID, please?’ ‘We’ll need to do an extra security check.’ 
Even worse is the moment I have to get onto the plane. That’s right. People are 
shocked. They are in the middle of a conversation. “So where are you from…?” 
And then they suddenly see me. [slightly hysterical voice] ‘Oh my God! I’m 
gonna die. [desperate whisper into cell phone] Honey, I love you. He is s-o-o 
hairy. 
 
 [Here Azhar takes a break from the drama and complains to his audience:] 
I don’t really understand why these people are so scared of me. I don’t get it. Just 
think about it: if I were the crazy Muslim planning to hijack the plane, this is 
totally not the disguise I would be in. [pirouetting his large, bearded self around 
the stage] It doesn’t exactly slip me under the radar. 
 
[He concludes his flight story with exaggerated relief] 
Of course, once the plane safely lands, they are just looking over smiling. Ha haa 
ha. I am waiting for one real honest passenger to come up to me at the end of the 
flight… He says, “Excuse me sir, I thought you were gonna kill us. Ha ha. Sorry 
about that. Ha ha. Remember when you got up to go to bathroom? I was gonna 




This joke provides a perfect illustration of the Muslim airport experience, where 
the negative charisma of being Muslim assumes full transparency. At the airport, those 
who have so far (i.e., in the city, at the ticket counter, etc.) been treated equally suddenly 
become suspect. Before they enter the airport they may be outside the definition of the 
nation, but they are still protected by the law; that is, still inside the state. But when they 
walk into the airport— where internal and external meet and where external (state) 
borders are now internalized (Balibar 2004: 1)— they suddenly feel their protected status 
begin to evaporate. Now they risk falling outside of both the nation and the state. Even 
those Muslims who do not consider themselves particularly profiled or discriminated 
against in everyday life suddenly begin to feel uneasy. They enter into communitas 
(Turner 1969), becoming occupants of an anti-structure where they lack any status.97 The 
metal detectors turn citizens into naked bodies, at least electronically. Strip search and 
other security rites of passage through the border show them the hard edge of the nation. 
For Muslim citizens, the disjuncture between the nation and the state reaches its 
peak— at least psychologically— at the airport, because there they find themselves 
exiting the state at a time when they are already excluded from the nation. At that 
moment they become aware of the sovereignty beyond law, something experienced in its 
pure form in prison camps such as Guantanamo Bay. In short, at the airport, Muslims 
come face to face with the nation without the protections of the state. They fear and 
tremble.98 This existential anxiety affects both sides: it brings extra security checks and 
                                                 
97 Here is Turner’s definition of anti-structure: “Liminality, the optimal setting of communitas relations, 
and communitas, a spontaneously generated relationship between leveled and equal total and individuated 
human beings, stripped of structural attributes, together constitute what one might call “anti-structure” 
(Turner 1973: 216). 
98 Maysoon Zayid, a Palestinian-American comedian from New Jersey, describes how she hates flying out 
of Newark airport. “I have cerebral palsy,” says Zayid, “so when I walk in, security doesn’t just see an 
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profiling on the one hand and a sense of public and institutional discrimination, stress and 
insecurity on the other. 
The fear a Muslim inspires is associated with the unpredictability of his behavior. 
What if he is a terrorist? What if he hijacks the plane? What if he is only pretending to be 
normal? All these questions that citizens are asked to consider by the airport authorities 
transform the Muslim passenger in the eyes of his fellow travelers into a source of 
unpredictability and danger. When a Muslim like Azhar Usman gets onto the plane, faces 
fall. Danger is imminent. The anxiety reaches new heights when the plane takes off. Up 
until take-off, the charisma and unpredictability of the Muslim has been contained in his 
body, but with take-off, it contaminates the entire plane. The sense of suspense and 
anxiety ends when the plane safely lands. The relief from danger is reflected on the 
passengers’ faces. People are laughing and almost thankful to the Muslim passenger for 
not doing what they feared he might do. Flying while Muslim thus becomes an extremely 
public event. 
Much more could be said in the way of interpretation. Let me emphasize here one 
other dimension of this type of jokes:  their remarkable transparency and universality. 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike can understand and laugh at airport and airplane jokes. 
They are simultaneously ethnic and national, particular and universal. As such, these 
jokes represent the comic surface where Muslim and American experiences intersect 
most “dangerously” and with full intelligibility.  
 
Axis of Evil 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arab. They see a shaking Arab. ‘She’s nervous!’ “And I’m afraid of flying so I’m crying. So now, I’m a 
crying, shaking Arab. ‘She’s guilty!’” 
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The Axis of Evil comedy tour started in November 2005 and gained national 
recognition with an appearance on Comedy Central on March 10, 2007. The group also 
put out a DVD in 2007 which features Maz Jobrani, Ahmed Ahmed, Aron Kader, and 
guest member Dean Obeidallah. They perform on a stage festooned with nuclear warning 
signs and each comedian is frisked by a tough-looking female security screener in full 
TSA regalia as he steps onto the stage. Maz Jobrani is an Iranian-American and jokes 
about the Iranian accent and the Iranian diaspora’s tendency to call themselves “Persians” 
to distance themselves from contemporary Iran. In explaining his reason for becoming a 
comedian, Jobrani talks about how the only available roles for Middle Easterners in 
Hollywood are as terrorists. He says that after several such stints (including one with 
Chuck Norris) he decided not to take those parts any longer and took to stand-up instead. 
Ahmed Ahmed is an Egyptian-American who also had an acting career in 
Hollywood. He was similarly dissatisfied with the parts available to Middle Eastern 
actors. Ahmed’s routine typically revolves around the absurdities of the security check at 
the airport. He says that his name matches one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists. So 
each time he goes to the airport he has to go through extra security checks. He says, 
It is a bad time to be from the Middle East. I read a statistic on CBS.com. Right 
after 9/11 hate crimes against Arabs, Middle Eastern people and Muslims went up 
over 1000 %. Apparently that puts us in the fourth place behind blacks, gays and 
Jews. You guys know this? We are still in the fourth place. So what do we have to 
do to be number one in something? 
 
Ahmed Ahmed notes that often people don’t believe that he is a comedian. 
Especially when the airport security staff ask him what he does for a living. They always 
say, “So tell us a joke.” He replies, “Well, I just graduated from flight school.” Once on 
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board, Ahmed looks around the plane. “Do you know who the air marshal is on the 
plane? The guy reading People magazine upside down while keeping an eye on me.” 
Aron Kader is a Palestianian-American whose mother is Mormon. His jokes 
include impersonations of President Bush and accent jokes about his cousin in Jordan. He 
pokes fun at anti-American sentiment in the Middle East and uses relatively vulgar 
language. Unlike Jobrani and Ahmed, Aron Kader looks more white than Middle Eastern. 
He also talks about how he is often thought to be Jewish because of his first name.  
Dean Obeidallah is perhaps the most interesting member of the group. Growing 
up in northern New Jersey, Obeidallah had an Arab father and an Italian mother. Despite 
the fact that his father was an immigrant, he never considered himself a minority. Like 
Kader, he looks white and his re-discovery of his ethnic identity is a post-9/11 
phenomenon. He is another cultural entrepreneur who has used his newly found ethnicity 
to reinvent his comic career. In his routine, Obeidallah criticizes the backlash against 
people of Middle Eastern backgrounds. Referring to a recent movie title, he claims that 
these days the idea of “Middle Easterners on a plane” scares people more than snakes. 
People are afraid of us because they don’t know who we are. There are only two 
news stories about us. Bad story: We are terrorists. Good story:  We are alleged 
terrorists. I see other minorities and I am jealous. They get a whole month that 
celebrates their heritage. Black history month, Asian awareness month. Hispanic 
awareness month. What do we get? We get ORANGE ALERT! 
 
The No-Joke Zone: Airport as Stage 
An interesting outcome of the securitization of society is the ban on jokes at the 
airport. Making jokes in the security check area at the airport is strictly prohibited and 
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punishable by law.99 This particular ban makes airports a unique place in the national 
space. Airports are the internal borders of the nation. As entry and exit points to the 
nation, airports provide us a unique perspective on questions of sovereignty and identity. 
The enforcement of no-joke zones at the airports after the tragedy of 9/11 is thus 
indicative of the paradoxical connection between the tragic and the comic.  
An equally interesting development is the attempt on the part of Muslim ethnic 
comedians to turn the stage into a symbolic airport space. They do so not only by 
drawing much of their material from their experiences at the airport but also by literally 
entering the stage in a mock ritual (anti-rite) of passing through the scanner and being 
frisked by mock TSA staff. Axis of Evil’s famous performance on Comedy Central is the 
best example but not the only one. Similarly, in one of his performances with comedian 
Rabbi Bob Alper, Azhar Usman and Alper patted one another down as they took turns at 
the microphone (The two comedians have toured together across the country, doing 
shows on college campuses and at Muslim and Jewish religious centers. I saw them in 
Detroit at a Wayne State University program cosponsored by the Muslim Students’ 
Association and Hillel.) 
The turning of airports into no-joke zones and the turning of the Muslim comic 
zone into a symbolic airport are two expressions of a single undercurrent. They are also 
symptomatic of the Dionysian continuum of fear and laughter or the existential continuity 
between insecurity and relief. What links the no-joke zone to the comic stage is what 
links the tragedy of 9/11 to the emergence of Muslim comedy. 
                                                 
99 According to a statement released in March 11, 2004, by the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) “in 
January (2004) a 21-year-old woman was jailed for joking about bombs in her luggage.” The TSA Press 





Themes and Audiences 
The jokes that Muslim standup comedians make can be classified broadly into 
two groups: in-group jokes and out-group jokes. In-group jokes require some cultural 
literacy on the part of the audience. Such jokes are possible only when the out-group, 
mainstream culture, is used as a background. For example, a joke about Muslims’ fear of 
being caught with one foot in the sink by their employer requires knowledge of Muslim 
ritual washing before the five daily prayers⎯ but it would not be funny to Muslims living 
in Muslim societies. This joke is an in-group joke for Muslims who live in a non-Muslim 
society. The same can be said about one of the jokes by Azeem, another African-
American Muslim comedian. When he tells his grandmother, “Grandma, I can’t eat that 
pork. I’m Muslim,” his grandma says, “No you ain’t! You ain’t never been to jail.” This 
joke won’t be intelligible to most immigrant Muslims, although it is fully intelligible to 
indigenous Muslims and even many non-Muslim Americans. To make sense of the joke, 
one has to be familiar with the experience of Black Muslims or the Nation of Islam and 
their strong connection to prison ministries.  
There is a difference between humor in front of an all-Muslim audience and 
humor in front of a non-Muslim audience. The latter has a narrower window of encounter 
(terrorism). Whereas the former can exploit internal issues and differences (e.g., Azhar 
Usman’s bit about the twenty ways of saying as salamu alaikum).  
The sphere of jokes that has maximum transparency for a general audience deals 
mostly with airports and terrorism. With such jokes the Muslim comic disappears into the 
laughter he or she generates in both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences. As one moves 
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away from this sphere, the mutual transparency diminishes. For example, when Azhar 
Usman performed in one of Chicago’s major stand-up venues before a large non-Muslim 
audience, many of his jokes failed to generate laughter. One can also speak of a certain 
‘attention span’ which determines the ‘shelf life’ of a joke. Although with 9/11 Muslim 
comedians grabbed America’s attention, they could not hold that attention for long. The 
window of opportunity for a Muslim comic is limited to a narrow range of issues and as 
soon as he runs out of those jokes, the Muslim comic becomes opaque and falls back to 
the sphere of irrelevant otherness. 
Part of the problem seems to be that Muslim comedy is all based on an appeal to 
commonality with an audience who is assumed to be “the other.” The comics often start 
with a given difference (the stereotype of Muslims as radically different) and try to show 
similarity. Instead of saying “look, these ‘stupid’ people think I am this and that, so they 
are stupid,” they usually say “they did this and that thinking I am such and such but look, 
I am really just like you.” Because American society is accustomed to viewing him as 
outlandish,  the “extraodinary” Muslim becomes funny when he does something ordinary 
(e.g., when the backyard explosion turns out to be a barbecue and not a bomb). This 
approach is certainly part of turning the symbolic order upside down, but it has a very 
limited scope. 
Now that we have briefly surveyed the landscape of Muslim standup comedy, let 






Theories of Comedy 
Most of the works on comedy, including extant sociological ones, tend to simply 
list various theories of comedy, humor and laughter (Morreal 1983, Koller 1988, Berger 
1997, Rappoport 2005).100 In such theories, the role of the context within which ethnic 
comedy takes place is often neglected. Yet this aspect, I believe, opens the way for a 
distinctively sociological take on ethnic comedy. Sociological explanation and 
interpretation thus goes beyond biological and psychological explanations.  
Aware of the fact that we laugh at so many diverse situations, scholars of humor 
have found it “almost impossible to come up with a single formula that would cover all 
cases of laughter” (Morreal 1983: 1). As a result, what has been circulating in the 
literature as theories of comedy are actually mid-way classifications (Weberian ideal 
types) of comic situations. Humor, it seems, does not lend itself to a singular theorization. 
My task here is more specific and less ambitious than an overall theorization of comedy. 
What I offer is a sociological theory of ethnic comedy, a theory that appears to be absent 
in the humor literature in general and sociological studies in particular. 
Before presenting my own articulation of a theory of ethnic comedy, let me first 
briefly describe existing theories of comedy. These theories in many ways complement 
rather than compete with one another. Nevertheless, one looks in vain to find a 
convincing integration of them that is distinctively sociological. 
The first theory is known as superiority theory. I call this the political explanation. 
This ancient theory has been around since Plato and Aristotle and was most famously 
formulated by Hobbes as “sudden glory”. Laughter is seen as a means of expressing 
                                                 
100 For the purposes of this chapter, I do not distinguish between comedy, humor and laughter. Although 
there are some nuances in usage, I will not engage in a terminological discussion here due to my special 
focus on “ethnic comedy” and limitations of space. 
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superiority over other people. Such laughter can be aggressive and is certainly self-
celebratory. For our purposes here, the main insight of the superiority theory of humor is 
the idea of relationality (Bourdieu’s discussion of aesthetic judgment in Distinction 
provides a parallel here). Superiority theory acknowledges both power differential and 
relationality between two parties. 
The second and by far more important theory is the incongruity theory. We can 
comfortably consider this a cultural theory. This theory, which has much greater 
explanatory power than the first, sees humor as an outcome of inconsistent, unexpected 
acts and conditions. For example, Pascal, one of the early proponents of this view, argues 
that “nothing produces laughter more than a surprising disproportion between that which 
one expects and that which one sees” (Morreal 1983: 16). Similarly Schopenhauer 
describes laughter as happening in situations marked by “the sudden perception of 
incongruity between a concept and things themselves” (Schopenhauer 1966: 91). As 
Morreal puts it, summarizing Schopenhauer’s perspective: “what causes laughter is a 
mismatch between conceptual understanding and perception” (Morreal 1983: 18). Here a 
concept is general and lumps together unique and particular things as if they were 
identical instantiations of that concept. All concepts do violence to the uniqueness of the 
things they claim to represent. This is a problem intrinsic to any abstraction (Nietzsche 
2006: 117, Simmel 1950: 63). As such it demands refutation or rectification. One way to 
cure it is through (comic) treatment. The discrepancy between our mental structures 
(theories) and the realities of the practical world (facticity) is bridged in the act of 
laughter. That’s why, according to Kierkegaard, what lies at the root of the comic 
phenomenon is the discrepancy, the contradiction (Kierkegaard 1992: 82). Laughter, one 
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may argue, is a product of the sudden recognition of this very gap. In this accidental 
encounter between practice (Bourdieu) or experience (Simmel) and the abstract 
metaphysics, an everyday version of destruction of metaphysics (what Derrida calls 
deconstruction) takes place. Is not comedy nothing but a comic deconstruction? 
The third prominent theory of humor is called the relief theory. A psychological 
theory, relief theory is best formulated in the approach of Sigmund Freud. Relief theory 
emphasizes the cathartic release from repression. In Civilization and Its Discontents, 
Freud explores the psychic cost of civilization (i.e., society) for individuals. He identifies 
the overwhelming power and expansion of reality principle over pleasure principle as the 
main cause for the unhappiness of modern man (Freud 1961: 22). In comedy the 
relationship is reversed. We revert to the pleasure principle, albeit temporarily. In his 
discussion of jokes, Freud also links jokes to the unconscious and draws attention to the 
economy of psychic energy in the repression of emotions (the id) by the superego. “In 
‘The Interpretation of Dreams’(1900) and ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious,’” Freud argues that the “manifest content of dreams and jokes yield 
pleasure through their disguised expression of unconscious wishes, resulting in partial 
lifting of repression and an economic expenditure of psychic energy” (Bergmann 1999: 
3). 
The closest to sociological perspectives on comedy are those provided by cultural 
anthropologists. Mary Douglas in particular draws attention to the importance of context 
in making sense of comic experience. The funniness of jokes depends on the context in 
which they are deployed (Douglas 1975). Both Mary Douglas and Victor Turner (1969), 
two prominent anthropologists working within the Durkheimian tradition, therefore 
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rightly point to the margins and to liminality as the location of humor. Comedy is an anti-
rite presented in a ritual, an anti-structure imagined as an alternative structure. Let me 
clarify these two points. Comedy turns the world upside down by showing the audience 
the view from the other side. The majority’s vision (structure) is temporarily and 
imaginarily relegated to the status of anti-structure while the minority’s vision (anti-
structure) is elevated to the status of structure. In this reversal of symbolic order, the 
minority is released from social classifications (e.g., stereotypes) and the majority is 
given the opportunity to feel like the minority (Douglas 1975: 103, Berger 1997: 72).  
The idea of reversal of symbolic order is of crucial importance for understanding 
the structural dimensions of ethnic comedy. Often perceived as a reversal of the 
relationship between the rational and the irrational, comic vision does indeed thrive on 
the discrepancies and interplay of two forces. For Nietzsche, these two forces were the 
Apollonian and Dionysian principles. The former is associated with structure, rationality 
and seriousness and the latter with anti-structure, emotions and laughter (one cannot but 
remember Nietzsche’s Gay Science as a revolt against rationalism). Both Plato in his cave 
metaphor and Nietzsche in his Dionysian language invite us to such a reversal of the 
order. This Dionysian element in Greek tradition is continued by the Roman festival of 
Saturnalia (Nietzsche 2006: 122) and extends into the present day in the many versions of 
Carnival. Mikhail Bakhtin famously observed that in carnivals and other rites of passage, 
the ordinary world is turned upside down (Bakhtin 1968, Brottman 2004: 150, Berger 
1997: 21). Laughter is therefore “one of the essential forms of truth concerning the world 
as a whole…. It is a peculiar point of view relative to the world… Certain essential 
aspects of the world are accessible only to laughter” (Bakhtin 1968: 20).  
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An important insight of the scholarship on the comic phenomenon is the idea that 
it is a particular worldview. Comic vision reveals a reality different from commonsense 
reality. It is thus a “worldview” in two senses: it reveals another world and it is the ability 
to see differently. The comic vision’s ability to reveal reality is a theme that deserves 
further discussion. 
In a famous piece, “On Multiple Realities,” Alfred Schutz distinguishes between 
commonsense reality (“the paramount reality of the everyday life”) and other realities 
(“finite provinces of meaning”) (Schutz 1962: 207). We leap from one world into another 
when we start to daydream, for example. Or we slip into another when we fall asleep.  
Here, commonsense reality is objective in that it is shared by multiple social 
actors and is thoroughly sedimented in the language and everyday symbolic structures. 
Other realities, however, remain subjective and partial. The comic as an alternative 
reality transcends the reality of the ordinary and is capable of seeing things from a certain 
distance. What is crucial here is the relationship between vision and distance. Those who 
are in a condition of seeing things differently are more likely to generate humor. Behind 
the large body of Jewish humor lies the Jewish experience of marginality vis-à-vis 
societies in which they lived (Rappoport 2005: 66, Berger 1997: xvii). Simmel’s famous 
social type, the stranger, represents this ability to be both near and far and to be able to 
stay attached to the mainstream vision and withdraw back to the ethnic vision (Simmel 






A Phenomenological Theory of Ethnic Comedy 
As noted earlier, theoretical works on comedy⎯ let alone ethnic comedy⎯ are 
few and far between. The volumes upon volumes of popular books on ethnic comedy, not 
surprisingly, do not have a theoretical agenda (Lowe 1986). Unfortunately, the few 
sociological treatments of comedy that do exist (Koller 1988) are not particularly 
theoretical. John Morreal’s alternative to existing theories (humor as “pleasant 
psychological shift”) still remains psychological (Morreal 1983: 38). Even Peter Berger, 
who is fully equipped with the insights of phenomenological sociology, somehow leaves 
the sociological dimension of comedy undertheorized in his otherwise very original and 
entertaining book (Berger 1997). As others have noted (Fine 1998: 383), a sociological 
discussion of comedy needs to combine the different theories of comedy which have been 
developed from non-sociological perspectives and then go beyond them. 
In this part of my discussion, I propose a sociological theory of ethnic comedy. 
My aim is to build a structural framework for understanding the comic phenomenon. In 
this endeavor, I draw on Simmel’s distinction between subjective and objective cultures. 
In his writings on the crisis of modern culture, he argues that in modern times we are 
experiencing a cultural crisis because the equilibrium between subjective culture and 
objective culture has been lost (Simmel 1971: 227-234, Simmel 1997). What Simmel 
says about the relationship between the individual and modern society can be said as well 
of the relationship between (ethnic) minorities and (national) majorities. In the beginning, 
a minority group’s subjective culture (an internal culture) has not yet been harmonized or 
synchronized with the objective culture, a culture which is external to them. The 
discrepancy between their subjective culture and the (objective) culture of the majority 
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gives rise to incongruities and becomes a fertile ground for humor. Simmel’s objective 
and subjective cultures correspond to Alfred Schutz’s categories of “paramount reality” 
(i.e., everyday reality) and “finite provinces of meaning” respectively. 
The relationship between the new minority and the majority, to use the terms of 
figurationist sociologist Norbert Elias, is the relationship between the established and the 
outsider (Elias 1994). In the following outline of a theory of ethnic comedy I add a 
phenomenological dimension to the combined insights of Simmel and Elias.101 In 
addition to the relative power and relationality of parties that are central to the arguments 
of Simmel and Elias, I introduce two considerations of context. Location and temporality 
are two indispensable elements in making sense of the rise and disappearance of ethnic 
comedy.102 This rise and later disappearance of ethnic comedy is also an instance of the 
emergence of a group charisma and its later routinization. 
Let me start with the most basic condition of possibility for ethnic comedy. There 
has to be two different visions: the vision of the (ethnic or religious) minority and that of 
the majority. These are not the same. Had they been the same, we would not be able to 
speak of a minority and a majority, which are residual categories of each other. By vision, 
here, I am referring to a situated perspective and a particular perception of reality. The 
space for stereotypes is opened by the discrepancy between these two visions or 
perceptions of reality. It is the difference between a group’s self-perception and the way 
the group is perceived by others. Otherwise, prejudices would not stay as prejudice but 
                                                 
101 It is worth noting that the theoretical affinities between Simmel and Elias are not accidental. Elias 
(together with Kurt H. Wolff) was a student of Karl Mannheim, who in turn was a student of Simmel. 
 
102 As Randall Collins points out, “Sociological theory does not pay enough attention to the dynamics of 
processes over time. We tend to be stuck in a meta-theoretical dichotomy between static comparisons of 
how structures hang together and an actor-centered view of fluid action. But processes have shapes in time, 
patterns of intensity, rapid shifts, and gradual declines, which sweep people up at one moment and bring 
them down at another” (Collins 2004: 53). 
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would become correct judgments. That is to say, when the gap between the two visions⎯ 
between stereotype and reality⎯ is fully bridged, both ethnicity and comedy disappear. If 
so, when does ethnic comedy emerge?  
People usually don’t make fun of people about whom they know nothing (hence 
there are no American jokes about Peruvians or Uzbeks). For ethnic jokes to emerge 
there has to be some contact. Real or imaginary, experiential or abstract, it is this contact 
that first opens the door for typification and opinion-formation. But if the group is known 
too well and fully assimilated, we cannot speak of ethnic comedy either. Assimilation in 
this case means not the disappearance of group identity, but the loss of “stranger” status. 
The temporality that flattens a joke (especially when it is told a third time) also flattens 
the ethnicity of a group as it gradually moves from outsider to insider position. Ethnic 
humor, therefore, is by definition an intracultural or subcultural phenomenon. We don’t 
have German ethnic comedy in America any longer. Instead we have jokes about 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Indo-Pakistanis. Such new ethnicities are usurping the 
visibility that once belonged to Italians, Poles and Irish. In short, ethnic comedy emerges 
when the ethnic group is like an iceberg in relation to the majority. The tip of the iceberg 
represents the zone of familiarity and contact. It has to be big enough. The part under the 
water represents the zone of unfamiliarity and exclusivity. In the beginning the iceberg is 
under the water and there is no ethnic comedy. When its tip surfaces (a form of intrusion) 
and catches attention, it generates comedy. But when its body is fully displayed it loses 
its magic (i.e., ethnic and comic character), it starts to melt away, if we are to follow up 
on our metaphor here.  
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Therefore, the ethnic group in question first of all has to acquire a relevant 
otherness. Irrelevant otherness does not generate jokes. It is the combination of otherness 
and relevance (the terrorists lurking among us, the Mexican worker in our neighborhood, 
the Pakistani computer engineer in the next cubicle) that generates jokes. Ethnic comedy 
is made across a boundary that separates us (majority) from them (minority). When that 
boundary is erased (including through comedy itself), otherness evaporates, despite 
continuing relevance. And so does the ethnic comedy that clings to it.  
When both groups share the same vision, their comedy is no longer “ethnic.” It is 
the gap between the two visions that makes each one funny from the other’s point of 
view.103 But when the object of comedy in one world (i.e. a minority’s internal joke) 
lacks a counterpart or resonance on the other side, it will not appear funny. One can think 
of in-group jokes by Muslim comedians that fail to generate laughter among audie
unfamiliar with Muslim culture. All funniness is subjective and can exist only for and 
according to a particular point of view, situated in place and time. No joke is 
“objectively” funny. An act or joke, always situated in place and time, is comical only to 
someone. This is similar to the role of intentionality in phenomenological theory, which 
holds that consciousness is always consciousness of something. This directedness is part 
of the comic experience. Something that looks incongruous and thus funny from one 
vantage point might look congruous and un-funny from another. Although as Heidegger 
points out we are always already “in the world,” still we have to start from somewhere. 
Later expansions of horizon and accumulation of knowledge are pathways opened from 
that starting point. Comedy “occurs” as one moves along (i.e., opens up) that pathway. 
nces 
                                                 
103 Bourdieu, in his The Weight of the World, for example, shows how people of different class and location 
backgrounds have incongruent views of the world (Bourdieu et al 2000). 
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To the extent that different people’s pathways overlap (in the form of common sense, 
doxa), they share a highway of everyday language and a collective attunement toward 
what might occur, be it comic or tragic.  
The degree of humor diminishes as you move away from the overlapping areas or 
contact zones of mutuality, toward the exclusive domains (Figure 6.1). In that regard, 
comedy is similar to aesthetic experience. It introduces the unseen, the unknown, 
surprise. The performance of ethnic comedy on stage is a collaboration in routinization of 
the charismatic. The ineluctable, the strange and incongruous particular is tamed, 
normalized, and neutralized under (and toward) the universal familiar. Ethnic comedy is 
unfamiliarity packaged in a box of familiarity, a glimpse of charisma before it is 
routinized. That is why its delivery  must be partial and gradual, so that it can be digested 
mentally and perceptually. It is also why the creator of ethnic jokes himself does not 
laugh at them: because they are not unfamiliar to him anymore. And for the same reason, 
most pieces of humor will have their full effect on an audience only once (because the 
joke exists only in statu nascendi). This rule holds not only for jokes, but for ethnic 
groups as well. Length-of-stay in American society, for example, is important because 
those who come later are likely to be the butt of jokes. This is best illustrated in the 
thriving sub-genre (among many ethnic communities, including Muslims) of “boater” 
jokes⎯ humor at the expense of those “fresh off the boat.” 
The work of comedy is therefore aesthetic. In the aesthetic experience we come 
across a surface which has been experienced but not yet conceptualized. Let me explain 
this point using Heideggerian terminology, which I am afraid itself often begs 
explanation⎯ but his writings on the work of art are of particular relevance here. 
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Heidegger defines art “as the becoming and happening of truth” because “art is by nature 
an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical” 
(Heidegger 1971: 69, 75). Ancient Greeks used the word techne to describe craft and art. 
In their world, Heidegger believes, art (techne) and truth (alethia) belonged together. 104 
The artist or comedian is someone who makes “truth as unconcealment” (alethia) 
happen. As a form of art, comedy is similar to poetry. “Poetry proper is never merely a 
higher mode of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a 
forgotten [i.e., routinized -MB] and therefore used-up poem” (Heidegger 1971: 205). As 
a result of this aesthetic incorporation of a foreign/new element, the language (i.e., 
culture) expands. Hence, the comedian is an artist, a Dionysian poet who brings forth 
new manifestations of being. The comic’s magic lies in the ability to pull us into an 
experience which lies beyond our conceptualized world of familiarity. In short, like all 
aesthetic experiences, comedy has both otherness (unfamiliarity) and relevance. 
Of course, one question that comes to mind is: why should the majority care about 
such comedy? Or to put it another way, what is it that links the two groups? What 
connects the two groups is care and concern. Here I use the concept of care in a 
Heideggerian sense, as the specifically human mode of being (Heidegger 1962: 225). It 
can be positive as in love and care or negative as in fear and anxiety. Care and concern 
delimit the surface of relevance105 and the zone of objects and themes. These objects and 
themes become the raw material for comedy. They can be taken up by an ethnic 
                                                 
104 Heidegger argues that “the word techne denotes rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have 
seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present, as such. For Greek thought 
the nature of knowing consists in alethia, that is, in the uncovering of beings. Techne, as knowledge 
experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth present beings as such 
beings out of concealedness” (Heidegger 1971: 75). 
105 Alfred Schutz also pays particular attention to the importance of relevance in the constitution of our 
(multiple) worlds (Schutz 1962). 
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comedian to poke fun at the majority or by the majority to ridicule the minority. Fear and 
anxiety are similar to love and care in producing themes and objects of (selective) 
perception. Care and concern bring the other under our radar. The fear of the Muslim as a 
potential terrorist is precisely what creates room for him in the world of non-Muslims and 
thus opens the ground for Muslim comedy. Azhar Usman’s description of his experience 
at the airport starts with the fact that as soon as he steps into the airport “heads turn 
simultaneously.” A Muslim who could otherwise be completely ignored takes on 
charisma, albeit a negative charisma. Even when other citizens fail to pay attention to the 
Muslim individual, the airport announcements invite them to turn their radars on and 
search for suspicious behavior.106 In the face of such concern⎯ whether naturally arising  
or artificially provoked⎯  space is opened up for Muslims in the world of the average 
American. 
Because the Muslim entered the American imagination (most forcefully, in both 
senses of the word) through the hijacking of planes, the most effective jokes non-Muslim 
audiences hear from Muslim comedians are jokes that happen to be about aviation and 
airport security. Such jokes are fully transparent and make perfect sense to the non-
Muslim audience. They correspond to the tip of the iceberg. 
 
                                                 
106 Azhar Usman describes this experience with an almost existentialist punch line: “My least favorite thing 
about being comedian is all these traveling. That is right. The moment I have to walk to the airport. Heads 
are turned simultaneously. The security (officers speak: … we got Mohammad at 4 o’clock). Can I see your 
ID please. Later, of course, the worst thing is that they constantly repeat: “Please report any suspicious 
activity, please report any suspicious individuals.” Well, I am at the airport at this corner. I thought I saw 
this guy. He looks shady. I called the security guy, he said “ Sir, you are looking at the mirror.” Here 
Usman takes on the gaze/vision of the majority (the objective culture, that’s, majority’s subjective culture) 
and sees himself as an other. As himself (Azhar-in-himself) he sees the anxiety and gaze of the others but 
when he participates in the act of seeing like the majority, he turns himself into an object. Reflection in the 
mirror reflects the objectified subject. Azhar’s joke is also Lacanian in pointing to a mirror stage for 





Figure 7.1: The iceberg model of ethnic comedy. 
 
In other words, in the mutually engaged routinization of the new object, each 
vision is influenced and transformed by the other. We can therefore speak of a comic 
“surrender and catch,” a phrase Kurt Wolff devised to describe our immersion in 
experience and withdrawal to analytical objectification (Wolff 1991). This is also similar 
to the idea of pre-conceptual experience in Simmel and certainly the Dionysian element 
in Nietzsche. In the comic encounter, the ethnic comedian and his audience play 
Wittgensteinian “language-games.” A specific experience (strangeness) is baptized into 
normality through mutual witnessing. At the very moment of linguistic expression of a 
 254
 
life experience (what Wittgenstein himself calls life forms (Wittgenstein 1997)), language 
expands beyond its earlier limits. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant, along the same lines, 
defines beauty as the object of representation without concepts (Kant 1987: 53). It is the 
sighting of previously unseen surfaces that amazes and amuses us. 
Taking in a stereotype and giving back a joke not only produces laughter, which 
is a spark of the merging of two visions, but also has a leveling effect on people and their 
understandings. The subjective and objective cultures which are expressed by the two 
visions approach a certain balance, transparency, and correspondence under the 
jurisdiction of the comic operation.107 
In my theory of ethnic comedy, I attempt to integrate the three otherwise separate 
theories of comedy: superiority, incongruity and relief theories. Here centrality goes to 
incongruity theory and it remains the backbone of the model discussed above. However, 
it is supplemented by the relational and cathartic insights of the other two theories. 
Furthermore,  my theory is phenomenological and pays particular attention to questions 
of time and space.  
First, superiority theory provides the otherness necessary for the possibility of  
vision from the other side. The incongruity theory posits two visions of reality in a 
structural relationship that produces comedy. Finally, relief theory refers to the tension 
between these two visions. The comic relief is generated by the gradual fusion of these 
visions which produces sparks of laughter. The integration of the three theories would not 
be sufficient for our model, had we not included elements of space and time. The 
question of situated perspectives and different visions are absolutely central for such a 
                                                 
107 We can appropriate the notion of “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer 2004) here as “fusion of visions”. The 




theory building. Similarly, we have to recognize that not only a single joke but also the 
whole phenomenon of ethnic comedy is a temporal event. Muslim ethnic comedy is a 
product of a particular time (after 9/11) and place (in relation to American mainstream). 
As a temporal event ethnic comedy is a symptom of integration. The coming-
closer which gives rise to jokes and the consequent attrition of otherness eventually lead 
to incorporation. We are of course talking about domestic ethnic comedy and more 
specifically ethnic comedy in American society. (Comedy that pokes fun at external 
groups such as other nationalities has a different trajectory and as such is not part of this 
analysis.) 
 
Ethnic Comedy and Cultural Citizenship 
Given that comedy is both culture-specific and very local, is there an American 
Muslim culture which can produce its own comic manifestation? After all, ethnic comedy 
proceeds from ethnic culture. Muslim ethnic comedy in the United States is a symptom of 
the emergence of a Muslim ethnicity in America. One sees the signs of this process in the 
character of Muslim comedy. There is a Muslim in-group humor and a humor that is 
presented to outsiders or mixed audiences. The Muslim comedy that appears on stage has 
a very short shelf life. It is so perishable because the window of recognition for Muslims 
within the landscape of American society is still small and confined to terrorism and 
aviation. Over the last couple of years, my observation has been that Muslim comics are 
expanding their spectrum of jokes as they try to reach larger audiences. Presidential 
campaigns and national politics offer one such avenue. 
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Nevertheless, there is a more crucial point with respect to Americanization. As 
others have argued, ethnic humor is part of the Americanization process (Lowe 1986: 
19). Muslim comedy existed as an immigrant ethnic comedy and as an in-group 
phenomenon prior to 9/11. However, pan-Muslim ethnic comedy, which is best 
illustrated by Allah Made Me Funny, is a by-product of 9/11, where the outsider audience 
is pulled into the theater of Muslim comedy. Such comedy also benefits from a trend 
triggered by 9/11 known as “Muslim first” (Naber 2005). Being Muslim became the 
primary identification for many Muslim ethnicities. Muslimness provides a larger 
community and visible victimhood that generates recognition. Pan-Muslim ethnic 
comedy addresses this new audience.  
One of the functions of ethnic comedy is as a form of cultural mediation (Mintz 
1985: 71). But it takes place within a “time bubble” (Collins 2004) and is closely linked 
to the life chances of the ethnic group in question. Not only an individual joke but also 
the entire ethnic humor of a particular group has a temporal character. If repetition of a 
joke blunts its power and newness, so does prolonged encounter with an ethnic/religious 
group blunts ethnic comedy, because it saps its otherness and unfamiliarity. That which is 
familiar is no longer incongruent.108  
Ethnic comedy or the comic operation as a form of interaction is a cultural stitch. 
What happens in ethnic comedy is that the comedian takes a stereotype (a synthetic form 
produced by the objective culture of the majority) and plays on it (adds to it his subjective 
culture, his concrete facticity) and finally gives it back to society through laughter. It is 
no wonder that ethnic comedy is often celebrated for its “healing” capacity. It soothes 
                                                 
108 What remains is actually mainstream comedy still labeled as ethnic as in the case of Jewish and African-




people. By undoing otherness, ethnic comedy lifts, albeit temporarily, the restrictive 
limits on the self and abolishes the gulf that separates the in-group from the out-group. It 
provides a relief from social classifications, which are often oppressive of the minority 
group. As such it is also a psychoanalytical operation: it makes one’s own what was once 
perceived as external. The self is redeployed in such a way that it now includes the 
former other. Boundaries are blurred. How does this inclusion happen? The ability of 
comedy to disclose the rock bottom of our identities as “human” plays a significant role 
in showing commonality under the surface of “difference.” That comedy reveals our 
humanity is well illustrated by a statement by Jewish comic Rabbi Bob Alper, who said 
after his performance with Azhar Usman in Detroit in April 1, 2008, “You can’t hate the 
person you’ve laughed with.” One of the reactions Usman said he received from a non-
Muslim audience during his tour across America is similarly worth quoting: “I didn’t see 
you as a Muslim, I saw you as a human being.” 
 
Conclusion 
The tragedy of 9/11 focused America’s attention on the Muslim minority. It 
created unprecedented visibility. It also opened up the space for Muslim comedy. After 
all, Muslim ethnic comedy is exploiting that attention in a way that is beneficial to both 
parties. Laughing about the ways of Muslim people in America helps blur the lines that 
separate Muslims from other Americans. Its basic message is that we are all human. It 
shows that Muslims are not that different from the rest of humanity and therefore merit 
compassion and understanding. 
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The ironic humor which characterizes Muslim comedy “acknowledges certain de-
humanizing, life-threatening circumstances and seeks to transform them into something 
human” (Koller 1988: 10). If humor is a distortion of reality, those whose reality is 
already distorted by stereotypes must resort to humor to rectify them. Humor becomes a 
means of undoing otherness. By re-humanizing Muslims in the eyes of non-Muslim 
Americans, Muslim comedy heals the effects of the neurosis triggered by 9/11 which has 
left Muslims outside the definition of the nation. The very crisis that cast Muslims away 
from the American mainstream becomes a means of re-integrating them. Muslim comedy 
provides another instance of what I have elsewhere called “negative incorporation.” 
Finally, Muslim ethnic comedy is a symptom of Muslims’ Americanization. It reflects the 



















Conclusion: American Life and Muslim Forms 
 
 
Community and Crisis 
Discrimination against Muslims and their growing exclusion in the aftermath of 
9/11 have forged a distinct American Muslim identity out of a plethora of ethnic, racial 
and diasporic groups. The crisis has given a history, an orientation, in short a relative 
coherence to the otherwise fragmented Muslims of the United States. This coherence has 
been a painful one: while 9/11 has given Muslims a common ground and unprecedented 
public visibility, they have come at a high cost in human suffering. 
Insofar as one can allow sweeping generalizations, 9/11 has opened a wide track 
of integration. I call this path to integration negative incorporation. By placing Muslims 
(or more precisely, the imaginary or real threat emanating from them) front and center, 
9/11 forced Americans to think about and deal with Islam in their conversations around 
the dinner table, in the glare of the mass media and under the scrutiny of government 
agencies. One consequence of 9/11 for the larger public was that it  put Muslims on the 
agenda. It sensitized the law and classificatory systems to Muslim identity by forcing 
Muslims to make pleas to multiple audiences: to the law, to other faith communities, and 
to a general sense of humanity. Another consequence for Muslims themselves is that it 
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accelerated the autonomization of American Islam from its imaginary or real origins 
elsewhere (e.g., in the Middle East).  
 
Origins of Values 
 An interesting turn of events is that 9/11 has placed Muslims, most of whom are 
newcomers to America, in the forefront of the struggle for civil rights in contemporary 
American society. Muslims have found themselves speaking the language of law and 
rights in ways that look almost awkward. As if they were freshmen in a school that grants 
a degree in human and civil rights. Yet it is a school whose graduating cohorts may well 
have forgotten the lessons they once learned. In any case, Muslims nowadays speak the 
language of American law and universal human rights. It puts them in an, at times, 
uneasy alliance with progressive groups such as homosexuals, feminists and anti-war 
activists. Muslims often have ambivalent feelings towards their new friends. At a time 
when they desperately need to build alliances, they are torn between such progressive 
groups and the conservative discourses of morality and family values. Muslims might 
find themselves caught up in the debate over abortion, normally a very marginal and 
unpoliticized theme in the Muslim imagination. Are we going to see a situation where 
every Muslim happens to be a liberal (as with earlier Jewish and Catholic cohorts)? Or 
will we see Muslims closing ranks around an American identity defined by conservative 
values? 
 Values arise out of experience. They do not, as we tend to think, circulate as 
universally acceptable and appreciable norms. As Hans Joas notes, “Our commitment to 
values is based on our experiences, not our knowledge of them.” The ease and eagerness 
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with which American Muslims approach democracy is a case in point. American Muslim 
experience challenges the conclusions that assume an inherent incompatibility between 
Islam and democracy. 
 The implications of American Muslims’ apparent success in articulating a 
harmony between Islam and democratic values are not merely theoretical. Once they gain 
self-confidence, American Muslims may become an important agent in influencing the 
discourse of the Muslim world. Indeed, they could become a new marketing force for 
domestic American values at a time when America’s own foreign policy experts have 
long since lost interest, if they ever had it, in promoting democracy in the Muslim world.  
  
Muslim Life in American Forms 
 Second generation and convert Muslims frequently distinguish between “cultural 
Islam” and “true Islam,” or more generally between “culture” and “religion”. I always 
find this distinction to be a powerful discursive device. It allows them to dissociate what 
they consider “pure Islam” or the “essence of religion” from the cultural forms and 
practices associated with it. A religious Muslim woman criticizing the patriarchal 
practices of not-so-religious immigrant parents or an African American imam ridiculing 
the Saudi Arabian policy of not allowing women to drive are just two examples. This 
immanent critique is not unique to American Muslims. Islam has crossed many cultural 
boundaries through such constant re-interpretation, a point that most of the current calls 
for reform in Islam seem to miss. 
  My research on Islam in America has shown me that context considerably skews 
the content. This of course is no news to students of the sociology of knowledge or 
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adherents to the constructionist view of reality. But here I would like to draw attention to 
something more specific. Islam is not rebuilt anew in America. It draws upon the same 
vocabulary of Islamic images and symbols available everywhere, but it emphasizes 
different words of that vocabulary. Dormant concepts are revitalized, while some active 
elements may be put to sleep. This happens at an unconscious level, in response to the 
social and historical environment. Let me give a few examples. 
 The figure of Abraham, who is unavoidably present in Muslim ritual prayers but 
yet does not occupy a central place in Muslim self-perception, gains centrality in 
American Muslim discourse. In a similar vein, many Muslims would say that the legacy 
of Muslim Spain does not necessarily represent the high point of Muslim religious 
history. For many Muslims (certainly the orthodox), it can very well be seen as a period 
of degeneration. Not because Muslims do not value the pluralism and religious tolerance 
of that period, but because that dimension is not their main criterion. In Muslim contact 
zones, whether in America or elsewhere, such elements gain new relevance and 
importance. Or sometimes non-issues like abortion and homosexuality (both of them 
mainly ignored in classical Muslim legal discourses) become hot issues. In yet another 
case, parallels are drawn between the frontier cultures of Western Islam (then Spain, now 
Europe and America), as if the Muslim owl of Andalusia had taken off from medieval 
times and landed in contemporary America. So a Muslim educational center in Virgina 
calls itself the University of Cordoba, and a multimedia company, a subdivision of the 
Zaytuna Institute in California, is named AlHambra Productions. Muslim parents in 
America name their sons Ibrahim, Joseph, and Adam and their daughters Maryam and 
Sarah (but not Hagar). As I noted in the chapter on the direction to Mecca, some early 
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Muslim immigrants in Dearborn met for prayer on Sundays. Today Muslims are debating 
the difficulties they face because of the lunar calendar. The conflict between the 
indeterminacy of the lunar year and the rhythms of capitalist lifestyle in America, which 
requires planning and scheduling, forces Muslims to adopt a scientific form of 
moonsighting in place of the “organic” one, where holidays begin with a new moon seen 
by the naked eye. Muslim temporality in America remains an unresolved problem. 
 Muslim life or habitus is a composite of boundary-forming, constitutive beliefs 
and values. The conditions of deployment of those beliefs and values depend on the 
context of their practice. When a Muslim immigrant relocates to America, this composite 
structure melts, but only partially. The old boundaries, no longer supported, turn into 
empty shells, while new boundaries cut through formerly uninterrupted areas. This whole 
process is the outpouring of a life, which so far has been contained in one form, into 
another. The process has temporal and spatial dimensions and takes place at both 
individual and communal levels. What I have called empty shells, the corpses of earlier 
form, are deconstructed by the children of immigrants through such distinctions as 
“cultural Islam” versus “pure Islam.” 
My point is this: Muslim life is being poured into an American mold. A new 
metaphysics of relevance and irrelevance punctuates the historical shape that American 
Islam takes today.  The forms that press themselves onto Muslim life as a result of 
various crises all contribute to the formation of a Muslim identity specific to America. 
The pain of discrimination mingles with the joys of freedom, and the fear spurred by 






The fate of this study is similar to that of its subject. The religious minority I 
studied is neither immigrant only nor convert only. Similarly this study is neither 
sociology of religion only nor immigration studies only. In this section, I will briefly 
touch upon some of the contributions this dissertation has aimed to make. 
I have drawn sociological attention to the airport as a site of identity and a rite of 
passage. Sociologists need to pay more attention to this long neglected space in which we 
all spend increasingly more time. 
My discussion of qibla in Chapter 2 is a contribution to the study of direction as a 
sub-field of space. More work needs to be done on this specific form of relationship 
between Muslims and with their spatial environments. 
In discussing the complicated nature of membership in contemporary liberal 
societies, I have highlighted the concept of cultural citizenship. The cultural dimension of 
membership in a polity is dependent on both state and nation,  on the market as well as on 
the community. Cultural citizenship goes beyond legal entitlements and sheds light on the 
psychic and everyday symbolic dimensions of membership in society. Furthermore, in 
exploring the multiple dimensions of citizenship as belonging, I have thematized inward 
processes as well as outward processes of citizenship. 
I believe that my discussion has underscored the relevance of temporality and 
context for understanding citizenship. Against abstract universalism and its claims of 
equality, a situated look at the protective mantle of citizenship reveals holes, tears and 
uneven surface in the reality of citizenship. 
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I have also developed some theoretical insights. I have drawn attention to 
negative charisma, a neglected dimension of Weberian “pure charisma.” In this way I 
have sought to link Weber and Turner as theorists of positive and negative charisma 
respectively. As my discussion has shown, charisma is not an exclusive property of 
individuals. Groups and spaces such as the Kaaba can also assume charisma. 
I have also distinguished between two types of symbolic violence: constitutive 
and repressive. These are past and present experiences of symbolic violence. In 
Bourdieu’s language, the first of my types of symbolic violence is habitus; the second 
corresponds to his symbolic violence. By making this distinction, I have re-interpreted 
and expanded Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic violence in a way that sheds new light on his 
other concepts. While I rely on some of Bourdiue’s theoretical constructs, I hope that my 
discussion has provided an implicit critique of Bourdieu’s reductionism, which translates 
everything to power. The centrality he gives to power is both very modern (western) and 
French (centralist).  
I hope that I have contributed to the revival of phenomenological sociology, a 
tradition whose richness has not been sufficiently appreciated. Symbolic interactionism is 
certainly not the only possible sociological appropriation of the phenomenological 
tradition in philosophy. I make the call for a new appropriation of phenomenology for 
sociological purposes partly because I believe phenomenological sociology is particularly 
useful in making sense of cultural conditions that involve non-Western worlds.  
By drawing on Simmel and Heidegger, I have defended the primacy of experience 
in the development of values. My discussion of the transformation of Muslim discourses 
on America provides a detailed illustration of how values arise as a result of experience. 
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Most classical sociologists were either philosophers or legal scholars. Today 
sociology seems to have forgotten these origins. I hope that this work has partly achieved 
one of its clandestine desires: re-linking philosophy and sociology.  
In a close encounter with ethnic comedy, I would like to think that I have 
produced a phenomenologically informed sociological theory of ethnic comedy. 
I have offered some preliminary insights into what I call agonistic sociology, 
where anomie, charisma and life are not treated as residuals but as starting points. This 
point has been previously made by Norbert Elias⎯ but only with respect to anomie⎯ in 
his critique of Merton’s misinterpretation of Durkheim. I suggest that we should extend 
this critique to the treatment of charisma and utter neglect of “life,” a Simmelian 
category. 
Unlike most (backlash) studies on the impact of 9/11 on American Muslims, I 
have explored the positive consequences of those tragic events. My investigation reveals 
the ways in which 9/11 has accelerated the formation of a distinctly American Muslim 
identity that defines itself in greater autonomy from the rest of the Muslim world. 
The field of American Muslim studies is a new one and there are many areas yet 
to be explored. Such areas of interest for future research include Muslim politicians in the 
U.S. Congress, questions of Muslim temporality and calender, the development of sharia-
compliant finance, practices and institutions of halal certification, Islamic fashion and 
lifestyle magazines, chaplaincy programs, and expanding media universes (including 
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